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ABSTRACT 
The profession of seafaring involves rest and sleep in a 24-hour-a-day work 
environment; obtaining sufficient sleep under such conditions is often 
difficult, and sleep loss and the need for sleep is often related to fatigue and 
contributory to accidents. Maritime incident reports form a rich source of 
human performance data with high face validity, however fatigue as 
contributory to human error is elusive, and direct evidence of accident 
causation is hard to come by. In Australia, the Australian Transportation 
Safety Board has responsibility to investigate incidents at sea. 
The present study aimed to identify evidence of time of day and sleep 
deprivation as factors that appear contributory to fatigue in "Incidents at 
Sea" reports. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the text of these 
reports were conducted using NUDIST®, categories were developed and 
patterns identified. 
The effect of time of day was identified from analysis of the conclusions of 
100 consecutive reports to determine the nature and distribution of 
behaviours associated with fatigue. Collisions and groundings were more 
prevalent during the early morning watches. Behaviours consistent with 
fatigue were identified, categorised and described for different times of the 
day with deficits in alertness predominating in the early morning watches 
and deficits in information processing predominating in the afternoon 
watches. 
.I 
The contribution of sleep deprivation and its relationship with fatigue and 
accidents was identified from analysis of the full text of 44 reports, which 
incorporated three levels of association of sleep with accident causation. The 
highest level establishes either being asleep, or being sleep deprived as causal 
to an accident. At an intermediate level, reference to the conflicting pressures 
-' of work and sleep suggests a work environment that is not conducive to 
obtaining sufficient sleep, and accident investigators were usually unable to 
link the watchkeeping environment with fatigue as a contributing factor. At 
the lowest level of association, reference is made to the integrated nature of 
sleeping and work on board. 
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Finally a model illustrating the relationships between sleep deprivation, time 
of day and fatigue behaviours in the maritime setting was proposed, 
providing accident investigators with a tool to assist with the identification of 
fatigue in their analyses of maritime incidents. In addition, this model would 
be useful in the education of maritime administrators and policy developers, 
shipping companies and seafarers. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purpose and introduction 
In Australia, the Marine Investigation Unit of the Australian Transportation 
Safety Board has statutory responsibility to investigate incidents at sea1 as 
defined in the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations and specified in the 
Navigation Act of 1912. Since 1991, this unit has published 152 Incidents at 
Sea reports and made available another 26 previously published reports. Full 
text of these reports is available from the Marine Incident Investigation's 
web site at <http:/ /www.atsb.gov.au/marine/incident/index.cfm>. An 
example of an Incident at Sea report is given in Appendix 1. 
The Incidents at Sea reports have high ecological validity, being 
documentation of actual incidents but are, naturally enough, not designed as 
scientific experiments. The scientific literature, on the other hand, contains 
much evidence of the effects of fatigue under experimental conditions, but 
lacks ecological validity. 
The study addresses the literature relating to the concept of relevant 
competence in watchkeepers, human factors and human error in a maritime 
and transport setting and the general nature of fatigue, its measurement and 
its effect on performance. 
The role of the ship's watchkeeper is introduced using the National Maritime 
Industry Competency Standards as a benchmark for the industry-accepted 
role of ship watchkeeper, supported by the International Convention and 
Code on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers 
(STCW). 
Content analysis of selected Incidents at Sea reports, using a non-numerical 
text analysis computer software package, was used to correlate fatigue 
1 The term incidents at sea will be used in this thesis to refer to any maritime incident or 
accident, whereas the (capitalised) Incidents at Sea will refer specifically to those 
incidents investigated and reported under statute by the Australian Marine Investigation 
Unit. 
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characteristics obtained from the scientific literature with the watch-keeping 
activities. Possible relationships between fatigue behaviours, competence and 
human errors leading to incidents at sea were established using a theory-
building approach. 
Time-of-day factors and sleep-loss factors are the two fatigue-related 
variables that appear to be most contributory to accidents, based on the 
results of this study and supported by the literature. These two variables 
were subject to separate analyses. First, the conclusions of 100 reports were 
analysed in order to determine the nature of human error demonstrated on 
each watch (conventional ship's watches consist of six four-hour periods over 
a 24-hour qay). Second, 44 complete reports were analysed to determine the 
accident investigators reference to sleep and to develop a model relating 
sleep factors and time-of-day factors with accidents. 
Descriptors of fatigue behaviours may well be of use to marine incident 
investigations in determining the extent to which fatigue contributes to 
accidents. The outcomes of this research may be used in further quantitative 
studies. For example, descriptors of fatigue that are identified as contributing 
to accidents, could be used as experimental dependent variables in simulation 
studies, possibly using a marine simulator such as the Australian Maritime 
College's Ship Simulator. These further studies should allow the 
manipulation of independent variables that are hypothesised to be causally 
related to Incidents at Sea identified in this study with observation of 
dependent performance variables. 
1.2. Research Questions 
A study into shipping casualties in the United Kingdom identified that 
although the human element has been identified in 90% of collisions and 75% 
of fires and explosions (Bryant 1991), " ... there is so little detailed information 
and inability to determine the relationship between hours worked and 
frequency of accidents to men at sea - direct evidence of fatigue as a cause of 
collisions is hard to come by" (Brown 1989). 
The central question in any analysis of fatigue and accidents is does fatigue 
contribute to incidents at sea, and if so to what extent and in what 
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manner? With. the advent of decreased manning levels and increased 
automation within the maritime industry, this problem has increasing 
relevance. The challenge lies in attempting to reconstruct and understand the 
reality of fatigue-induced incidents from retrospective analyses, given the 
difficulty that human actors exhibit in describing and interpreting such an 
indefinite concept as fatigue. 
The relationships between these events could be represented as follows: 
Figure 1: Sequence of events leading to an incident investigation 
In this sequence of events, the actual phenomenon of fatigue and the 
establishment of causality by an investigator involve quite complex 
communication processes, both written and verbal, during the process of a 
formal investigation. The indeterminate nature of fatigue and the complexity 
and formality of the communication process all contribute to potentially 
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compromising the establishment of a relationship between fatigue and the 
incident. 
In this study, the latter four events of the above chain were explored - those 
events that related to the description and interpretation of fatigue. In 
addition, this study explored the nature of fatigue as described in the 
scientific literature and related this knowledge to fatigue as possibly 
experienced by ship's watchkeepers. 
In addressing this problem therefore, the following research questions were 
raised: 
• Within maritime accident investigation, what are the potential 
manifestations of fatigue experien~ed by watchkeepers and interpreted 
by accident investigators? 
• What are the factors that contribute to fatigue in a maritime setting? 
• How do these factors interact and what is their contribution to 
accidents? 
• How does the fatigue experienced by watchkeepers in the maritime 
industry compare with the phenomenon that is described by cognitive 
psychologists, human factors and human error researchers? 
And finally, in general terms: 
• Within the maritime context, what is this phenomenon known as 
fatigue? 
Captain Kit Filor of the Australian Transportation Safety Board (1996, pers. 
comm.) identifies the difficulty accident investigators have in determining the 
extent to which fatigue contributes to accidents due to the indeterminate 
nature of fatigue in the real world. The problem facing marine investigators 
is establishing what is meant by fatigue and differentiating between various 
manifestations of fatigue as contributing causes of accidents. The STCW 
Code of 1995 indirectly describes fatigue as a consequence of time on task, 
" ... provisions made to prevent fatigue should ensure that excessive or 
unreasonable overall working hours are not undertaken." This latter 
statement may also be construed to take into account time-of-day influences 
if the term "unreasonable" is interpreted to include night work. The Code 
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(1995) also states that " ... there is no universally accepted technical definition 
of fatigue" but refers readers to the International Maritime Resolution (IMO 
Resolution A772 (18), paragraphs 2 to 4.4.1.) which identifies factors which 
could contribute to fatigue. 
Though fatigue may be ill defined, its causal relationship with performance is 
well documented and the subsequent physiological, behavioural and 
subjective manifestations are well documented - the difficulty lies in different 
people having differing interpretations of fatigue in its various contexts. 
Specifically, those presenting evidence at a Departmental Investigation or a 
Marine Court of Inquiry may consider fatigue differently from each other 
and from the point of view of an investigator. Those presenting evidence 
may hold popular or simplistic views on the nature of fatigue whereas the 
investigator may have an understanding of fatigue based on previous 
experiences in accident analysis. It is desirable that there is a common 
currency of understanding as to the contributing factors, nature, 
manifestations and consequences of fatigue in the maritime environment. 
This requires translating the subjective nature of fatigue from the language 
of the seafarer to an objective interpretation by the accident investigator. 
Much of the literature defines fatigue from the perspective of particular 
disciplines or based on a specific research methodology. In order that 
previous studies in the area could be contextualised, a common 
understanding of fatigue needed to be found, or conversely, the limitation of 
definitions from various disciplines or using particular methods needed to be 
established. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will describe various 
interpretations of the effects of fatigue from a behaviourist, physiological 
and subjective viewpoint; perspectives which will form the basis of 
interpreting the nature of fatigue, independent of any specific context. 
Finally, given that fatigue is also a subjective phenomenon, what is the 
essence of this phenomenon? This question is beyond the scope of this study 
but could be addressed using phenomenological methods allowing learning 
and understanding of peoples' subjective experiences. Such qualitative 
methods could involve interviewing those directly experiencing the 
phenomenon - namely ship watchkeepers affected by fatigue inducing 
stressors. 
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Much work has already been done in quantifying the effects of fatiguing 
stressors on subjective, behavioural and physiological variables, and there is 
little doubt that there are decrements in performance resultant from 
variables such as time of day, time on task and arousal. The critical issue for 
accident investigators is establishing the relationship between these possible 
causes and the resultant changes in behaviour of the operative that results in 
the incident. 
According to the Tavistock Report on the Human Element in Shipping 
Casualties (Bryant 1991) " ... direct evidence on fatigue as a cause of collisions 
is hard to come by". The contribution of fatigue to incidents at sea is not 
established outside the anecdotal evidence detailed in reports of such 
incidents. Bryant (1991) does, however, note that lack of supporting 
documentary evidence on the work patterns and watchkeeping system on 
board hampers the investigator's ability to determine the extent to which 
fatigue may have been a factor. This position does demonstrate a limited 
view of the nature of fatigue on the part of the Tavistock Institute whereby 
fatigue is described only in terms of a consequence of previous work. 
There are many factors that contribute to the phenomenon of fatigue that 
may present as a number of critical behaviours other than lapses of 
attention, awareness or vigilance as described by the Tavistock team (Bryant 
1991). This issue is pursued by Brown (1989) who questions the Tavistock 
team's [earlier and preliminary] finding of 
" ... no direct evidence of the presence of fatigue ... in the Marine 
Surveyors' files' in the light of findings of carelessness, over-confidence 
and other risky behaviour, with errors of judgement and excessive 
speed in poor visibility being plausibly associated with the mental 
exhaustion associated with fatigue". 
It may appear that unless fatigue, manifest as a loss of alertness, is explicitly 
presented as evidence in an inquiry, behaviours may be unable to be 
attributed to fatigue, or alternatively, the incident may be attributed to some 
other mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The role of the ship's watchkeeper 
Introduction 
Seafaring has been described as the original 24-hour society (Filor 1996). 
Commercial vessels employ a ship's crew of a master and two or three deck 
officers, engineering officers and a complement of integrated ratings. These 
personnel may be engaged in navigation, cargo handling, communication, 
emergency response, maintenance, catering, administration and human 
resource management in a closed community that is isolated physically and 
socially from other vessels and from shore-based life (ANTA; Maritime 
Competency Standards 2001). These activities take place 24 hours a day, for 
every day that the vessel is in commission. 
Watchkeeping is the responsibility of deck officers, who comprise the master 
and first and second mate (and perhaps a third mate), typically operating a 
three-watch system. The first mate tcikes responsibility for the 4 to 82 watch, 
the second mate the 12 to 4 watch and the third mate and/ or the master the 
8 to 12 watch. Ships' officers therefore have two four-hour watches per 24-
hour period. In addition to watchkeeping, officers have other duties; the first 
mate manages mooring and unmooring operations and cargo handling, and 
the master has overall responsibility for command of the vessel and the 
safety of crew, specific manoeuvring operations, monitoring, budget, 
information control and security. 
2 Each officer generally undertakes two watches during each 24-hour period, hence the 
first mate, for example, would take the early morning 0400 to 0800 watch, and the evening 
watch of 1600 to 2000. Watches are numbered following the evening meal, hence the first 
watch is from 2000 to 0000, the middle watch is from 0000 to 0400, the morning watch from 
0400 to 0800, the forenoon watch from 0800 to 0000 and the afternoon watch from 1200 to 
1600. The evening watch is from 1600 to 2000, and may be broken into two two-hour watches 
known as the first and last dog watch, however this is rarely done in Australian vessels. 
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Smaller vessels such as fishing boats typically have a skipper and one or two 
deck hands, who operate a watchkeeping system based around fishing 
activities. For example, prawn trawling is a night-time activity with the crew 
sleeping during the day. Travelling to and from the fishing grounds, cleaning 
and stowing the catch and getting the catch to markets frequently involves 
extended periods of wakefulness and it is common for the entire ship's 
complement to sleep at anchor or to lie ahull (i.e. engine off and not 
underway, but not at anchor) between fishing activities. 
The human need for regular and extended periods of sleep is often at odds 
with the ongoing nature of shipboard activities. Just as "time and tide wait 
for no man", ship operations must continue around the clock due to 
economic (time) and navigational (tide) pressures and the physiological 
needs of the crew are frequently left wanting. 
Definition of roles and competence 
The role of the ship's watchkeeper is defined by two documents; the 1995 
Revised International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (known as STCW) and the National Maritime 
Competency Standards. The former document is an international convention 
of deliberations and resolutions agreed to by parties to the convention, 
namely representatives of 71 sovereign states and numerous inter-
governmental organisations and non-government organisations. The latter 
document has been endorsed by the National Training Board (the national 
body responsible within Australia for industry standards endorsement) and 
is a reflection of the Australian Maritime Industry's position following major 
structural reforms and is in complete accord with relevant industrial awards. 
In addition, the watchkeepers role is specified in the various training 
documents, employers' job specifications, and operational manuals and 
procedures guides used within the maritime industry. 
As the National Competency Standards for the Maritime Industry (referred 
to hereafter as Maritime Competency Standards) contain specific 
performance requirements (known as performance criteria) for the role of 
deck watchkeeper, this document was used as the primary specification for 
determining watchkeeping tasks and in extracting the subset of tasks that 
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may be affected by fatigue. In addition, the STCW Code was used as a means 
of validating watch-keeping competencies extracted from the Competency 
Standards as they apply to both watchkeeping tasks and the Australian 
context. The STCW Code also contains some general guidance regarding 
watchkeeping. (Chapter VIII, STCW Code) 
For the purpose of this study, the role of deck watchkeeper was defined by 
the Units of Competency for the occupational group Deck Watchkeeper with 
the exception of the Units relating to administrative and lower management 
functions that have no direct relation to the safe operation of a watch. 
The Master and Chief Mate are involved in both the supervision of deck 
watchkeepers and frequently participate in watchkeeping activities according 
to Tony Boyle of the Australian Maritime College (1996, pers. comm.). Many 
of the competency units performed by the Chief Mate and Master were 
closely related to the watchkeeping role and involve both the monitoring 
and controlling of watchkeeping functions. 
2.2. The concept of stress and fatigue 
Introduction 
This section will explore the relationship between stress, boredom, vigilance 
and fatigue and consider both historical and contemporary neurological and 
humoral models. Fatigue is a difficult construct as it behaves as both an 
independent and dependent variable and is unlikely to operate in a purely 
linear fashion (Finkelman 1994). In addition Finkelman (1994) states "fatigue 
remains an elusive variable because of the inability to extrapolate laboratory 
research into real-world settings and because of the great variety of 
moderating variables that alter fatigue's relationship with performance." 
Fatigue stress and strain 
Stress, strain, fatigue and boredom are interrelated subjective states, though 
there may be objective components of each state. 
In popular use, the term fatigue infers tiredness, exhaustion, loss of energy 
and inability to carry on. This thesis considers fatigue in the cognitive sense -
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the decrement in cognitive (and often physical) performance following some 
stress or activity. 
Fatigue has been described by Cameron (1974) as" ... a generalised response 
to stress experienced over a period of time, with effects which may be acute 
or chronic, or both, confined to the subjective state of the individual, or 
extending into measurable aspects of individual performance." Hockey 
(1986) adopts the position that boredom results from the requirement to 
maintain attention in the absence of relevant task information whereas 
fatigue is the consequence of continuously high levels of information load. 
Hockey's (1986) discussion on fatigue maintains the core concept of 
prolonged work as contributory to fatigue and differentiates between 
physical, and cognitive or perceptual work. 
Finkelman (1994) views fatigue as both an independent and a dependent 
variable that is unlikely to operate in a purely linear fashion, but rather as a 
variable in a limited-channel capacity model that only becomes manifest after 
no more reserve capacity is available to offset its input. Finkelman (1994) 
acknowledges motivational factors may serve to moderate the effect of 
fatigue on performance. 
Bartley and Chute's (1947) classic publication on fatigue makes a distinction 
between the subjective experience of symptoms and the physiological 
impairment of performance. McFarland (1971) describes both physiological 
factors such as energy requirements, muscle fatigue and oxygen 
consumption, and psychological aspects such as time on task that result in 
attention loss and error. In addition, he proposes stress and anxiety as 
contributory to fatigue and the modem industrial environment and an 
increasing utilisation of shiftwork having significant influence. Finally, 
McFarland (1971) cites fear and apprehension as well as boredom as 
contributory to fatigue, particularly in the context of aviation where selection 
and training have mitigated against the effects of these common but extreme 
contributing factors. 
Hockey (1986) classifies fatigue contributing to stress as either skill fatigue or 
the after effects of prolonged work; the former characterised by undertaking 
complex and/ or simultaneous tasks (overloading). The latter effect has been 
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particularly difficult to demonstrate due to individuals' ability to compensate 
over long periods of time (Hockey 1986). 
Johns (2000), in consideration of driver fatigue, prefers to use the term 
sleepiness and avoids the use of the term fatigue, reserving that term for the 
" ... process that occurs typically in many ... muscles, whereby their strength 
of contraction decreases with continuing use and is usually restored by rest." 
Johns (2000) does not accept the use of the term fatigue in any context other 
than muscular, a view that is in conflict with a considerable body of literature 
on cognitive fatigue. As will be evident later in this thesis, where fatigue is 
simply reduced to a decrease in alertness, or as argued by Johns (2000), 
decreased muscular strength following exertion, the varied manifestations of 
work, at different times of the day and often under conditions of deficient 
sleep may be missed. 
Stress was first discussed by Selye in 1936 as an endocrinological 
phenomenon and became a common term in the performance/ efficiency 
literature in the 1960s (Hockey 1986). Contemporary stress models include 
both information-processing models, characterised by a limited system 
information processor approach, and an arousal theory characterised by 
drive, stress and arousal (Hockey 1986). The latter theory incorporates 
Selye's general adaptation syndrome and the inverted-U relation between 
performance and arousal (Hockey 1986). Arousal is defined as a general state 
varying from coma and drowsiness to alertness and frantic excitement 
(Parasuraman 1986). This latter relationship between performance and 
arousal provides an explanation of selectivity of cues such that performance 
is optimised at high levels of arousal by restricting the range of 
environmental events that could be processed and at low levels of arousal by 
reducing attention to irrelevant cues (Hockey 1986). 
The dependence relationship between stress and fatigue is unclear. In a 
model proposed by Hockey (1986), fatigue is cited as a primary contributory 
variable of stress, along with cyclical changes, physical stressors, drugs and 
cognitive factors. Hockey (1986) describes fatigue as an internal stressor, 
which in conjunction with cyclical changes (another internal stressor) and 
external stressors, contributes to performance changes and subjective states 
following the closely related functions of information-processing resources 
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and cognitive appraisal respectively. He adds that effects of the social 
environment (social stressors) normally influence cognitive appraisal, which 
in turn affects subjective reactions. This model categorises fatigue as a 
hypothetical construct, which like memory, is not observable but has 
observable effects on situations and behaviours (Haworth et al. 1988). 
Conversely, some authors have described fatigue as the dependent variable 
(such as Bartlett 1943). Cook and Shipley (1980) describe fatigue as " ... the 
result of high stress activity, whereas ... the term 'loss of alertness' [is used 
to] describe the effects of continued work under low stress conditions" (Fitts 
& Posner 1967). The term fatigue is frequently used therefore to cover the 
effects of both high _stress and low stress activities. This is particularly 
relevant in studies where both high stress (e.g. time on task, high 
information density and adverse environmental factors) and low stress (e.g. 
the requirement for vigilance in low stimulation environments) are 
encountered. 
In summary, fatigue can be considered a response to stress and, the 
consequence of fatigue may be subjective, behavioural or physiological. The 
stressors most frequently considered in the literature are sleep deprivation 
and its interaction with time of day. Environmental stressors such as noise, 
heat and cold, the nature and duration of work appear to be less influential 
stressors contributing to fatigue (Hockey, 1986). 
Adaptive and protective aspects of stress and fatigue 
Mendelson (1990) describes the emotional effects of occupational stress as 
being affective disturbances, behavioural manifestations and psychiatric 
disorders. He cites alcoholism, smoking and drug abuse as well as emotional 
and psychiatric disorders as possible sequelae to occupational stress and 
proposes that feelings of tension, apprehension and nervousness associated 
with emotional arousal contribute to the anxiety response, the first step in a 
pathway, which may lead to adaptive anxiety. Such adaptive anxiety could 
either be beneficial in allowing mastery of a stressful situation or 
alternatively lead to decompensation and development of some 
psychopathology (Mendelson 1990). 
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Grandjean and Kogi (1971) refer to discrimination between acceptable and 
unacceptable (e.g. overwork, overloading, exhaustion) fatigue situations. In 
that paper they determine criteria for evaluation of fatigue rather than 
developing an argument for adaptive aspects of fatigue. However in 
introducing the concept of fatigue, Grandjean and Kogi (1971) described the 
sensations of fatigue as biological signs of the necessity to recover. 
Bartley and Chute (1947) had previously " .. .interpreted the subjective 
feelings of fatigue as a warning to the body that its resources were being 
overtaxed and expected that the subjective feelings would be the first effects 
of fatigue to be manifest." Bartlett (1951) thought that the warnings 
generally arrived too late however. Comparison can be made between the 
adaptive aspects of stress such as adaptive anxiety (which allows mastery 
and control of the stressful situation) as described by Mendelson (1990) and 
the protective role of fatigue symptomatology as described by Bartley and 
Chute (1947) and by Grandjean and Kogi (1971). 
Fatigue and alertness 
Grandjean and Kogi (1971) discuss fatigue in terms of central inhibition, 
however such discussion alone risks reducing fatigue to manifestations of 
reduced alertness, omitting the more complex manifestations such as 
changes in long and short term memory, information processing and higher 
cognitive functions. 
The role of the reticular activating system in maintaining wakefulness and 
alerting the cortex was first documented by Moruzzi and Magoun (1949, as 
reviewed by Berlucchi 1997). As part of the non-specific sensory system, the 
reticular formation extends from sensory receptors through the brain stem 
in a multi.synaptic network terminating in the cerebral cortex, particularly the 
association cortex. The reticular activating system arouses cortical cells and 
determines how responsive they are to incoming signals. Grandjean and 
Kogi (1971) also refer to a descending corticofugal pathway descending on 
the reticular system from the cortex, responsible for stimulating the reticular 
activating system, which in tum maintains the cortex and behaviour in a 
state of arousal and alertness. 
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Bills (1931) introduced the concept of blocks (i.e. periods of time in which no 
responses were made in a laboratory alertness test) as rests which allow the 
individual to maintain efficiency in spite of the changes which fatigue has 
wrought on his nervous system. He speculated that the neural mechanism 
involved was a " ... cumulative refractory phase, a periodic breakdown in the 
central facilitative mechanism ... " Hockey (1986) later refers to blocks as brief 
interruptions in performance; " ... prolonged work may be associated with a 
general increase in mean reaction time, as well as an increase in choice 
errors." Subsequent authors such as Harrison and Home (1996) associate 
"microsleeps" with excessive daytime sleepiness and a marked reduction in 
behavioural responses. There are serious implications of such periods of 
cognitive absence such as during the operation of machinery, driving and 
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monitoring equipment. Incidents may result from the operator either failing 
to remain vigilant or failing to recognise a visual or other cue required for 
safe operation. 
Humoral and pharmacological models of fatigue 
It is tempting to postulate that sleep is the consequence of some humoral 
entity, however early research to determine the presence of such a factor is 
conflicting. Though humoral sleep theories pre-date neurological theories, it 
was the advances in neurophysiology in the 1950's that helped explain the 
role of chemical neurotransmitters in sleep and activation studies. Studies 
giving credence to the involvement of humoral factors in the regulation of 
sleep and alertness include those undertaken by Elmadjian et al. (1956), 
Pappenheimer et al. (1967) and Monnier, (1963). It was the technical advances 
of the 1950's and 1960's, however, that resulted in these "humoral" factors 
being best explained in terms of "wet" pharmacology, or the study of 
neurotransmitters. More recent reviewers (Nicholson & Pascoe 1989; 
Nicholson 1989; Mendelson 2001) note the involvement of a variety of 
neurotransmitters in the regulation of alertness. 
Secretion of melatonin by the pineal gland was thought to be associated with 
hypnotic and zietgeber (German for time-giving) properties at least in 
animal studies (Arendt et al. 1985). Described as a functional third eye, the 
mammalian pineal responds to changes in light via the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus of the hypothalamus (Klein 1985) Melatonin is synthesised 
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rhythmically on a 24-hour basis, with a nocturnal increase in synthesis (Klein 
1985). Arendt et al. (1985) observes that" ... melatonin may have zeitgeber 
properties with respect to fatigue and alertness ... " In a study by Lieberman 
et al. (1984) oral administration of melatonin decreased alertness and 
increased sleepiness in environmentally-isolated subjects. Lieberman et al. 
(1984) also showed that melatonin slowed choice reaction time but decreased 
errors of commission, concluding that melatonin had short-acting, sedative-
like properties. Its role as a possible synchroniser of circadian rhythm forms 
the basis of melatonin being used in overcoming the adverse effects 
associated with jet lag (Reiter 1985; Lieberman et al. 1984; Arendt et al. 1985; 
Comperatore et al. 1996). 
2.3. Assessment of fatigue and vigilance 
Introduction 
Fatigue exists as a hypothetical construct - in the real world it may only exist 
in terms of its consequences - the subjective experience and its effects on 
performance. The assessment of fatigue may then, be reflected by the 
measurement of its effects. The measurement of fatigue in the real world is 
difficult due to the great variety of moderating variables (Finkelman 1994). 
In experimental situations, specific dependent variables have been measured 
following manipulation of the independent variables such as time on task, 
time of day and sleep. 
Muscio (1921) in asking the question "Is a fatigue test possible?" argued that 
fatigue is an undefined entity and therefore directly unmeasurable. He 
proposes a performance-based definition: 
. "Fatigue is a condition caused by activity, in which the output produced 
by that activity tends to be relatively poor, and the degree of fatigue 
tends to vary directly with the poorness of the output" (Muscio 1921). 
He argues that though fatigue per se is unmeasurable, the subsequent 
diminished capacity is measurable, and he proposes a battery of 
performance and non-performance tests, the latter being measures of 
physiological variables such as pulse rate, blood pressure and muscle tone 
thought to be affected by fatigue. 
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In contrast to fatigue, consumed alcohol can be measured, as can the 
subsequent physiological, performance and subjective effects. Folkard et al. 
(1977), in a memory study involving 130 school children, found significant 
differences in retention of material presented at 0900 compared with 1500 
and highlighted the magnitude of this difference by equating it to the 
performance difference one finds following sleep reduction to three hours, 
or alternatively being given the legal limit of alcohol for driving. In a recent 
study undertaken by Dawson and Reid (1997), performance following sleep 
deprivation was compared with performance following alcohol 
consumption. Dawson and Reid (1997) found that " ... after 17 hours of 
sustained wakefulness, cognitive psychomotor performance decreased to a 
level equivalent to the performance impairment observed at a blood alcohol 
concentration of 0.05%, and after 24 hours of sustained wakefulness, 
cognitive psychomotor performance decreased to a level observed at a 
blood alcohol concentration of roughly 0.10%." 
Human performance has been measured in laboratory performance tests, 
workplace tests and by simulations. Subjective measures of fatigue have 
utilised various rating scales, checklists and questionnaires. In addition, 
researchers have utilised a battery of experimental performance tests that 
attempt to establish a relationship to the subjective fatigue state or the 
performance differential or both. These latter tests have been used as both 
predictive and reactive to fatigue effects. 
Much of the discussion in chapter 5 of this thesis is based on evidence from 
studies that have determined the amount of sleep that seafarers receive, their 
ability to subjectively assess their fatigue state and the decrements in 
performance associated with being fatigued. The following section outlines 
how fatigue is assessed from both an experimental viewpoint and in real 
world situations and comments on how fatigue may manifest. Finally, the 
behaviours associated with being fatigued are extracted and summarised in 
Table 1. 
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Subjective assessment of fatigue 
Fatigue and sleep rating scales 
Sleepiness has been quantified by at least two separate rating scales, the 
Stanford Sleepiness Scale (SSS), developed by Hoddes et al. (1973) and the 
later Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS), developed by Akerstedt and Gilberg 
(Akerstedt & Folkard 1995). Such rating scales are designed to provide 
descriptors of sleepiness at equal-appearing intervals that allow sensitive 
ratings of sleepiness. Such scales are also validated by comparison with EEG 
and other physiological variables (Hoddes et al. 1973). Although the Stanford 
Sleepiness Scale has been independently validated as a predictor of 
performance following partial sleep deprivation (Broughton 1988), it does 
not predict individual performance efficiency and cannot be used as a 
substitute for performance measures in studies involving chronic sleep loss 
(Herscovitch & Broughton 1981). The Stanford Sleepiness Scale was, 
however, shown to correlate with performance in most cases in a total sleep 
deprivation study involving 290 naval seamen by How et al. (1994). 
Daily records (diaries) and logs 
In the study of watchkeeping by Colquhoun et al. (1988), subjects maintained 
daily records on a standardised 24-hour chart to record watchkeeping or 
other activities, the record incorporating a visual analogue scale to record 
sleep quality. Stampi (1988) reviews the use of interviews, questionnaires and 
sleep logs in his studies on the effects of ultrashort sleep patterns during 
singlehanded yacht races. 
Parker and Hubinger (1998) utilised on-tour logbooks to record pilotage 
times, stress, sleep and fatigue ratings plus work schedules in a study of 176 
work assignments undertaken by 23 Great Barrier Reef (Australia) pilots 
over a two-month period. These logbooks were similar to those used by a 
US Coast Guard Study conducted by Sanquist et al. (1996) involving 148 
mariners from 8 commercial ships. Both studies identified a significant 
fatigue problem within their occupational group, and by inference, 
internationally. 
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Adi.graphic devices may be used to record movement as an adjunct to 
written records, and be thereby used to objectively determine sleep periods. 
For example, Stampi (1988) utilised ambulatory wrist movement recorders 
to study polyphasic sleep strategies of solo sailors, allowing analysis of data 
on sleep duration. 
Workplace reporting systems 
Finkelman (1994) utilised a large database (n=l00,000) to survey employees 
who reported job fatigue during their assignments. The results of this survey 
are discussed elsewhere, however the author cites lack of controlled and 
manipulated experimental design as limiting the ability to extrapolate from 
correlational data. 
Behavioural (Performance) tests 
Perceptual, cognitive and motor tests 
Shingledecker (1989) outlines a group of available physiological and 
behavioural assessment methods that could be used as meaningful indicators 
of aircrew performance. These were not intended as a research tool but as a 
biocybemetic measure to provide the aircraft with feedback on pilot 
performance, an issue also raised by O'Donnell (1989). 
Lamond and Dawson (1999) utilised a battery of neurobehavioural tests 
(simple sensory comparison task, unpredictable tracking task, vigilance task 
and grammatical reasoning task) in a study involving 22 participants. This 
study involved a comparison of performance decrement following a period 
of sustained wakefulness in comparison with performance decrement 
following alcohol consumption. Both variables resulted in a decrease in 
performance, allowing the authors to conclude that after only 20 hours of 
sustained wakefulness, performance impairment may be equivalent to that 
observed at a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10%. 
Memory tests 
Folkard et al. (1977) in a study involving 130 school children (mean age 12 
years 11 months) investigated recall of a story presented at either 0900 or 
1500 hours. The authors found that immediate recall was superior following 
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the presentation of the story during the morning, whereas delayed recall 
was superior following the afternoon presentation of the same story. The 
authors demonstrated a time of day difference in both short-term and long-
term memory. Interestingly, the authors found no significant difference 
between morning and afternoon recall (irrespective of the time of delivery of 
the story), suggesting that the time of day difference was related to encoding 
information rather than its recall. 
Psychomotor tests 
Colquhoun et al. (1988) utilised a vector test, a simple performance test 
involving an assessment of the risk of collision of two ships with given 
courses and speeds, represented by two lines of different angle and length. A 
similar test used by Craig and Condon (1984) required subjects to determine 
whether the risk of collision existed and also their confidence in their 
estimation. 
Bohnen and Gaillard (1994) used a computer monitor to measure tracking, 
the ability to hold a cursor in the centre of a target. The dependent variables 
were the mean square error and the percentage oversteps (Bohnen & 
Gaillard 1994). In addition, Craig and Condon (1984) utilised a navigational 
plotting exercise whereby subjects plotted 50 pairs of coordinates on graph 
paper, the time taken being the measure. How et al. (1994) used a battery of 
neurobehavioural tests in a sleep deprivation study including the grooved 
peg board test, the digit span test and the digit symbol test. The authors also 
measured flicker fusion3 and subjective variables (How et al. 1994). Craig 
and Condon (1984) have also used signal identification (similar but different 
discs) and visual search of a punctuation mark in an array of characters as a 
performance measure. 
Sleep propensity 
Lavie (1988) measured EEG, EOG and EMG in normal and sleep-deprived 
subjects who underwent 7-minute sleep, 13-minute awake schedules for 24 
3 Flicker fusion (also known as critical flicker fusion, or CFF) is the frequency at which a 
flickering light appears as a constant image and is often used as an index of fatigue. 
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hours. Propensity to sleep and to resist sleep was determined using the 
physiological measures to determine onset and offset of sleep. The results of 
this study provided the author with evidence of sleep "gates" (periods of 
increased sleep propensity) and "forbidden zones" for sleep (whereby 
subjects have difficulty falling asleep). Sleep gates occurred in the afternoon 
and evening and were preceded by forbidden zones for sleep. 
Simulations 
How et al. (1994) used a set of known naval tasks in their studies on sleep 
deprivation, finding an improvement in performance over the first 30 hours, 
probably due to the effects of practice. There was, however, a drop in 
performance after 36 hours in all the subjects, followed by a partial recovery 
and finally a precipitous fall at 72 hours (How et al. 1994). 
Physiological tests 
Core temperature 
Hockey (1986) claims that core body temperature is one of the most stable of 
all 24-hour rhythms and has attracted more study and attention than any 
other. Cook and Shipley (1980) note a relationship between body 
temperature and performance. Colquhoun et al. (1988) used the parameter 
of oral temperature in their study on sleep and circadian rhythms of ship's 
watchkeepers. In this study, the authors also monitored rectal temperature, 
however low social acceptance of this measure resulted in a small sample of 
results. The authors argue that by reducing environmental factors such as 
low ambient temperature, and by leaving specially designed oral 
thermometers under the subjects tongue for a five-minute period, oral 
approximations of core temperature were obtained (Colquhoun et al. 1988). 
Hockey (1986) states that most researchers use body temperature as a 
reference point and a readily obtained physiological measure when studying 
the effects of time of day on performance. In Cook and Shipley's (1980) 
study, there was correlation between body temperature and pulse rates, 
subjective self-ratings and one measure of reaction time. However, the 
researchers noted an unexplained observation, that pre-pilotage 
32 
temperatures were higher than post-pilotage temperatures irrespective of 
the time of day (Cook & Shipley 1980). 
Heart Rate and ECG 
Cook and Shipley (1980) measured the heart rate of ships' pilots using 
Medilog Recorders and found that in addition to the diurnal variation of 
heart rate there was a considerably higher heart rate when on pilotage duty 
than when off-duty. In addition they found that during monotonous and 
uneventful acts, the heart rate fell to a very low level, especially at night. 
Aasman et al. (1988) also found an increase in heart rate with dual task 
conditions compared to simple task conditions and that during a working 
day, the heart rate gradually decreased. Colquhoun et al. (1988) used heart 
rate as a physiological measure parallel to a continuous record of physical 
activity. 
EEG 
Cabon et al. (1993) used a combination of EEG, eye blink (electro-oculogram, 
EOG) and motor activity, the latter being measured by a small transducer 
placed on the subject's wrist, and provided a measure of the frequency and 
duration of sleep periods. Analysis of the EEG and EOG was conducted by 
Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) which gave EEG spectrum power and eye 
blink frequency, measures of which were related to vigilance (Cabon et al. 
1993). Broughton (1988) reviewed the use of EEG in determining the effect of 
microsleeps on performance, many authors claiming that they are the major 
cause of performance deficit in sleepy subjects. 
Heart rate variability 
Heart rate variability (HRV) decreases as workload increases (Shingledecker 
1989). This is explained by Meshkati (1988) as " ... heart rate was said to 
decrease in situations which required environmental intakes and accelerate in 
situations in which environmental rejection was involved." Thus a 
relationship is established between cardiac activity, cortical activity and 
behaviour (Meshkati 1988). 
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Critical Flicker Fusion Frequency 
Critical flicker fusion frequency (CFF) has been used by Kogi and Saito 
(1971) to indicate the level of cortical activity. Grandjean et al. (1971) found 
that there was a significant correlation between CFF and self-rating test of 
subjective feelings of fatigue in addition to correlation between CFF and 
tapping tests. Therefore they concluded that all these above measures are 
indicative of a common state of fatigue. 
Biochemical measures - blood, urinary and salivary assays 
Measured in many studies, certain electrolytes and organic compounds show 
relationships with exercise and stress. Dukes-Dobos (1971) notes that these 
variations in electrolytes and metabolites are affected by nutritional status, 
climate and environmental conditions, and in the case of substances affected 
in opposite directions by exercise and stress, there will be a cancelling effect 
in conditions of both stress and exercise. 
Selye (1950) proposed a general adaptation syndrome whereby activation of 
the pituitary-adrenal cortical axis results in a set of adaptive reactions 
including increased excretion of adrenaline, noradrenaline and cortisol. 
Dukes-Dobos (1971) noted contradictory results in studies where urinary 
metabolites of cortisol have been measured following various stressors. It is 
important that any measurements are taken at the same time of day to 
account for time of day variations due to sleep-wake cycles (Dukes-Dobos 
1971). Measurement of 17 hydroxycorticosteroids (17-0HCS), which are 
metabolites of cortisol and cortisone, have shown variable results (Dukes-
Dobos 1971). 
In a study of ship's watchkeepers, Colquhoun et al. (1988) measured urinary 
adrenaline, noradrenaline, sodium and potassium and found levels of 
noradrenaline and adrenaline increased during the watchkeeping period, 
with levels of adrenaline remaining high during the whole of the waking 
day. Colquhoun's group found a more circadian rhythm with adrenaline 
excretion than noradrenaline excretion, noting that adrenaline excretion is 
more influenced by mental load than by changes in physical activity 
(reported by Plett et al. 1988). 
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Goh et al. (2000) studied circadian desynchronisation in 60 military personnel 
(20 day-work controls and 40 night-shift duties) onboard a naval ship. 
Salivary melatonin and cortisol profiles were obtained from 2-hourly 
samples. The authors found that day workers exhibited typical patterns of 
cortisol and melatonin, whereas 48% of night workers exhibited distortions, 
abnormal peaks and troughs and phase shifts in melatonin rhythm and 
erratic peaks and troughs in cortisol rhythm. The authors claim that salivary 
concentrations closely reflect serum concentrations of those hormones and 
are much more convenient and non-invasive. 
Numerous authors refer to serum melatonin assays in laboratory studies of 
fatigue and alertness (e.g. Arendt et al. 1985; Lewy et al. 1985; Lieberman et 
al. 1984; Bitman 1985). 
2.4. Performance variables - fatigue behaviours in the 
literature 
In supporting the identification of performance variables associated with 
fatigue found during an analysis of Incidents at Sea reports presented in 
chapter 4, it is appropriate to summarise the performance variables obtained 
from the literature. In this chapter so far, the author has referred to the 
nature of fatigue and numerous assessments of fatigue, determined as being 
subjective, behavioural or physiological. 
In comparing performance variables extracted from the literature with 
behaviours extracted from Incidents at Sea reports, the subjective and 
physiological measures of fatigue were largely omitted from further study. 
The conclusions of Incidents at Sea reports describe human behaviours (or 
human contributions in behavioural terms) that have resulted in the 
particular incident. There is infrequent reference to subjective measures of 
fatigue (such as where a watchkeeper admits to feeling tired or sleepy) and 
there is no opportunity to measure physiological variables (unlike the 
measure of blood alcohol used in motor vehicle accident investigation). 
There appears to be no appropriate physiological measure to assess fatigue 
in real world settings, nor would there be any more capacity to measure 
such a variable in maritime accident investigation. 
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Table 1: Fatigue Behaviours 
Fatigue Behaviour Reference 
1. Activation problems 
Decreased vigilance (during a constant task) Mackworth 1950; Krueger 1989. 
Decreased alertness (to a possible problem) Hockey 1986; Fitts & Posner 1967; 
Haworth et al. 1988; Stokes & Kite 1994; 
Broughton 1988; Vidacek 1993; Condon et 
al. 1988b; Folkard & Monk 1979. 
Gaps, lapses or blocks Haworth et al. 1988; Bills 1931; Hockey 
1986; Brown 1989; Harrison & Horne, 
1996. 
2. Perception (and sensory input) limitations 
Reliance on visual (eyes and radar) inputs Bryant 1991. 
Decreased attention to peripheral instruments Hockey 1986. 
Uncertainty of observations Bohnen & Gaillard 1994. 
Decreased night-time communication Ohashi & Morikiyo 1974; Graeber 1989b; 
Bryant 1991 . 
3. Information processing problems 
Decreased encoding/registration of recently Hockey 1986. 
acquired information 
Failure to interpret information as part of a single, McFarland 1971. 
integrated system 
Decreased ability to correlate dynamic processes Luczac 1991. 
Decreased ability to process lower and peripheral Sablowski 1989; Gaillard & Steyvers 1988. 
processes 
Information processing deficiencies in secondary Sablowski 1989. 
task 
4. Aversion to effort 
Low effort, low probability of success Hockey 1986. 
Easy, but risky alternatives Hockey 1986. 
Response latency/decreased speed of execution Hockey 1986, Dawson & Reid 1997. 
Lower standards of accuracy and performance McFarland 1971, Colquhoun et al. 1988, 
Craig & Condon, 1984. 
5. Differing effort 
Increased variability of timing of actions Hockey 1986. 
Decreased performance with lower/peripheral Gaillard & Steyvers 1988. 
processes 
General performance decrement Grandjean 1970; Folkard & Monk 1979; 
Condon et al. 1988b; Haworth et al. 1988; 
Brown 1989; Stokes & Kite 1994; How et al. 
1994; Parasuraman 1986; Hockey 1986; 
Cameron, 1974. 
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Behaviours associated with fatigue may serve as markers or identifiers of 
fatigue (among other things) in the absence of subjective or physiological 
measures. The classification of behavioural manifestations presented here 
(i.e. activation problems, perception limitations etc) were developed from the 
behaviours coded and classified in the analysis of Incidents at Sea reports and 
will be dealt with in the results and discussion chapters. The specific 
behaviours, however, are expressed in the terms that the various researchers 
have used in their studies (i.e. decreased vigilance, blocks, information 
processing deficiencies in a secondary task etc). 
Table 1 summarises the behavioural or performance manifestations of 
fatigue as described in the scientific literature. Most of these behaviours have 
been discussed previously and have been extensively described in the 
literature. References attributed to the particular behaviour are exemplary 
and are not specific to a particular independent variable. The reference list 
includes studies using laboratory-based experimental models as well as 
occupational studies from maritime, aviation or industry settings. 
2.5. Contributing factors: circadian desynchronisation 
and its consequences 
Time of day - cyclical changes 
The nature of circadian rhythms 
The state of the body is able to adjust in anticipation to daily events -
predictive homeostasis which presents as a series of daily cycles of body 
temperature, sleepiness, wakefulness, catecholamine and corticosteroid 
levels which have a direct influence on psychological, physiological and 
performance variables. The term circadian rhythm was coined by Halberg 
(Hockey 1986) and infers a rhythm of about one day. In addition, longer 
(infradian) and shorter (ultradian) rhythms have been identified (Broughton 
1975; Lavie & Scherson 1981). Such rhythmic processes are said to have a 
period, a phase and an amplitude: studies of circadian rhythms tending to 
use a sinusoidal mathematical model (Hockey 1986). Endogenous rhythms 
are the body's innate rhythms resulting from some internal clock, whereas 
37 
exogenous rhythms are those rhythms that are entrained by environmental 
factors such as light and dark, social behaviour and work patterns (Hockey 
1986). 
The internal clock and entrainment 
In the absence of daily cues such as clocks, work commib.nents and meals, 
the body's internal clock usually has a period of approximately 25 hours 
(circadian means "about" one day). Mistleberger and Rusak (1989) note the 
existence of an internal biological clock mechanism with a 25-hour periodicity 
that is influenced by environmental cues. The internal clock is thereby 
entrained to a 24-hour cycle by such cues, which are called zeitgebers 
(German for "time givers"). 
The body's internal clock is thought to be located in the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus of the hypothalamus in association with other centres responsible for 
the control of body temperature and cortisol secretion (Mistleberger & 
Rusak 1989). Conn (1995) states that in all mammals, the cells of the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus receive retinohypothalamic input. Thompson (1993) 
states that these optic nerve fibres serve to entrain the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus rather than to control it, an argument he claims is supported by 
experimental studies where circadian rhythms remain intact on severing the 
optic nerve but are abolished by experimental lesions to the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus. Photic entrainment is the most significant cue, mediated by a neural 
pathway from the retina, via the lateral geniculate thalamic nucleus to the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus of the hypothalamus. Neural transmission from the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus mediates circadian variations in melatonin, 
produced by the pineal gland, via the sympathetic nervous system's superior 
cervical ganglion (Klein 1985). Mistleberger and Rusak (1989) also note the 
regulatory influences of periodic food availability, ambient temperature and 
social cues in animal models, however noting substantial interspecies 
variability. In humans, the biological clock is particularly robust with a very 
persistent phase that resists adjusb.nent to non day-work patterns (Akerstedt 
1995a). The human internal clock forms the basis of a variety of daily 
variations in physiological activities. 
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Circadian rhythm in alertness and sleep propensity 
Subjective alertness in humans increases during the waking day and reduces 
prior to sleep. Studies delving further into this phenomenon have identified 
an alertness rhythm coupled to physiological need for sleep. Objective 
alertness may be measured by sleep propensity as proposed by Lavie (1988) 
or multiple sleep latency as proposed by Dement, (Carskadon & Dement 
1977). Circadian rhythms and sleep are intimately interrelated; "sleep gates" 
occurring at predictable times during the day, allowing the transition from 
the waking state to the sleeping state, in order to obtain the sleep necessary 
for tissue repair and restitution, as well as consolidation of memory (Home 
1978). Disruption of circadian rhythms due to shift work, jet lag or 
underlying sleep pathology will most likely be associated with sleep 
deprivation and its consequences. For example, Folkard (1996) notes that the 
decrease in sleep propensity between 0600 and 1200 corresponds to the time 
that night shift workers might try to get some sleep between shifts. 
In a study of sleep propensity, Lavie (1988) proposed "gates of sleep", as the 
probability of falling asleep varies in a systematic way across the 24 hours. 
The author found that the probability of falling asleep was " ... low during the 
morning-midday period increased during the afternoon, decreased again 
during the evening and gradually increased during the evening." Lavie 
(1988) also identified three peaks of sleepiness with sleep deprived subjects; a 
morning, a mid afternoon and a nocturnal peak The nocturnal peak of 
increased probability of falling asleep (from 2300 hours and for 4.5 hours 
thereafter) was consistent in both normal and sleep-deprived subjects and 
was termed by La vie as the nocturnal sleep "gate". The period just before 
the sleep "gate" has been termed the "forbidden zone for sleep" and is 
characterised by a large decline in the tendency to fall asleep, explained in 
terms of spontaneous activation of arousal related neural networks (Lavie 
1988). 
Ultradian rhythms 
Ultradian rhythms include the 90-minute cycling between REM and non-
REM sleep that occurs during normal sleep. Kleitman (1963) claimed the 
existence of a "basic rest activity cycle" (BRAC), also of 90-minutes duration, 
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which has been supported by a number of studies. Broughton (1975), in his 
review of biorhythmic variations in consciousness and performance, notes 
that "normal" day work social and break activities incorporate the BRAC, 
and cites numerous studies supporting ultradian (predominantly 90 minute) 
rhythms during wakefulness such as gastric contractions, oral activity, heart 
rate and body temperature. The major implication of these rhythms is a 
propensity towards sleep, or at least reduced alertness that, in times of sleep 
loss or inadequate recovery, may lead to a critical performance breach and a 
possible accident. 
Lavie and Scherson (1981) demonstrated rhythmic variations in subject's 
ability to fall asleep throughout the day and proposed that persons retiring 
at a somnolent phase of these daytime rhythms will exhibit a greater sleep 
propensity than those retiring nearer crests of arousal. Broughton (1988) 
does, however, state, "it appears that drowsiness enhances the daytime 
ultradian rhythm of vigilance, whereas high alertness suppresses it." 
Superimposed on the circadian rhythm, the basic rest activity cycle may 
influence alertness and sleepiness in some predictable manner, however 
confounding environmental factors are likely to render any measurement of 
this effect in real life situations impractical. 
Time zone desynchronisation ("jet lag") 
Adaptation to altered schedules either due to transmeridian flight (which 
results in "jet lag") or a change of work-sleep pattern (e.g. shiftwork) result 
in a phase shift of various rhythms depending on the ability of the individual 
to adjust to the new schedule (Hockey 1986). In the case of "jet lag" the new 
time zone is usually adopted for a longer period of time and social and day-
night zeitgebers rapidly entrain the various rhythms, however in the case of 
shiftwork, there is usually alternation between the night shift state and more 
sociable day off schedules resulting in a compromise adjustment of body 
rhythms (Hockey 1986). Though not historically applicable to the maritime 
setting, modern high-speed vessels are capable of crossing time zones on a 
daily basis, and the use of air transport to transfer crew renders jet lag a 
potential fatigue-inducing factor. 
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There are two issues concerning so-called "jet lag". Firstly, the effect of time 
zone crossings and secondly, the opportunity for entrainment once the 
destination is reached. The latter issue depends largely on the amount of 
time spent at the destination time zone. "Jet lag" is a phenomenon of 
transmeridian flight and unlike shiftwork; the social and physical zeitgebers 
only allow adaptation over a long stay. Adaptation is relatively faster when 
the journey is east to west rather than vice versa. Hockey (1986) proposes 
that this is due to the phase delay of westward flight being more 
physiologically natural to the normal delay in the endogenous circadian 
rhythm. 
In a study of adaptation of ship's watchkeepers conducted by Condon et al. 
(1988a) the authors found that there was full adjustment of phase to a change 
in time zone of 30 minutes per day. The study by Condon et al. (1988a) did, 
however, find that the normal body temperature waveform was distorted 
and that " ... the peak of the daily curve occurred at a time that was earlier on 
westward journeys and later on eastward journeys, than is usual in ordinary 
circumstances." The authors propose that this distortion may be due to 
either an endogenous response of the rhythm to the shift in zeitgeber 
schedule or from alterations in sleep duration (Condon et al. 1988a). 
The implications of this adjustment are particularly noteworthy in the 
aviation industry, both from the viewpoint of multiple time zone crossings 
and the shift schedules of airline pilots. Melton and Bartanowicz (1986) 
recommend phase delayed schedules (i.e. early shifts preceding afternoon 
shifts preceding night shifts) for air traffic controllers and the avoidance of 
long schedules of midshifts (midnight to morning) and extrapolate the 
dietary recommendations for travellers to the needs of night shift workers 
by advising high protein meals before going to work, high carbohydrate, 
low protein meals upon leaving work together with caffeine in coffee or tea 
during the first half of the night shift with abstinence during the latter half. 
The authors therefore note the similarity that exists between the issue of 
adjustment from jet lag (from moving time zones) and adaptation to a 
differing shift pattern (from moving work periods). 
The adjustment from one time zone to another however is assisted by the 
presence of consistent zietgebers in the new time zone, and unless there is 
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frequent moving between time zones (as in the case of airline crew), the 
subject has the opportunity to rapidly entrain to the new time zone, where~s 
the typical shift worker usually works in one "time zone" (the shift) but lives 
in another (the non-shiftwork world with all its daily cues). One might argue 
that shiftwork presents a chronic adjustment crises, in comparison with the 
once only adjustment associated with jet lag. 
In addition to the slow time zone adjustment required on board a ship at sea, 
there is the increasing problem of jet lag associated with air travel associated 
with crew changes. There is a tendency to use air travel to redeploy ship 
crew, particularly in the offshore industry. Unless crewmembers have the 
opportunity to acclimatise to the new time zone before commencing duty, 
critical crewmembers (such as watchkeepers) risk being desynchronised in 
addition to being sleep deprived subsequent to their travel. There is at least 
one Incidents at Sea report citing jet lag as a contributing factor. 
2.6. Contributing factors: sleep deprivation and its 
consequences 
Sleep deprivation 
Sleep 
In a review of total sleep deprivation, Horne (1978) notes that sleep is 
governed by a requirement for tissue repair and restitution; non-rapid eye 
movement (non-REM) sleep, and a sleep mechanism directed towards 
protein synthesis and consolidation of memory; rapid eye movement (REM) 
sleep. Normal daily sleep duration is about 7.5 hours (with variability of 
about one hour) in the young adult with a slight decline in old age (Hockey 
1986). Studies into sleep loss usually consider either the effects of total sleep 
loss (one night), partial sleep loss (several sleep cycles) or selective sleep loss 
(Hockey 1986). The latter usually involves the prevention of a particular type 
of sleep, usually REM sleep. 
Sleep is characterised by changing levels of consciousness with alternation 
between two states -non REM sleep and REM sleep. Non-REM sleep, the 
first period after falling asleep, is characterised by a fall in heart rate and 
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blood pressure and an alternating cycle of sleep depth over approximately 90 
minute cycles throughout the night, deeper levels diminishing progressively 
over the period of sleep. Classically, there are four stages of non REM sleep 
described, the most deep (stage 4) characterised by sleepwalking, talking, 
tooth grinding and nightmares, particularly in the young. Stage 4 sleep is 
also called slow wave sleep (SWS) due to a characteristic 
electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern. 
REM sleep, also called paradoxical sleep, is associated with rapid eye 
movements, dreaming, profound muscle relaxation and an increase in blood 
pressure, pulse and breathing. REM sleep occurs for a few minutes at a time, 
but the episodes lengthen as the night progresses with changes in body 
position and body movement in alternating between non-REM and REM 
states. 
Total sleep loss 
In most real-world work settings, total sleep loss is unlikely, however as a 
worst-case scenario it is relevant to identify the consequences of this extreme 
condition. Early studies on the effect of total sleep loss on performance have 
not yielded conclusive results, however it became apparent that the effects of 
total sleep loss varied depending on the particular task under investigation. 
Williams et al. (1959) deprived 50 volunteer subjects of sleep for 98 hours and 
found that lapses increase in frequency with hours of sleep deprivation 
during a reaction time task. The authors also found that speed was adversely 
affected in subject-paced tasks whereas errors were critical in event-paced 
tasks under prolonged sleep deprivation. The authors found an increase in 
variability of reaction time - by an increase in blocks or lapses, which are 
characteristic of many studies into total sleep loss (for example, as reviewed 
by Hockey 1986). Williams et al. (1959) termed these blocks "microsleeps", 
brief periods of reduced EEG alpha amplitude, which become more common 
with fatigue. 
2.7. Other factors affecting human performance 
Though time of day and sleep deprivation appear to be the major factors 
contributing to fatigue and affecting performance, there are also a variety of 
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individual, environmental and work-related factors. Many of these factors 
have particular significance in the maritime industry with its unique 
shiftwork, technological and economic contexts. 
Time on task 
Grandjean and Kogi (1971) state that "fatigue appears to be the chief factor 
limiting a person's output... and that when the working day is lengthened, 
hourly productivity goes down ... ". Brown (1989) claims that if duty periods 
are extended for too long, there is a " ... disinclination of the human brain to 
continue producing the same response over and over again to the same 
environmental stimulus ... " - a term he called "reactive inhibition". Studies in 
which subjects are required to perform over long periods have identified 
changes in patterns of attention (Hockey 1986). 
The effect of shift length is a significant predictor of performance decrements 
and accident propensity. Hanecke et al. (1998) analysed data on 1.4 million 
accidents looking at time of day and hours at work and noted an exponential 
increase in accident risk after the 9th hour of work. The researchers were 
limited in not having available the time of commencing work, however 
Folkard (2002) in his empirical review of work hours for the U.K. Civil 
Aviation Authority noted a 30% increase in relative risk of accidents for the 
night shift compared to the day shift. Time on task and time of day (i.e. shift 
commencement time) interact in a complex manner, however it is a 
reasonable simplification to state that accident risk increases with shifts 
commencing later in the day, and also increases with the shift duration. 
The maritime setting is quite different from typical land-based eight-hour 
shift systems, as ship's watches are typically four hours in duration and the 
exponential rise in accident risk after nine hours work, as described by 
Hanecke et al. (1998), is therefore not able to be observed. 
Performance over time is also significantly influenced by the nature of the 
task; Brown (1989) observes that few tasks are truly continuous and that 
many tasks permit voluntary rests at intervals during the task. Holding 
(1983) states that" ... change per se appears to play a significant role in 
overcoming effects of fatigue ... and ... subjects may be able to compensate 
for a reduction in efficiency in meeting the demands of short tests." Most 
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importantly, Holding (1983) states that" ... tests have not examined the most 
central feature of the tonic fatigue state, that of aversion to effort...many of 
the effects of prolonged work may be seen in terms of less active control 
over behaviour and the selection of easy but risky alternatives" (Holding 
1983). 
This concept, referred to in terms of a speed-accuracy trade off is a well-
documented phenomenon of prolonged work (Hockey 1986). Bartlett's 
(1951) cockpit studies experiments showed that when pilots became fatigued, 
" ... they were willing to accept lower and lower standards of accuracy and 
performance." In addition, Bartlett (1951) found that they failed to interpret 
various instrument readings as part of a single integrated system and most 
significantly, there was a general tendency for an increase in errors at the 
end of a flight. Holding's (1983) Choice of Probability and Effort test (COPE) 
identified that after 24 - 32 hours on a multiple performance battery, subjects 
were found to be more likely to choose low effort/low probability of success 
strategies. Hockey (1989) summarises this phenomena in that " ... a prolonged 
period of cognitive overloading may put an individual into a state where any 
further effort to meet task demands is aversive." 
The classical view of fatigue proposed by Bartlett (1943) whereby there is a 
measurable deterioration in performance over time must be considered in 
association with other influencing factors. Stokes and Kite (1994) discuss the 
results of the Boeing Commercial Aircraft Company's study of fatigue-
related accidents which indicate that the number of incidents peak in the 
middle of the duty period and decrease thereafter. Simon Folkard (1997) 
considered transport accident risk as a function of time of day and time on 
task and notes both circadian performance factors will reflect time on task 
for shifts commencing at certain times. Based on the work of both Pokorny 
and Wharf, Folkard (1997) makes the observation that relative risk of 
accidents increase over the first four hours of work, then decreases to a 
minimum at about 6-8 hours, only to rise exponentially thereafter. Folkard 
(1997) notes that the relative risk decreased by nearly 30% from the first four 
hours on duty to the second four hours on duty and explains the cause of the 
transient 2-4 hour period in terms of re-automisation of skills in the latter 
part of an eight-hour shift. Condon et al. (1988b), in studies of ship's 
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watchkeepers, notes that alertness tends to decline when a spell of sleep is 
imminent. 
Time-on-task usually parallels time-since-sleep, given that many working 
days or shift periods follow a period of sleep. Nicholson and Spencer (1988) 
propose that " ... changes in performance during an irregular schedule of 
work and rest arise from both the endogenous circadian rhythm and the 
time that has elapsed since the end of the preceding rest period ... " and have 
developed a mathematical model incorporating a sinusoidal component for 
time of day and a cubic trend in time since sleep. Nicholson and Spencer 
(1988) claim that this model could be used to predict changes in performance 
at different starting times and note in particular that performance of workers 
who commence duty in the evening will rapidly fall to very low levels due to 
the combination of time of day (circadian rhythm) and time since sleep. This 
model has been presented most elegantly by Akerstedt and Folkard (1995) 
as the "Three Process Model of Alertness Regulation", where time since 
awakening, circadian influences and sleep inertia interact to affect alertness in 
a predictable manner. 
Automation 
Workload is an important human factors issue, in aviation as well as the 
maritime industry. In a study using the Airbus Industrie workload model 
where pilot error could be measured using line flights of varying workload 
and automation, Blomberg et al. (1989) suggest that there is a relationship 
between the severity and type of error and workload and that automation 
and workload are inversely related. The implication is that automation 
decreases workload and this decreased workload decreases errors and 
thereby increases safety. Though high workload could lead to errors, there is 
an optimum level of workload that provides optimum balance between 
boredom at one extreme, and overstimulation on the other. High workload 
could lead to a loss of spare capacity to attend to anything but the task in 
which the operator is engrossed (Blomberg et al. 1989). Automation allows 
the operator the capacity to concentrate on the critical task while concurrent 
non-critical or less critical tasks are executed. The issue of low workload has 
infrequently been addressed, there being need for further study as 
suggested by Blomberg et al. (1989). 
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An alternative case could be put whereby high levels of automation tend to 
encourage gross blunders rather than small errors (Blomberg et al. 1989). 
With the trend towards decreased crew size and increased automation in 
both the aviation and the maritime industry however, the relationship 
between workload, automation and errors/ safety is pivotal. Roscoe (1989) 
notes that flight deck automation is associated with an increased probability 
of pilots experiencing underload and under arousal leading to reduced 
vigilance and even complacency. 
The concern is expressed by Graeber (1989b) that low workload and the 
compromise of mental efficiency at night and after successive time zone 
crossings coupled to a decrease in (air) crew size may detrimentally affect 
decision making. Graeber (1989b) proposes that manufacturers capitalise on 
the power of on-board computers to generate high levels of attention and to 
monitor operator responses; to provide feedback to crewmembers about 
their alertness, and to provide stimulation to overcome boredom and 
sleepiness while on duty. 
The decrease in workload associated with automated systems and the 
subsequent decrease in crew size may lead to changes in crew 
communication behaviours in both normal and emergency conditions. 
Graeber (1989b) notes that crews in .advanced cockpit systems communicate 
less often with each other than do those in more traditional two-man 
cockpits and that this communication is even less frequent at night. Poor 
crew coordination has been identified as one of the prominent causes of 
aviation accidents and incidents (Lauber & Kayten 1988). 
Crew size 
Economic imperatives have pressured shipping companies and legal 
authorities to think about ways to save costs by increasing automation and 
reducing crew manning (Sablowski 1989). The Committee on the Effects of 
Smaller Crew Size on Maritime Safety (1990) note the interdependence of the 
four dimensions (technologies, people, organisational structures and the 
external environment) of the sociotechnical systems of ships. The 
introduction of new technologies, if managed in conjunction with the other 
three dimensions may result in improved health, safety, quality of work life 
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and operating efficiency, however " ... the extent to which technology, 
implementation, and associated crew reductions increase the risks of stress, 
fatigue and boredom is not precisely known, since little research has been 
devoted to stress in the shipboard environment" (Committee on the Effects 
of Smaller Crew Size on Maritime Safety 1990). 
The two possible major effects of reduced crew size are overload, due to 
increased work hours and the more specialised nature of the work, (with 
reduced extra capacity in times of high work intensity), and underload and 
decreased vigilance due to the automation that invariably accompanied 
decreased crew size. Either extreme may result in fatigue and concomitant 
performance decrement with consequences for safety and efficiency. 
Decreased crew size and automation present the risk that the navigator 
could become detached from the operation of the system by becoming a 
passive monitor in systems that remove much of the active content from the 
job, without decreasing the need for vigilance (Committee on the Effects of 
Smaller Crew Size on Maritime Safety 1990). Additional difficulties are 
encountered as a result of the non standard arrangement of ship bridges, 
lack of integration of navigational equipment and poor ergonomic bridge 
design without consideration for the ultimate user (Committee on the Effects 
of Smaller Crew Size on Maritime SC1fety 1990). 
Decreased crew size has led to changes in the way modem vessels are 
manned, with the introduction of integrated bridge systems and single 
handed bridge operations, and integration of deck and engine room 
operation. In times where wages were not a major factor in vessel running 
costs, even small pilot vessels had manned engine rooms with separate 
engine and deck departments. In the modem ship's operation centre, routine 
navigational tasks, and controls for essential vessel functions are automated 
and centralised allowing a single operator control of all vital functions of the 
vessel. The Committee on the Effects of Smaller Crew Size on Maritime 
Safety (1990) note that" ... when systems are working properly, this 
environment may be stimulating enough to keep the officer on the bridge 
awake and alert. On the other hand, it may be distracting enough to degrade 
performance on critical course keeping and collision-avoidance tasks." 
Studies that have evaluated the impact of automated bridge systems on 
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performance have been inconclusive (Committee on the Effects of Smaller 
Crew Size on Maritime Safety 1990). 
Single-handed bridges where the watchk~eper serves as helmsman operate 
either legally or without permission. The success of such an operation in 
simulation studies requires that ship control tasks change from active control 
actions to passive monitoring activities. There is the risk that operators may 
be reduced to a role of passive monitors of control systems. This issue is 
addressed in the section on human factors and automation and it is 
noteworthy that the argument in favour of automation in the aviation 
industry may be considered in quite a different light in the maritime 
industry. The control of a ship by a single fallible person may present a 
higher risk to life and property than the control of an aircraft by two-flight 
crew rather than three. In addition, the system redundancies, alarms and 
ground control requirements in aviation, coupled with "voyages" measured 
in hours rather than days and weeks may further require the maritime 
industry being considered in quite a different light. 
The operation of a ship has been traditionally divided into a deck department 
and an engine department with lines of demarcation between the two areas 
of expertise. Both departments have operated separate, but around-the -
clock watches with little if no integration. Automated engine rooms relieve 
the engine department of standing the traditional watch system and allow 
control of the engines to be conducted from the bridge. Most commercial 
shipping currently has capacity for unmanned engine rooms (unmanned 
machinery space) with implications in both automation (e.g. bridge 
monitoring of engine functions) and crew size. The US Coast Guard, Marine 
Safety Manual does, however, stipulate that vessels with automated engine 
departments carry sufficient crew to safeguard it if all the automated systems 
fail (Committee on the Effects of Smaller Crew Size on Maritime Safety 
1990). In addition, engineers operating vessels in unmanned machinery space 
mode no longer stand watches and are on call outside their normal rostered 
hours (Committee on the Effects of Smaller Crew Size on Maritime Safety 
1990). The effect of being on-call places this group of workers in a position 
where they may suffer additional anxiety and stress, sleep loss and 
performance decrements. 
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Medical conditions, sleep apnoea and minor illnesses 
Though it is beyond the scope of this literature review to detail a health 
profile of the maritime industry, some picture can be painted of the health of 
seafarers and comments made on the possible consequences of health on 
performance. A number of disorders such as sleep apnoea do have a direct 
effect on sleepiness and therefore performance. Seafarers have higher than 
average incidence of specific diseases, some of which may be related to the 
seafaring lifestyle. In addition, some studies indicate a significantly higher 
incidence of personal accidents both at sea and ashore, a statistic which may 
indicate that seafarers exhibit risk-taking behaviour in addition to the 
occupational risks involved in seafaring. 
Health profile of the maritime industry 
In a series of three studies, Filikowski et al. (1992) examined the health of 
over 10,000 Polish seafarers over a ten year period from 1971 and found an 
increase in the incidence of neuroses, arterial hypertension, ulcers of the 
stomach and duodenum and renal calculi. The incidence of alcohol 
dependency decreased over that ten-year period. 
Carel, Carmil and Keinan (1990) in a historical prospective study of a group 
of 144 ship captains and marine chief engineers found that though there 
were certain behavioural risk factors more dominant among seamen, there 
were only mild differences in biochemical and physiological health 
parameters as compared to a reference group of matched controls. The 
sample group, though not representative of the general seafaring 
population, reported higher levels of smoking, alcohol (>3 glasses per week) 
and coffee consumption, utilisation of medications and lack of physical 
activities, however only heavy smoking differed statistically significantly 
between the two groups. The specific sample group " ... tended to show 
greater satisfaction at work and in life in general compared with the controls. 
They also indicated fewer complaints that could indicate depression, anxiety 
and burnout." The authors concede that though captains and chief engineers 
possess more behavioural and physiological risk factors than the control 
group, the slight differences in health indices may be attributable to the 
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healthy worker effect, the self-selected nature of the group and the balancing 
effect of their high positions. 
Rafnsson and Gunnarsdottir (1992 and 1993) investigated both fatal accidents 
at sea and fatal accidents occurring other than at sea among Icelandic Seamen 
and claim that " ... fatal accidents at sea are about 36 to 50 times more frequent 
than occupational accidents ashore." In addition to occupational accidents, 
Rafnsson and Gunnarsdottir (1993) deduced that " ... seamen seem to be a 
special group with a high risk of fatal accidents," based on the standardised 
mortality ratio of 1.83 for death due to accidents, poisoning and violence. 
They also found that " .. .length of employment was associated with higher 
risk of accidents unrelated to work indicating that seamen may have riskier 
lifestyles and that " ... more experienced than inexperienced seamen died in 
accidents and drowned at sea" (Rafnsson & Gunnarsdottir 1993). 
The effect of minor illnesses 
Smith (1992) reviews the effects of minor illnesses such as the common cold 
on performance and notes that: 
• Influenza impairs performance on tasks where a person is unsure of 
whether a signal will appear. 
• Colds impair psychomotor performance slowing speed of response 
and reducing eye-hand coordination. 
• Performance is impaired prior to the development of symptoms and 
can persist into convalescence. 
• Minor illnesses make the individual more susceptible to the effects of 
other factors, such as prolonged work or noise. 
Incidents at Sea rarely refer to the presence of minor illness as a factors 
contributing to accidents, however people living in close confinement are 
frequently susceptible to respiratory illnesses, which coupled to time of day 
and sleep factors may result in considerable performance deficits. 
Sleeping disorders 
Obstructive sleep apnoea is a likely factor contributing to excessive daytime 
sleepiness, fatigue and performance deficits. Gander et al. (1998), notes that 
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while obstructive sleep apnoea affects up to 4% of the adult male population, 
some occupational groups exhibit a greater incidence, quoting one US study 
(n=156) claiming that 46% of commercial truck drivers suffered from 
moderate to severe sleep apnoea. Gander et al. (1998) notes that large neck 
size, age, regular snoring and excessive daytime sleepiness are risk factors 
for sleep apnoea. Parker and Hubinger (1998), in their on-tour analysis of 176 
work assignments involving 23 Great Barrier Reef pilots note that a 
considerable number of pilots were classified as either overweight or obese 
as well as a considerable number reporting experiencing breathing 
difficulties while sleeping. A questionnaire survey of 263 Australian transport 
drivers found that 6% of drivers had a diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnoea, 
but a Multi.variate Apnoea Prediction questionnaire and polysomnographic 
studies supported an obstructive sleep apnoea incidence of 18% (Howard et 
al. 2000). The authors' results mirrored those of other studies (such as 
Stepanski et al. 1984) in that sleep apnoea resulted in fragmented sleep, and 
excessive daytime sleepiness. 
Johns (2000) notes that though sleep apnoea may increase an individual's 
instantaneous sleep propensity, subjects will avoid situations or modify their 
behaviour in situations where sleep onset may occur if they are required to 
perform tasks such as driving or operating machinery. 
Drugs 
Drugs could be considered from both the viewpoint of the intentional 
modification of behaviour, either stimulation for periods of activity or 
depression to facilitate sleep, or from the viewpoint of the side effects of 
recreational drugs such as caffeine, alcohol and marijuana. 
The performance enhancing effects of amphetamines such as Benzedrine has 
been known and utilised in military applications since the Second World War 
(Mackworth 1950). Dopamine transmission acts to maintain wakefulness and 
amphetamines act to stimulate wakefulness by stimulating dopamine 
receptors in the reticular activating system (Nicholson & Pascoe 1988). 
Mackworth (1950) investigated these actions in post-war vigilance research, 
finding that Benzedrine (amphetamine) improved both speed and accuracy 
(particularly the latter) in a battery of vigilance tests. Buysse (1991) states that 
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amphetamines increase sleep latency, decrease total sleep time and sleep 
efficiency, increase body movements, increase REM latency and decrease the 
amount of REM sleep. Krueger (1989) reviews the use of sedatives and 
hypnotics, ranging from tryptophan and benzodiazepines to facilitate rest 
and sleep prior to military missions (such as the raid on Entebbe). 
Caffeine and other methylxanthines block adenosine receptors and enhance 
wakefulness (Mendelson 2001). Caffeine leads to marked sleep disturbances, 
increases wakefulness and drowsy sleep and reduces slow wave sleep (SWS) 
and total sleep time (Nicholson & Pascoe 1988). Caffeine attenuates the 
decrease in overnight performance and improves performance and vigilance 
during the day. (Nicholson & Pascoe 1988). Weiss and Laties (1962) however, 
make the point that performance is not normally improved unless 
previously suppressed by fatigue and boredom. 
The effects of alcohol on performance are well documented in the transport, 
aviation and shipping industry and there are frequently legislative and 
company restrictions that apply to blood alcohol concentration or periods of 
abstinence prior to work. The extensive body of road safety research 
indicates that alcohol exerts a marked influence on tracking tasks, causes a 
deficit in information processing rate with a marked shift towards fast, 
inaccurate performance. (Hockey 1986). In addition, alcohol effects include 
problems with the acquisition of new material, with storage of order 
infontlation more of a problem than that of item information (Hockey 1986). 
The relationship between performance following sleep deprivation and 
performance following ingestion of alcohol (Lamond & Dawson 1999) 
facilitates comparison between these two variables (i.e. 20 hours of sustained 
wakefulness equates to a performance with a blood alcohol concentration of 
0.10%) 
The new 1995 amendments to the IMO International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers advises 
governments to prescribe a maximum of 0.08% blood alcohol level (BAC) for 
seafarers during watchkeeping and to prohibit alcohol consumption within 4 
hours prior to serving as a member of the watch (The revised STCW 
convention 1995). It appears incongruous that though the new Convention is 
" ... arguably the most important development concerning the improvement 
53 
of maritime safety in over a decade" (The revised STCW convention 1995) it 
is still within the spirit of the standards that a watchkeeper may navigate a 
100,000 tonne tanker with a blood alcohol concentration almost twice the 
legal limit of an automobile driver. 
The physical environment 
As distinct from continuous or sustained operations that have been discussed 
previously, the watchkeeping environment may also be contributory to 
fatigue. Human factors research involves the study of ergonomic design to 
adapt both work demands to human capabilities and human performance to 
work demands (Luczac 1991). The watchkeeping environment has changed 
dramatically in recent years, from the exposed ships wheel in traditional 
sailing ships, to the semi open wheelhouse in small coastal vessels (and as 
currently applies to most coastal fishing vessels). to the environmentally 
controlled bridge of a modem supertanker. Each watchkeeping situation 
presents its own environmental and ergonomic difficulties including heat and 
cold, noise, motion, visibility, exposure to climactic variation, illumination, 
and chemical and gaseous contamination. 
The majority of performance studies have centred around heat and noise, 
however, aerospace medicine has also provided the impetus for work on the 
effects of gravity, acceleration and deceleration, and, along with diving and 
hyperbaric medicine, the effects of pressure. There is surprisingly little 
evidence of research on (sea) motion sickness in the medical literature. 
Noise 
The presence of unwanted sound on a ship bridge results from the constant 
sound and vibration of the ship's engines, the noise of wind and sea and to a 
lesser extent, the intermittent use of sound signalling devices. 
Jones and Broadbent (1987) review the effects of noise on performance and 
describe deleterious as well as performance-enhancing effects. Performance 
will be temporarily disrupted by sudden bursts of noise, which may affect 
posture (due to the startle reflex) or intake of information (due to masking 
signals). Background speech will have damaging effects on remembering 
verbal material and continual unvarying noise will have damaging effects on 
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performance at the end of a long period of work Gones & Broadbent 1987). 
The effect of noise may, however, counteract the effect of sleep loss. 
Corcoran (1962) found that noise was arousing and reduced the decline in 
performance that is normally associated with loss of sleep. The author notes, 
however that separately, noise and sleep loss both serve to decrease 
performance. Noise usually accentuates strategies resulting in more extreme 
judgements and more confidence in the adequacy of a decision, even though 
this may be unwarranted Gones & Broadbent 1987). 
The effects of noise on watchkeeping and the interrelation of noise with 
other variables are not well documented. From the above studies, noise may 
contribute to erroneous and risky decision making and concentration on 
particular sources of information on the bridge, phenomena well 
documented in accident reports (Bryant 1991). 
Finally, noise effects memory and cognition, however researchers have 
observed that continuous noise improves recall of the dominant aspects of a 
stimulus but impairs recall of contextual and spatial information surrounding 
the dominant stimulus (Hockey & Hamilton 1970). This tendency is described 
as the incidental-learning paradigm. Other researchers have found that 
increased alertness during learning facilitates recall after a delay but impairs 
immediate retrieval of the material (Kleinsmith & Kaplan 1963), though 
interpretation of this research is confounded by the often-different nature of 
tests of immediate recall and delayed recall (Hockey 1986). 
The effect of noise on a ship bridge has the potential to affect watchkeepers 
decision making, tending towards more extreme decisions, based on the 
most dominant information with decreased accuracy with speed of cognitive 
activity. Though noise may enhance delayed recall, decision-making may be 
hampered by decreased immediate recall. 
Heat and cold 
A second significant environmental variable affecting performance is that of 
heat and cold. In the modem ship's bridge, the temperature is controlled by 
air conditioning and ventilation systems - a far cry from the open wheel on 
the deck, exposed to the ravages of wind and weather. Rarely would a 
watchkeeper suffer exposure to environmental temperatures so extreme, 
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save for accidental immersion or tropical heat in brief periods on deck. The 
work in the engine department is quite a different matter with extremes of 
temperature and noise being experienced for virtually all of the time during 
the working period. Much of the research in the area of extremes of climate 
has centred on the determination of performance and length of continuous 
work in varying conditions of humidity and temperature under different 
types of work. The body has some capacity to adapt to changes in 
environmental temperature, however there is some cost both 
physiologically and in terms of performance. 
Hockey (1986) describes the performance changes in cognitive reaction time 
associated with heat as including a clear trade off between time and 
temperature. Exposures to temperatures above 35°C should be limited to 
less than 2.5 hours, however continuous performance tasks are almost 
independent of exposure time, but sensitive to temperature increases above 
30°C. Hockey (1986) notes that artificial increases in body temperature are 
not inductive to increases in performance unlike the increased temperature 
associated with circadian fluctuations in body temperature. 
Extremes of temperature and humidity are unlikely to play a significant role 
in the performance of deck watchkeepers, except for brief periods of 
exposure to climatic factors in tropical or artic environments and during 
exposure to enclosed machinery spaces. This situation contrasts strongly to 
that of the engineer watchkeeper. 
The job environment 
Finkelman (1994) conducting a large database study (n=lOO OOO) of factors 
associated with work-induced fatigue identified 3705 reports of fatigue. The 
study surveyed the employee database of a large regional employment 
agency in California and identified lack of job challenge as the major cause of 
fatigue (Finkelman 1994). Poor supervision ranked second with supervisor 
attributes being described as demanding, uncaring, unreasonable and unfair 
(Finkelman 1994). Less than 3% of temporary employees reported lack of 
sleep as a contributory factor, sleep deprivation being mainly due to travel 
between two assignments, work and financial anxiety and in some cases, the 
physical demands of the work (Finkelman 1994). From the database study, 
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the author interprets five factors thought to be associated with either 
perceived or actual fatigue: 
• Inadequate information processing demands; high information 
processing assignments being far less likely to be associated with 
reports of job fatigue than low information processing assignments, 
• Lack of job control, 
• Ineffective job performance 
• Low pay rate, 
• Low physical demands. 
Finkelman {1994) concludes that the physical demands of a job assignment 
had the lowest correlation with reporting of fatigue whereas information 
processing demands of a job assignment had the highest correlation with 
reported job fatigue; assignments with an inadequate level of information 
processing were most likely to be associated with fatigue on the job. 
2.8. Human error, watchkeeping and accidents 
The concept of human factors and human error 
The term human factors or human element has achieved popular usage in 
contemporary literature; the term human error indicating component failure 
where human intervention is involved as a component of a complex system. 
Bryant (1991) observes that separation of the human and technological 
elements of complex systems is difficult in practice and argues that" ... 
seafaring is a way of life that cannot be separated from the physical 
environment and the technology that supports it." Similar views are 
expressed by Nitka and Dolmierski (1987), Nitka {1989 and 1990), and 
Dolmierski et al. {1990). 
Human behaviour is far from totally predictable (Bryant 1991), however in 
most countries, attempts are made to analyse accidents with the view that 
human factors could be identified and behaviours studied and hopefully 
modified. Bryant {1991) proposes that marine casualty investigations are 
undertaken to explain and understand the event, to establish blame and 
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liability and to comply with legal requirements. While some aspects of 
marine accidents may be able to be explained using the laws of physics, 
aspects involving human behaviour may not follow some scientifically 
reliable and valid pattern. However, from a cognitive control viewpoint, 
there is some predicability in error forms, as Reason (1990) states "far from 
being rooted in irrational and maladaptive tendencies, these recurrent error 
forms have their origins in fundamentally useful psychological processes." 
Reason (1990) claims that there are a limited number of ways in which errors 
may manifest themselves, depending on the" 'computational primitives' by 
which stored ~owledge structures are selected and retrieved in response to 
current situational demands". 
Error modelling systems 
James Reason (1990) defines an error as a generic term to encompass those 
occasions in which a planned sequence of mental and physical activities fails 
to achieve its intended outcomes and when these failures cannot be 
attributed to some change agency. It is evident therefore that human errors 
are possibly contributory to incidents or accidents, however it is not 
sufficient or necessary that an error may cause an accident. 
Reason (1990) explains this in terms of the failures in the elements of 
production in complex systems, namely corporate decision making, line 
management, preconditions (skilled workforce and reliable equipment), 
production activities (the interaction of human and mechanical elements) and 
defences against foreseeable hazards. 
The model of accident causation due to human error proposed by Reason 
(1990) describes "windows" of weaknesses in "planes" of production, such 
that if all the "windows" line up, an accident results. This is the basis of 
contemporary "risk management" approaches to workplace safety. 
Reason's (1990) planes of human contribution to breakdown of complex 
systems are: 
1. Fallible decisions by designers or managerial decision makers. 
Fallible decisions are constrained by the conflicting goals of safety and 
production. In incidents at sea, a fallible decision might include 
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inappropriate or insufficient policy on manning levels, passage 
planning or operational instructions. 
2. Line Management Deficiencies. Training and supervision act in 
concord to ensure that managerial decisions are carried out effectively 
and efficiently. A maritime example is the lack of proper monitoring 
by the watch officer or leaving navigation to unqualified hands. 
3. Psychological precursors of unsafe acts. Each single precursor may 
contribute to many unsafe acts and such precursors may have no 
relation to the workplace (for example, home stress, illnesses and 
marriage breakdown). The maritime setting might include such 
psychological precursors as drinking during and before duty, 
intentional sleep restriction, attitudes of laxity and allowing personal 
problems to interfere with work demands. 
4. Unsafe acts. Whereas preceding contributors are latent failures, unsafe 
acts are active failures - either by omission or commission, in the 
presence of a hazard. Unsafe acts involve the error types that will be 
discussed below - slips, lapses, mistakes and violations. In the 
maritime setting, such acts include overloading holds, ignoring 
signals, leaving the bridge, falling asleep and failing to alter course. 
5. Inadequate defences. These are also active failures and present a 
limited window of opportunity to remedy the consequences of an 
unsafe act. Very few unsafe acts result in damage or injury and with 
"defences in depth" such as in nuclear power plants, unsafe acts are 
less likely to cause an incident. Maritime examples are failing to 
recognise that a vessel is aground, failing to ascertain injuries after an 
accident and failure to summon assistance. 
Reason's (1990) classification of human contributions to breakdown of 
complex systems as described above is entirely appropriate to the maritime 
setting- one has only to reflect on the "Titanic" disaster to readily classify 
the human contributions of that incident according to the above categories. 
Proctor and van Zandt (1994) review the acquisition of cognitive skill in 
expert systems and describes the levels of behavioural controls that interact 
in determining performance in specific situations proposed by Jens 
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Rasmussen (1986). Reason's Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) is 
based on Rasmussen' s three performance levels, namely: 
1. The skill-based level; stored patterns of pre-programmed and 
largely automated instructions used as routine actions in familiar 
environments, 
2. The Rule-based level; stored rules or procedures derived through 
instruction or experience and operating at a conscious level, 
3. The Knowledge-based level occurs in situations for which no rules 
are applicable. Performance at this level involves problem solving, 
reasoning and decision-making. 
Reason's (1990) Generic Error Modelling System uses Rasmussen's levels of 
behavioural controls to further subdivide slips and lapses, and mistakes. 
Reason defines slips and lapses as failures in execution and/ or storage of an 
action sequence regardless of whether the plan which guided them was 
adequate to achieve its objective, and mistakes as deficiencies or failures in 
the judgement and/ or inferential process involved in the selection of an 
objective or in the specification of the means of achieving it irrespective of 
whether or not the actions directed by this decision scheme run according to 
plan. 
The three error types described by Reason (1990) are therefore: 
1. Skill-based slips and lapses such as inattention, omissions, confusion 
and interference errors. Much of an experienced navigator's 
performance is skill-based. 
2. Rule-based mistakes such as misapplying good rules or applying bad 
rules. Factors such as information overload, encoding deficiencies and 
existence of inelegant or inadvisable rules. Numerous formal 
navigational rules exist as well as less formal custom and practice. 
3. Knowledge-based mistakes result from failure in the powerful, yet 
slow serial and effortful "on-line" reasoning. Problem configurations 
may be static (such as in many psychometric tests of performance) or 
dynamic (such as in real world situations). Navigation involves 
multiple dynamic configurations where strategies are developed to 
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manoeuvre large vessels, through a dynamic medium (the sea) in 
context with other dynamic structures (other vessels, tugs and 
sometimes aircraft). 
Human error, watchkeeping and the task of navigation 
Navigation of a ship is a slow system feedback model, whereby the actions 
of the navigator do not immediately result in any meaningful feedback 
(Bryant 1988). In addition to this lead time, navigation is also affected by tide, 
weather, water density and depth as well the complex mechanical systems as 
involved in propulsion and steerage of the vessel. The navigator must also 
be able to accommodate an increasing sophistication of instruments such as 
electronic charts, radar, satellite and other electronic navigation systems and 
incorporate this additional information, along with environmental and 
mechanical factors in a complex decision making process to ensure the safe 
command of the ship. Such decision-making behaviour could be described as 
predictive rather than reactive. 
The implications of failure in the slow system feedback notion of ship 
handling coupled to a complex man-machine interface could be illustrated in 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster where management failure in a 
complex, dynamic environment led to a nuclear explosion (Luczac 1991). The 
disaster resulted from deficits in knowledge-based and social-interactive 
behaviour where 'intelligent idiots', intelligent enough to act as reactor 
operatives, but not intelligent enough to be aware of the consequences of 
their actions, brought the reactor to an unstable condition, with all automatic 
safety devices switched off, by following imperative orders with respect to 
an intended, but unauthorised test (Luczac 1991). Rasmussen (1986) describes 
similar deficiencies in the Three Mile Island disaster. 
From the above analyses, neither overload, nor fatigue of the operators 
were major contributory causes, nor was automation alone a factor in these 
disasters, but a combination of management and system design interfacing 
with willing but uncritical human operators. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Methodological approach 
The central research question and three related questions are best addressed 
from a qualitative stance. The basis for this approach is that: 
1. Incidents at Sea reports are individual textual documents containing a 
rich body of description, analysis, interpretation and conclusion (for an 
example of an Incident at Sea Report, see Appendix 1). Each report can 
stand alone, is unique and needs no reference to other reports. 
Incidents At Sea reports are not presented as statistical (or numerical) 
data, 
2. The conclusions of Incidents at Sea reports are informed opinions of 
skilled and experienced investigators, and are therefore already the 
result of some interpretation. They do not necessarily have the raw 
data that might be necessary for a statistical analysis, 
3. Not all incidents at sea are investigated. Though there is a requirement 
for investigators to investigate incidents according to certain statutory 
criteria, for various reasons (such as simply failing to report an 
incident) not all incidents are investigated. 
There is, however, some argument for utilising a quantitative, though not 
statistical, component to this study on the following basis: 
1. Incidents at Sea reports in Australia are structured (i.e. have an 
introduction, summary, incident description, analysis and conclusions) 
and include all incidents required by statute to be investigated (though 
noting point 3 above), 
2. The collective body of Incidents at Sea reports (almost 2000 
paragraphs in summaries and conclusions alone) comprises data that 
can be used to establish themes, trends and patterns, 
3. Conclusions of Incidents at Sea reports are comprehensive (i.e. contain 
latent and active errors, human and mechanical and environmental 
contributors), are mutually exclusive and are expressed in 
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behavioural, non-judgemental terms. A collection of 1224 mutually 
exclusive, behaviourally described conclusions forms a quantitatively 
valid (though not necessarily statistically valid) data set from which 
subsets of data can be extracted. 
4. Software (such as NUDUST) currently exists that readily allows 
quantification of textual data in an investigative manner that was not 
possible with previous manual methods. 
The methodological approach therefore used has been largely qualitative, 
looking at patterns, themes and ultimately coding and categorising text from 
Incidents at Sea reports. In addition some quantification of categories, 
particularly in respect of the "time of day" component where the incidence 
of particular behaviours during specific watch-keeping periods, were 
analysed. 
3.2. Textual analysis 
In this study, fatigue is considered from the viewpoint of the marine incident 
investigator and fatigue is primarily examined in the context of marine 
incident reports. Thus, the research objective is to show the way in which 
marine incident investigators identify fatigue as a possible cause of incidents 
and what possible fatigue-induced behaviours are implicit in marine incident 
reports. 
There are two perceptions of fatigue that may be expressed in marine 
incident reports - firstly the individual subjective experiences of fatigue 
experienced by personnel on board ships (including watchkeepers) and 
secondly, the interpretation given to these experiences by accident 
investigators. In examining these perceptions, textual analysis approaches 
such as content analysis, analytical semantics and hermeneutics could be 
applied to Incidents at Sea reports. 
In analytical semantics, text, particularly sentences, is interpreted against 
certain linguistic, logical, semantic or empirical claims (Lindkvist 1981). 
Sentences could be described in terms of their functions: analytical, synthetic, 
expressive, prescriptive and performative (Lindkvist 1981). The aim of 
analytical semantics is thus to eliminate ambiguity by showing the internal 
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connection of the meaning of text (Lindkvist 1981). Semantic analysis of 
Incidents at Sea reports would identify meaning within strategically selected 
sentences that may determine whether the function of the text unit was, for 
example, to ask about the effects of fatigue, to interpret some information 
that had been provided, to express an opinion of the investigator or to 
prescribe some course of action as a result of some finding. Such an approach 
may be of use in determining the purpose of component parts of an 
investigation report, however the component sections of Incidents at Sea 
reports are invariably well contextualised. For example the text section of a 
report includes a summary, sources of information, sequence of events, 
comment, conclusions and subsequent action, which pre-empt the functions 
of component sentences. Unfortunately, transcripts of investigator's 
interviews are not readily available, but such documentary material could be 
analysed semantically in order to decrease uncertainty and better establish 
the reality of the event. An appropriate incident would be the grounding of 
the vessel TNT Alltrans on Lady Musgrove Island, which was a Court of 
Marine Enquiry (rather than an Incident Report), where evidence was 
circumstantial, conflicting, ambiguous and subject to expert professional 
testimony. 
Hermeneutics considers the hidden meaning of text, emphasising the basic 
questions of thought (Lindkvist 1981). Lindkvist (1981) notes that text says 
nothing beyond what we knew before, and the text itself points to the 
method to which it is to be interpreted. As a phenomenological approach, 
hermeneutics is subjective, allowing the analyst to" 'enter the language', 
engage oneself as a subject, be influenced by the text" in order to understand 
the textual meaning (Lindkvist 1981). Hermeneutics is not a suitable 
methodology for relatively well-structured archival text, and it is unlikely 
that Incidents at Sea reports exhibit any "hidden meaning". 
Finally, content analysis, as defined by Krippendorff (1980) is a " ... research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their 
context." Content analysis formed a suitable methodological basis for this 
study and arguments for its application are proposed. 
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3.3. Content analysis 
Following Krippendorff's (1980) definition of content analysis, it is a 
"research technique" in that specialised procedures are used for processing 
scientific data and it is "replicable" in that, as an instrument of science, other 
researchers using the same data must be able to obtain the same results. 
These aspects of content analysis are reiterated by Lindkvist (1981) who 
discusses content analysis as a method for objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of a text. 
The place of procedures and impartiality of the researcher (objective) and the 
use of rules to ensure validity (systematic) are supported by Lindkvist (1981), 
however the issue of quantification versus generality is enigmatic. In most 
cases, the results obtained depend on the questions asked and content 
analysis (particularly using the speed and flexibility of a computer) allows the 
posing of theoretical questions and establishing meaning from the text based 
on those questions. This is supported by Lindkvist (1981) who states " ... only 
by linking data together with theoretical questions is analysis meaningful." 
In this study, examples of theoretical questions posed during analysis of 
Incident Reports included: 
• What is the incidence of fatigue being determined as contributory to an 
incident? 
• What is the nature and incidence of human error in conclusions of 
Incidents at Sea reports? 
• What behaviours, consistent with being in a fatigued state, are evident 
in Incidents at Sea reports, and what is the distribution of those 
behaviours through the six watchkeeping periods? 
• What part does sleep deprivation play in accident causation? 
• How does the need for sleep, being asleep and the watchkeeping 
routine affect fatigue behaviours and possibly contribute to marine 
accidents? How do watchkeepers balance the need for sleep with 
operational demands? 
• Who are the major contributors to marine incidents (i.e. master, mate, 
pilot etc)? 
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• What are the differences in behaviours, time of day and incident type 
for each of the major contributors? 
Krippendorff (1980) claims that the requirement to be quantitative is 
restrictive and qualitative methods in content analysis have had many 
successful outcomes. Content analysis could quantify meaning through 
sampling, coding, recording and finally interpretation of textual information. 
Applications include the analysis of newspaper editorials, advertising, mass 
media, political speeches and propaganda, both from a quantitative (for 
example, the number of references to women in a political speech) and a 
qualitative viewpoint (for example, an anthropological analysis of the 
meaning of linguistic symbols). In this study, content analysis was used both 
in a qualitative (e.g. the development of the concept of fatigue behaviours) 
and quantitative (e.g. the differing distribution of these fatigue behaviours 
across the six watchkeeping periods) manner. In each case, text units (i.e. 
paragraphs) were isolated from the text, coded, contextualised (both again 
with the original text and with similarly coded paragraphs), interpreted and 
discussed. The software readily allowed both an objective and systematic 
coding of text units as well as contextualising the text unit within its origins 
and the wider data set of incident reports. 
In defining content analysis, Krippendorff (1980) stresses two misleading 
connotations. First, " ... messages do not have a single meaning that needs to 
be unwrapped" which signifies that text may contain many simultaneous 
messages. Secondly, "meanings need not be shared" (Krippendorff 1980). 
These two issues are central to the research questions stated in the previous 
section. What is perceived as a fatigue inducing factor by a seafarer may be 
considered a reasonable requirement of employment by a shipping 
company and similarly, fatigue induced behaviour as described by a 
watchkeeper may be interpreted as lack of attention by an accident 
investigator. Krippendorff (1980) notes that messages and communication 
generally are about phenomena other than those directly observed and that 
the receiver must make inferences according to his empirical environment -
the context of the data. 
In comparison with other research techniques, Krippendorff (1980) claims 
that content analysis has the following distinctions: 
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1. Content analysis is an unobtrusive technique. Any act of measurement 
will interfere with the behaviour of the phenomena being assessed -
creating increasing! y contaminated observations the deeper the observer 
probes (Krippendorff 1980). Laboratory investigations of fatigue, 
particularly those involving behavioural or subjective dependent 
variables, by their contrived nature frequently lack ecological validity. 
Incidents at Sea reports, being retrospective analyses of actual events have 
high ecological validity and contain data about the possible presence of 
fatigue as a contributing cause of accident as well as interpretation on the 
part of accident investigators - all occurring in the natural environment of 
the sea or during an actual accident investigation respectively. 
2. Content analysis accepts unstructured material. The data language used 
in content analysis is that of the message sender rather than the 
engineered language of the receiver I analyst. One difficulty facing 
historians and of retrospective study in general is that the text exists in a 
form that may have never been designed for interpretation and even 
prospective studies may fail to generate the questions that may support 
or refute a hypothesis. Weber (1985) notes that such material may exist 
over long periods of time - even centuries, thereby providing a source for 
generation of cultural indicators from such historical unstructured data. 
Incidents at Sea reports however, could hardly be termed unstructured-
on the contrary, they are the result of a methodical investigation as 
specified in the Regulations of the Navigation Act. The regulations apply 
to investigation for the purposes of identifying the circumstances in which 
an incident occurred and to determine its cause rather than for the 
purposes of research, though the Marine Incident Investigation Unit does 
maintain a database holding the essential details of each incident reported 
for use in research and for the publication of statistics. Incidents at Sea 
reports are structured for the purpose of meeting statutory requirements, 
determining cause and for statistical purposes. The use of these reports for 
determining a relationship between fatigue behaviours, sleep and accident 
may render them "unstructured" for this purpose. 
3. Content analysis is context sensitive and thereby able to process 
symbolic forms. Krippendorff (1980) cites two reasons why a researcher 
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may wish to interpret data in context. Firstly, verbal data is symbolic 
phenomena, and exists in reference to its contextual surroundings. 
Secondly, data may exist in a context " ... that is neither shared nor 
conceptualised in a manner similar to that of the individual 
communicators or subjects involved." Content analysis allows the 
researcher to establish not only the meaning of the data but to analyse 
data in its original context and in ~ther contexts developed by the 
researcher. In Incidents at Sea reports, the data exists in the context of the 
statutory requirement to determine the cause of incidents, however a 
researcher may wish to view the data in the context of the human element 
as a contributing cause of accidents, fatigue behaviours or perhaps the 
perception of fatigue by incident investigators. 
4. Content analysis can cope with large volumes of data. Though small and 
\ unique bodies of text could be subject to content analysis, the data 
generated could quickly exceed the capacity of a single researcher 
(Krippendorff 1980). This dilemma has historically been addressed by 
instituting a collaborative team of researchers and assistants that code and 
analyse considerable quantities of textual information. More recently, 
computer analysis of unstructured data has been readily achievable using 
personal computers and the Internet has not only assisted in the exchange 
of textual material, analytical software and methodological discussion but 
has been subject of considerable content analysis as a contemporary mass 
media. 
Weber (1985) cites two additional advantages of content analysis over 
other data generating and analysis techniques: 
5. Content analysis operates directly on text or transcript of human 
communication, which is itself a central aspect of social interaction. This 
differs from approaches whereby meaning, interpretation and linguistic 
aspects of co~munication are analysed. Though content analysis operates 
directly on text, Incidents at Sea reports are the result of an interpretive 
process. It could be argued that interview transcripts, communication 
records and original reports from those under investigation should form 
the text that is directly analysed. 
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6. Both qualitative and quantitative operations on text can be utilised. This 
thereby combines the complimentary strengths of what are sometimes 
thought to be antithetical modes of analysis. 
Krippendorff (1980) describes three systems used in content analysis. Firstly, 
he describes the extrapolation of trends; an early form of content analysis 
(for example Speeds 1893 analysis of New York dailies). More recently, John 
Naisbitt (1982) has used content analysis in a futures study to project trends 
in the coming decade in his popular books Megatrends. In this analysis of 
Incidents at Sea reports, the determination of trends (across watchkeeping 
periods, with major human contributors and with incident type) formed a 
major component of the analysis. These trends are expounded in the 
discussion. The frequency and quality of reference to fatigue as a 
contributing cause of incidents at sea (or increasing awareness by incident 
investigators of fatigue) was not analysed due to the small sample size (being 
only seven reports where fatigue was contributory). 
The predictive use of patterns is a second content analysis system whereby 
patterns in text have predicability regardless of particular contents 
(Krippendorff 1980). In this study, watchkeeper's behaviour was isolated 
from the context of the incident, and patterns across watchkeeping periods 
were established. The patterns of behaviour resulting from fatigue found in 
these real life incidents appeared to be consistent with those found under 
experimental conditions and described in the scientific literature. 
Finally, content analysis may assess" ... the differences in messages 
generated by two communicators, by one source in two different situations, 
differences in audiences addressed and differences between input and 
output'' (Krippendorff 1980). This system was used in this study in order to 
determine the different manifestations of fatigue (termed fatigue 
behaviours) described by investigators in Incidents at Sea reports. 
The research questions would be best answered by identification of both 
patterns of fatigue descriptors within Incidents at Sea reports and differences 
between these descriptions, and their interpretation and the subsequent 
conclusions made by the investigators. Patterns in the description of fatigue 
would best be extracted from the language used by seafarers - by actual 
transcripts of verbal information presented at investigations and during 
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Marine Courts of Inquiry. Differences could be obtained from comparison of 
the previous data and the language used in Incidents at Sea reports - the 
language of investigators. Limitations and assumptions using this approach 
are discussed below. 
3.4. Sampling strategies 
A comprehensive study of maritime incidents as a possible consequence of 
fatigue should consider two populations: 
• The population of seafarers, 
• The population of incidents at sea. 
In consideration of the former, the following subpopulations exist: 
The subpopulation of seafarers who may experience fatigue 
Analysis of this subpopulation (which may be the same as the total 
population of seafarers) could provide data on the incidence and subjective 
experience of fatigue. Such data could be used to study the descriptors used 
to define fatigue in a maritime setting. In addition, performance decrement 
due to fatigue may result in "near misses" rather than catastrophes; in most 
instances fatigue does not result in an incident. This may be due to the 
human ability to adapt to physical and technical environments, to system 
automation and redundancy, and to the fact that not all human errors are 
critical. In the latter sense, fatigue may result in an error by an operator, 
however only a small proportion of such errors result in a catastrophic 
incident such as a collision, grounding or fire. Comprehensive records of 
such near misses are unlike! y to be found in incident reports. 
The subpopulation of seafarers whose competent behaviour is critical to 
the safe (i.e. incident free) operation of the ship 
Without attempting to marginalise various aspects of maritime competence, 
some elements of competence, such as preparing a passage plan or fixing the 
ship's position, play a critical part in ensuring the safe operation of the ship 
whereas other elements of competence such as preparation of menu items 
and performing a stock take do not have an immediate impact on safety. It is 
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arguable that inadequate or inappropriate diet or unavailability of critical 
parts may constitute a medium to long-term safety issue, however there is a 
less distinct causal relationship with such competencies. Within the 
population of seafarers one role, that of deck watchkeeper, embraces many 
critical competencies. The author proposes that the tasks performed in the 
deck watchkeeping role as performed by Deck Watchkeepers and 
supervised by the Chief Mate and Master were the most critical to the 
incident free operation of the ship and possibly the most sensitive to the 
effects of fatigue. This is supported by The United Kingdom Mutual 
Steamship Assurance Association [Bermuda] Limited (1993) assertion that the 
major cause of insurance claims is deck officer error (27% of all claims from 
1987 to 1992). Analysis of elements of competency within the Maritime 
Competency Standards (ANTA 2001) and the (International) Seafarers 
Training, Certification and W atchkeeping Code revealed elements of 
competence that could be described as critical to the safe and incident free 
operation of a merchant ship. It was these critical competencies that were 
related to fatigue behaviours and error types in analysis of Incidents at Sea 
reports. 
Though not central to this study, it was necessary from time to time to refer 
to the competence of personnel in other roles, such as integrated ratings, 
who may perform tasks in close association with watchkeeping tasks, or, in 
smaller vessels, where composite duties are undertaken. 
In considering the populations of incidents at sea, not all incidents are 
reported, and of those reported, the statutory authorities only investigate a 
small proportion. In considering the populations of incidents at "sea", many 
incidents involve pleasure boats and occur in inshore waters. The issues of 
competence, and of training and experience in such cases are extraneous 
variables and adversely affect the validity of considering fatigue as a 
contributing factor to maritime incidents. It is preferable therefore to exclude 
such incidents from analysis. Subsequently, this study considered only the 
sample of incidents that have been investigated by statutory authority. 
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Incidents at sea investigated by statutory authority 
In Australia, the Marine Incident Investigation Unit of the Deparbnent of 
Transport have statutory responsibility to investigate incidents at sea as 
defined in the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations as specified in the 
Navigation Act of 1912. 
Within the Regulations, an incident is defined as:-
" ... an event: 
(a) that has resulted in: 
(i) the loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship; or 
(ii) material damage to a ship; or 
(iii) the death of, or major injury to a person, that is reasonably 
suspected of being caused by, or in connection with, the operation of a 
ship; or 
(iv) the loss of a person from a ship; or 
(v) the stranding or disabling of a ship or the involvement of a ship in 
a collision; or 
(vi) material damage being caused or reasonably suspected of having 
been caused by, or in connection with, the operation of a ship; or 
(vii) serious damage to the environment being caused or reasonably 
expected of having been caused by, or in connection with, the 
operation of a ship; or 
(b) as a result of which: 
(i) serious damage to a ship or structure might reasonably have 
occurred; or 
(ii) serious damage to the environment might reasonably have 
occurred; or 
(iii) it is reasonably suspected that the safety of a person was 
imperilled by, or in connection with, the operations of a ship" 
(Navigation Regulations 1990). 
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Further, the Regulations interpret reference to an incident as " ... reference to 
an incident that involves, or involves the operations of, a ship: 
(a) in the territorial sea of Australia or in waters on the landward side of the 
territorial sea; or 
(b) if evidence relating to the incident is found in Australia; or 
(c) to which part II of the Act applies (Navigation Regulations 1990). 
There are four advantages of using the Incidents as reported under Statute: 
• The Navigation Act of 1912 applies only to commercial vessels which 
infers a standard of tr~ning and competence of personnel, 
• There are criteria for inclusion of incidents, in that an incident is defined, 
• There is a statutory requirement to conduct investigations, maintain 
records and publish reports which provides a plethora of potential data, 
• Data from incident reports (which are defined under Statute) may 
better integrate with other data prescribed by Statute including 
specifications of competence and technical standards. 
Under the current Act, 105 incidents at sea had been investigated at the time 
of this study, resulting in publication of 91 Incidents at Sea reports by the 
Marine Incident Investigation Unit. It would be both impractical and 
inappropriate to analyse all 105 reports, hence a sampling strategy was 
considered. 
There are both quantitative and qualitative rationale for sampling in content 
analysis. Krippendorff (1980), in his introduction to content analysis 
methodology has considered random sampling, systematic sampling, 
stratified sampling, cluster sampling and varying probability sampling. 
Given that this is a qualitative study, there is no statistical basis for using 
random sampling or systematic sampling (whereby every nth unit of a list is 
selected), also a statistical sampling method. 
Stratified sampling recognises subpopulations within a population, called 
strata. As a modification of random sampling, stratified random sampling 
offers greater matching of the subpopulation with the population on certain 
key variables (Mitchell & Jolley 1988). Again, stratified sampling offers 
representativeness and this method was not considered in this study. 
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Cluster sampling uses groups of elements as sampling units. The Incidents at 
Sea reports exist as clusters classified by type (i.e. fire, collision, grounding, 
foundering, injury and fatality), by location (either State /Territory or 
maritime area, e.g. Great Barrier Reef, Torres Strait) by time of day or by 
flag (i.e. country of registration). Analysis of certain clusters (e.g. collisions 
and groundings) yielded fatigue and performance-sensitive data. 
Varying probability sampling assigns probabilities according to some a priori 
criterion in order that a representative sample could be obtained. Again, this 
option is based on the statistical requirements of quantitative methodologies. 
Sampling for qualitative analysis 
Mitchell and Jolley (1988) offer the option of convenience sampling, whereby 
subjects are sampled that are easy to survey. Analysis of the Incidents at Sea 
reports is aimed, in part, at identifying fatigue-sensitive behaviours. The use 
of computer-assisted analysis allowed some quantification of these 
behaviours. The aim of sampling is therefore aimed at achieving a workable 
sample based on the availability of data, on maximising the identification of 
fatigue-sensitive behaviours and descriptors of fatigue, and identification of 
elements of competence that are both sensitive to fatigue and critical to the 
safe operation of the ship. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest sampling options ranging from a single 
case study to more complex methods, however they expound the 
characteristics of qualitative samples as being small rather than large, 
purposive rather than random, evolving rather than pre-specified and 
theory-driven rather than context-free. Such characteristics allow analytic 
generalisations rather than the sample-to population generalisations found in 
quantitative work (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
In this study, a generic, funnelling sampling sequence, as described by Miles 
and Huberman (1994) was used, allowing for a progressively deeper 
understanding of fatigue. First, the summaries and conclusions of 100 
consecutive reports (comprising some 1966 paragraphs or text units) were 
analysed quantitatively and qualitatively in order to establish the incidence 
and nature of the incident type, human contributor, human contribution (i.e. 
fatigue behaviour) and error types and forms. As profile of human 
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contribution became clearer and understanding deepened, the sample size 
decreased in order to study the phenomenon of fatigue (particularly sleep) in 
some depth. The latter part of the study considered the entire content of 
some 44 reports where there was evidence of considerable human 
contribution to the accident. In order to facilitate analysis, only reports 
available electronically were considered and in addition criteria for inclusion 
were: 
• Fatigue was determined as contributory by accident investigators 
• Fatigue behaviours were evident (usually three or more) 
• Human factors were primarily contributory to the accident 
The incident was excluded if the primary contributory factor was adverse 
weather or sea conditions, structural failure or fire in the absence of any 
initial human contribution. 
The sample comprised all collisions and groundings, plus two other incidents 
where there was considerable human contribution. 
Sources of data and analysis software 
Of the 105 Incidents at Sea investigated by the Marine Incident Investigation 
Unit available at the time of analysis, 14 were under investigation and full 
reports were not available. Of the remaining 91 reports, numbers one to 26 
were available in hard copy from libraries, numbers 27 to 91 were available 
in summary form (but including an unabridged list of conclusions) on the 
Marine Incident Investigation Unit's World Wide Web site on the Internet, 
while the most recent reports (87 to 91) were also downloadable via FTP 
from the MIIU homepage. Summaries and conclusions of the Incidents at Sea 
reports were scanned using optical character recognition software where the 
report was unavailable electronically, or downloaded from the Marine 
Incident Investigation Unit Web site (<http://www.miiu.gov.au> to June 1999) 
and imported into NUDIST®. In the second study, complete reports were 
imported into NUDIST®, again using the paragraph as the "text unit'' for 
analysis. 
The summaries of the Incidents at Sea reports comprise a brief outline of the 
incident and the context of the investigation, while the conclusions identify 
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the different factors contributing t~ the incident. Conclusions are a mutually 
exclusive list of contributory factors as determined by the investigation 
process, each Report averaging 14 text units. 
The availability or not of more detailed information is problematic as the 
publication of reports is not obligatory under the Regulations and "much of 
the investigation information is gathered under conditions of confidentiality 
and much of the detail. .. may be on file rather than in the report'' (Filor, K., 
Marine Incident Investigation Unit, 1996, pers. comm.). There is, however, a 
rich source of data in the Incidents at Sea reports available electronically, and 
given that a small sample, in context and studied in depth, is both practical 
and desirable (Miles & Huberman 1994) in a largely qualitative study, 
transcripts and more detailed information on individual cases were not 
sought in this study. 
Version 4.0 of the qualitative data analysis software NUDIST® (Qualitative 
Solutions and Research Pty Ltd) was utilised for storage of data, coding, 
analysis and reporting. NUDIST® (an acronym for non-numerical 
unstructured data indexing, searching and theorising) is a program designed 
for the storage, coding, analysis and retrieval of text and is regarded by 
Weitzman and Miles (1995) as "one of the best thought out qualitative 
analysis programs around". (For a discussion on the use of computers in 
qualitative analysis see Richards and Richards 1994). NUDIST® 
accommodates an indexing system of nodes (categories of related text units) 
and documents can be displayed, browsed and searched using Boolean, set 
logic, and sophisticated matrix and vector operators. 
Once the Incidents at Sea reports were formatted according to NUDIST® 
requirements (text-only flies, without formatting) they were imported into 
the program, given unique identifiers and formed the "document system." 
The NUDIST® "index system" allowed "text units", complete reports, or 
sections of complete reports to be categorised ("indexed" as it is known in 
NUDIST®) and attributed a hierarchical indexing code. Incidents were 
indexed according to time of day (by watchkeeping period), incident type 
(collision, grounding etc), major contributor (master, pilot etc) and whether 
the investigator determined fatigue was a contributory factor. 
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Individual text units (conclusions in particular) were indexed according to 
fatigue behaviour, error type and human contribution. In many instances, 
NUDIST' s powerful search capabilities were used to locate specific text items 
(e.g. the word "Radar") or to generate a list of paragraphs with common 
themes (e.g. reference to sleep, sleeping, being asleep, falling asleep, being 
drowsy, tired or run down). NUDIST® allowed the use of wild card 
commands (e.g. sleep* for any reference to any text containing the word 
sleep) and Boolean operators facilitated the narrowing of text for analysis. 
Collections of coded text were exported as reports that were easily 
assimilated into word-processing packages. The examples of behaviours in 
tables 2, 3 and 4 in the results chapter were taken from NUDIST® reports. 
Appendix 2 illustrates the nature of a NUDIST® report, in this instance the 47 
text units coded against the node pertaining to the fatigue behaviours 
presenting as information-processing deficiencies. It is of note to refer to the 
summary information provided at the end of a NUDIST® report, which 
assisted checking data for omissions or duplication. 
3.5. Data analysis 
Data analysis, as described by Miles and Huberman (1994) consists of three 
concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing I verification. 
"Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focussing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appears in written-up field notes 
or transcriptions" (Miles & Huberman 1994). Such condensation allows for 
chunking of data that facilitates the drawing of final conclusions and 
verification (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
There were two components to the data analysis, the first being the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the conclusions of 100 consecutive 
reports, primarily identifying the time of day contribution to fatigue and 
accidents. The second aspect involved a qualitative analysis of the full text of 
44 selected reports looking at aspects of sleep and sleep deprivation. Specific 
coding, analysis and analysis details for each component are outlined below. 
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Time of day component 
The paragraph was chosen as the unit of analysis and is termed a "text unit" 
by NUDIST®. The 1224 text units (comprising all conclusions of 100 reports) 
were categorised as follows: 
1. Incidents type (collision, grounding, fire, foundering, 
fatality I injury and other) 
2. Human contribution to the breakdown of complex systems 
(after Reason 1990) 
3. Error type (skill-based slips and lapses, rule-based mistakes and 
knowledge-based mistakes (after Reason 1990) 
4. Investigator's determination that fatigue was a contributory 
factor 
5. Reference to time 9f day by watch period (based on the six 
watch system) 
6. Reference to fatigue behaviour (obtained from the literature 
review). 
Incidents at Sea reports make reference to the behaviours of the various 
actors in the scenario. For example, in Incidents at Sea report 52 (the 
grounding of the Malinska), reference is made to the Master who, in taking 
evasive action, considered mistaken information and "failed to verify the 
validity of the information before acting upon it''. There were many 
instances of behavioural information and description in Incidents at Sea 
reports that were coded and later compared with fatigue behaviours, 
subjective experiences and physiological states that had been described in the 
scientific literature. 
Sleep factors component 
The sleep factors component involved a content analysis of a sample of 44 
Incidents at Sea reports. The sampling criteria included reports where human 
factors contributed to the incident (i.e. excluding fires, foundering and 
injuries to crew and collisions and groundings where the main contributing 
factors were weather and equipment failure). In the main, this comprised 
collisions and groundings; however one report of injury and one of over-
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pressurisation were included due to the involvement of substantial human 
error. Reports prior to 1991 were excluded due to the heterogeneous nature 
of these earlier reports, the newly formed MIIU adopting a pro forma for 
incident reporting from this date. 
Again, the paragraph was chosen as the unit of analysis (text unit). The 44 
reports comprised some 6,208 total paragraphs (an average of 141 
paragraphs per report). References to sleep made by accident investigators 
was determined by conducting a text search for sleep and related words 
(such as sleep, slept, asleep, rest, wake, awake, alert, bed etc.). 
Reference to sleep was coded into three levels of possible association4 with 
accident (high, medium and low) and five descriptive categories (see Table 5). 
Three of the five categories were subsequently subdivided into specific, 
described behaviours or factors. 
3.6. Trustworthiness of the study - limitations of the 
data source 
Differing views are held on the relevance of marine incident reports as a 
source of data for analysis of fatigue. The pilot study focussing on the 
quantitative aspects of marine casualties conducted by the Tavistock Institute 
of Human Relations (reported in 1982) showed that "valuable information 
on the human factor could be extracted from the Department's casualty 
records (Bryant 1991). Similarly, Remi Joly of Transport Canada (1996, pers. 
comm.) states that "accident reports ... have relevant data ... to draw on" for 
the purposes of researching the effects of fatigue on the performance of ship 
watchkeepers. However these views conflict with that of Brown (1989) who 
states that " ... the marine Surveyor's files are not a reliable source of evidence 
in the contribution of fatigue to shipping accidents, because those files 
provide inadequate information on accident-involved individuals' prior 
4 The term associate was used by the author to infer some possible degree of involvement of 
one factor with another. The term contribute is the term used by accident investigators to 
infer a causal relationship between one factor and a consequence. 
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working arrangements and this information usually provides the only clue 
to their possible fatigued state." In addition, Brown (1989) notes the concern 
expressed in the Tavistock Report, which expresses difficulty in investigating 
the effects of fatigue given the strong commercial pressures to sail and the 
unlikelihood that fatigue would be proffered as a possible cause of accident 
in this environment. As stated in the Tavistock Report, "information derived 
from any reporting scheme is likely to be systematically biased by the very 
process of data collection itself" (Bryant 1991). Bryant (1991) notes that lack 
of supporting documentary evidence on the work patterns and 
watchkeeping system on board hampers the investigator's ability to 
determine the extent to which fatigue may have been a factor. In addition, 
Finkelman (1994) claims that the measurement of fatigue in the real world is 
difficult, due to the great variety of moderating variables. 
Since 1991, marine incidents in Australia have been investigated by a Marine 
Incident Investigation Unit operating under statute. Investigators determine 
the circumstances of an incident and publish a report (Marine Incident 
Investigation Unit 1996). It is not the role of the Unit to assign fault or 
determine liability (Marine Incident Investigation Unit 1996). 
Although the Australian Navigation Regulations provide criteria for 
inclusion of incidents in the Marine Incident Investigation Unit database, the 
possibility of excluding some incidents (through non-reporting) does exist. 
Such exclusions should be minimal where other statutory (e.g. coronial, 
environmental and Port Authority By-Laws) and insurance reporting 
mechanisms exist. In addition, the identification of a second party in most 
collisions and the highly conspicuous nature of groundings renders non-
reporting less likely. 
This study, however, concentrates on fatigue behaviours present in Incidents 
at Sea reports, the reporting of being asleep and being sleep deprived, rather 
than identification of fatigue as a contributing factor. The concerns expressed 
by Bryant (1991) relate to Type 2 errors (overlooking fatigue as contributory 
to an incident); such errors are less likely to apply to a broad list of 
behaviours determined by an objective investigation than the more specific 
determination that fatigue was a factor. 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS 
4.1. Time-of-day factors 
Incident type and distribution 
Of the 100 Incidents at Sea reports analysed, there were 38 groundings and 
24 collisions. The remainder comprised foundering, fires, injuries/ fatalities 
and a small number of other incidents such as structural failures and 
incidents alongside wharves (Figure 2). 
Injury/Fatality 
9% 
Foundering 
14% 
Other 
Incidents 
5% 
Collisions 
23% 
Figure 2: Distribution of Incidents at Sea (from 100 consecutive reports) 
Founderings (13) involved vessels lost at sea (some with all hands); however, 
incident time and contributing details were often undetermined. Fires (11) 
usually involved latent failures such as design and maintenance deficiencies, 
and usually involved machinery spaces. Human factors were difficult to 
determine in both of these categories. 
The distribution of incident type by watch period varied; collisions and 
groundings exhibited a peak during the early morning, then decreased 
during the day and increased again during the afternoon. The frequency of 
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other incident types remained reasonably static throughout the 24 hour 
period (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Time of day and incident type 
Given the greater proportion of latent errors in fires, and meteorological and 
structural factors in foundering, these categories were excluded from further 
time of day analyses. Similarly, the disparate nature of the incidents in the 
injury I fatality and "other" categories, in addition to their relatively small 
number, also justified their exclusion. The distribution of these incidents 
according to watch is given in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Time of day and fire, foundering and injuries 
There appeared to be a diurnal distribution of the 62 collisions and 
groundings, peaking during the 0000 to 0400 watch, with a trough during the 
day (0800 to 1200 for collisions, 1200 to 1600 for groundings) (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Time of day and collisions and groundings 
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Human factors in Incidents at Sea: error type and human contribution to the 
breakdown of complex systems 
All conclusions were coded according to Reason's (1990) Generic Error-
Modelling System in an attempt to locate the origins of human error types 
within incidents (Figure 6). Examples of error types are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Examples of conclusions coded by error type (after Reason 1990) 
~~ -- ~· -- ~----· --- ~-------- ~----·------..........-~~ ---~- -,..,_...- -- --------~-~~~- -- -- -~ ......... ! 
' • " - ., < 
~kill..;based slips,cqid lapses 
< ;,_ L 
1. Maersk.Tapah!s Pilot accepted an.unnecessarily close quarter situ~tion;in the 
. ' ·-
oyertaking manoeuvre, resulting in contact between the ~o vessels. 
2 .. '.When Searoacf M~rsey maae.,conta,ct wit~,No.15 beacori:, :the Master lqst his 
, ,orientation, o:#er, r~acted ru\a 'applied exJe~sive helm.'' , , . , ; 
" ' 
3. · the Pilot and Master did not jointly consid~r.any sailing. plan for .Co11us, taking into J 
, , , , I 
, fiCcount the pre~ailing conciitlons, rather they relied on ~ 'standard' Cleparture 
~hich did not t~ke into ac~o~fif the possiblE;;. effect of. the wind ~r tide: 
4. New Noble's Master was preoccupied with the recovery, of the anchor and did not'· 1 
drive the ship a~·ead, either P,ragging the'. anchor or rel~a:sing the· bitter end and. ~ 
.. allowing· it to :pay out, ~hil~ the oppor~ity existed. , . , , . 
'l, 
j ·"· Cont'd· 
> < '" ' 
-~' ··---- --- - ____ ...,;;;; ____________ ~~- ·~-s...~~-~--- -- .:---· ~----,-"---~---~-
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Rule-based slips and lapses 
1. With Maersk Tapah's automatic radar plotting aid giving inconsistent data for 
the vessels being overtaken, the Second Mate did not use compass bearings to 
establish whether the bearings of the vessels being overtaken were altering 
appreciably. 
2. The Khudozhnik Ioganson was an overtaking vessel within the meaning of the 
International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (Colregs)' and had 
a duty to keep clear of the Zodiac, irrespective of whether or not the Zodiac was 
engaged in fishing, until finally passed ~md clear. 
3. Given the situation on the day, there was no compelling reason for ships to 
overtake in such close proximity. 
4. Having observed a structure and a number of fishing craft in proximity to it, the 
Master did not maintain a sufficiently safe passing distance. 
5. The Third Mate absenting himself from the bridge before the Second Mate arrived 
to take up his w51tch. 
Knowledge-based mistakes 
1. Inadequate strategic and operational planning, in particular in the consideration, 
by all parties involve~, of the safety case and the determination of safety 
parameters and precautions to be taken for the berthing operations. 
2. The grounding was caused by an error of judgment by the Pilot turning the ship to 
port rather than to starboard. 
3. The Second Mate failed to advise the Master of his concern with regard to the 
passage plan, and also failed to p~operly monitor the tidal heights and advise the 
Master of their significance. 
4. The Master failed to fully assess the situation before altering course to starboard, 
placing undue reliance on the ARP A, misreading or misinterpreting the distance to 
the collision point, and failing to check the ship's position. 
5. The absence of any contingency planning for the passing of machinery control from 
the bridge to the engine room under emergency conditions or plans to utilise the 
backup pitch co11trol and the emergency steering in the steering flat. 
6. The Pilot did not plan the undocking and take full account of the wind strength and 
direction. 
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Figure 6: Time of day (by watch) and error type based on the 
Generic Error Modelling System of Reason (1990) 
All conclusions were also coded according to Reason's (1990) human 
contribution to the breakdown of complex systems in order to exclude latent 
failures from further analysis . Examples of human contributions are shown 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Examples of conclusions coded by human contribution 
to the breakdown of complex systems (after Reason) 
Fallible decisions 
1. The anchors on Sampet Hope are apparently not arranged so that they can be 
slipped in an emergency. 
2. The audible alarms on the gantry cranes are not sufficiently loud or 'startling' as to . 
hold a person's attention while the cranes are moving along the deck, particularly 
in a strong wind and against the background noise of the hydraulic machinery. 
3. The regulatory minimum manning requirements for a vessel the size of Teresa, 
engaged in the fishing industry, virtually preclude the keeping of a look-out while . 
the vessel is anchored for the night. 
4. The labelling and instructions for the lifeboat release gear, although clear, were 
not in the language of the crew. 
5. Had a safety net been rigged underneath the gangway (as required by the Port of 
· Townsville By-laws) during the weeks immediately preceding the incident, it may 
have prevented the Master from falling into the water. 
Line management deficiencies 
1. A lack of communication and co-ordination between the two principal companies, 
which resulted in the vessel being misinformed. 
2. The lack of Bridge Resource Management procedures on board, whic~ resulted in 
the wheelhouse being unattended, the vessel's progress not being monitored and 
the order to go hard to port not being challenged by the Officer of the Watch. 
3, The Master's decision to release the seamen from lookout du.ties, in order to 
maximise their time on maintenance work. 
4. The Pilot did not fully brief the Master and Third Mate on the manoeuvre, to 
enable them to operate as a ·fully integrat~d, supportive team. The Skipper of the 
Zodiac failed in his responsibilities by leaving the navigation of the vessel in the 
charge of an unqualified deckhand. 
5. The Master in command on 24 June had ordered that a seaman should act as look-
out during .the hours of darkness. This instruction was not complied with possibly 
due to a misunderstanding and a lack of effective communications in the form of 
written notification, and because of the entrenched practice for the officers to keep 
a watch alone during the night. 
Cont'd 
Psychological precursors of unsafe acts 
l. A perceived need, on the part of the Adviser, to get the job done, which would 
have affected the level of caution adopted. 
2. Maersk Tapah's Second Mate, having voiced a concern about the overtaking 
situation, did not inform the Master of his concern. 
3. The progress of Gumbet was not properly monitored, the risk of collision was not 
assessed and the developing situation wa§ not appreciated. 
4. There is a possibility that the cadet, mistakenly thinking he had time to cross in 
front of the moving crane, attempted to< cross the crane track to get to the space 
between the after end of No.2 hold and the deckhouse. 
5. Reduced alertness on the part of the Watch Officer, brought about by a sleep debt 
and "jet lag". 
Unsafe Acts 
l. A spark from the grinder being used by th,e student ignited the hydrogen air 
mixture causing an explosion within the battery locker. 
2. An inappropriate course alteration was made, which nullified action taken by the 
other vessel. 
3. The spontaneous and simultaneous reactions of the Master and the Pilot to go hard 
to port, towards the intended track, before a full appraisal of the situation was 
carried out. 
4. The boat was released, by the operation of the releasing handle by one of three 
people actually in the boat. 
5. The bridge was unmanned because the Second Mate left the bridge at shortly after 
0105 and failed to return because he fell asleep. 
Inadequate Oefences 
l. After the incident with Moonshot, he did not make contact with the fishing vessel 
to ascertain whether the crew were injured and whether they needed assistance. 
2. The Master of the Jin Shan Hai was not informed of the developing situation and 
only became aware of the incident after the" collision. 
3. When Searoad Mersey made contact with No.15 beacon, the Master lost his 
orientation, over reacted and applied excessive helm. 
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This categorisation allowed the author to differentiate between latent errors 
(which were excluded from subsequent analysis) and watchkeeping errors. 
In each incident, a number of human contributions types coexisted; both 
latent and active errors. The distribution of the human contribution is given 
in Figure 7. 
Unsafe acts 
10% 
Psychological 
precursors 
40% 
Inadequate 
defences 
6% 
Fallable 
decisions 
35% 
Line 
management 
9% 
Figure 7: Human contributions to the breakdown of complex systems 
(expressed as a percentage of total text units) 
The distribution of error type (skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based) for 
all conclusions appeared to follow the diurnal variation of collisions and 
groundings; knowledge-based errors having the highest incidence, skill-
based errors the least. 
Incidents where investigators determined that fatigue was a contributing 
factor 
Investigators determined that fatigue was a factor in seven of the 100 
incidents in the study. Five of the seven incidents were groundings, one a 
collision and one an over pressurisation. Four of the seven incidents occurred 
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between 0000 and 0400, with two more occurring between 0400 and 0800. 
Only the over pressurisation incident occurred on day watches. 
Factors contributing to these incidents included prior use of alcohol, sleep 
deprivation, failure to use all available information in navigation, failure to 
keep a proper lookout and failure to monitor progress. The most common 
unsafe act in groundings was a failure to alter course; in the collision, failure 
to keep clear. 
Fatigue behaviours and time of day 
In order to constrain behaviours to watchkeeper error, the analysis of 
fatigue behaviours was limited to collisions and groundings, which were 
coded according to fatigue behaviours obtained from the literature review. 
Examples of conclusions coded according to fatigue behaviour are given in 
Table4. 
Table 4: Examples of conclusions coded by fatigue behaviour. 
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Input Limitations. 
1. Readily available, up to date information on the approaching front was not 
obtained from the Bureau of Meteorology. 
2. He did not use visual bearings or the radar to full effect to correctly ascertain the 
courses of the fishing vessels and to determine whether or not the risk of collision 
existed. 
3. There was no full exchange of views, in line with Bridge. Resource Management 
procedures, on.the developing situation and the appropriate action to be taken. 
' ' 
4. The Second Mate on River Erilbley made.assumptions reg.~ding the nature of 
Bronze Wing's operation based on scanty information and an inaccurate perception 
of the situation, during a time when other duties may have led to a.degree of 
distraction. 
Information-processing problems. 
1. With Maersk Tapah's autoII}atic radar plotting aid giving ,inconsistent data for 
the vessels being overtaken,· the Second Mate did not ~se .. c9mpass bearings to 
establish whether the bearings of the vessels being overtaken were altering 
appreciably. 
2. . A proper appraisal of the possible movement of the cycl°,ne was not ma,c:ie, and no 
' 
account taken of the steady.fall in barometric pressure ~nd lack of wind directional.; 
shift, which resulted in Osco Star passing close to the centre of the cyclone. 
3. The lack of any planning of the approach, with no .delineation of danger areas or' »1 
safety limits on the chart, or consideration of possible contingencies. 
4. The Master failed to fully assess the situation before altering course to starboard, 
placing undue reliance on th~ ARP A, misreading or misinterpreting th,e distance to 
,. 
the collision point, and failing to check the ship's position. 
5. Faced with a deviation from ,the usual OJ?erational procedures, the H~rbour Master 
did not fully evaluate the changed circl!ffistances and assess what appropriate 
action was required. 
Cont'd· 
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A version to Effort. 
1. The lack of decision to move the vessel at 2000 when the Master of Columbus 
Victoria voiced his annoyance at Sampet Hope's position, when the distance 
between the two ships had apparently reduced from 0.5 miles to 0.3 miles. 
2. Maersk Tapah's Pilot accepted an unnecessarily close quarter situation in the 
overtaking manoeuvre, resulting in contact between the two vessels. 
3. The collision between the Jin Shan Hai and the Kekenni was caused oy the failure" : 
of the of officer of the watch, the Second Mate, of the Jin Shan Hai to take early 
and substantial action to avoid a close quarter situation. 
4. The movement of the rudder to starboard 20 [degrees], the resultant sheer, and 
hence the grounding, would most probably not have occurred had the steering been 
conducted manually. 
Differing nature of effort. 
l. Inappropriate action to provide the necessary lee to enable the Pilots to board. 
. . 
2. The spontaneous and simultaneous reactiops of the Master and the Pilot to go hard' 
to port, towards the intended track, before a full appr~isal of the situation was 
carried out. 
3. The grounding was caused by an error. of judgment by the Pilot turning ~e ship to.· 
port rather than to starboard. 
The literature revealed a variety of behaviours associated with fatigue and its 
independent variables such as time-on-task, sleep loss and time of day. These 
are summarised in Table 1(page36). These behavioural manifestations were 
obtained from laboratory experiments (including perceptual, motor and 
cognitive tests, sleep propensity, reaction time and simulations) as well as 
field experiments including shipboard, aviation and road transport studies. 
Behaviours were sorted into the following categories using an information-
processing model similar to that described by Wickens (1997): 
1. Activation problems - attention failures, slips and lapses 
2. Perception limitations - limiting visual and auditory sensation 
3. Information processing problems - interpretation, encoding and 
correlation deficits 
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4. A version to effort - failure to act 
5. Differing effort - failure to act appropriately. 
The literature review, however, also referred to non-behavioural measures 
of fatigue such as subjective assessments of fatigue (rating scales, sleep 
quality, records and logs) and physiological tests (body temperature rhythm, 
EEG, heart rate and clinical chemistry assessments). As Incidents at Sea 
reports rarely report such potential data, subjective assessment and 
physiological tests, although potentially sensitive indicators of fatigue, were 
not included in this study. 
The initial analysis identified the frequency of particular fatigue behaviours in 
each watchkeeping period (Figure 8). 
The frequency of all fatigue behaviours was higher during the night watches 
and lower during the morning and afternoon watches. This distribution was 
most noticeable in the activation behaviours, with a ten-fold increase in the 
0000 to 0400 watch compared to the 1200 to 1600 watch. 
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Figure 8: Time of day and fatigue behaviour 
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As the distribution of collisions and groundings exhibited a strong diurnal 
variation, fatigue behaviours were expressed as relative frequencies - the 
number of text units corresponding to a particular fatigue behaviour relative 
to the total number of conclusions in that watchkeeping period. Figure 9 
shows the relative frequencies of all fatigue behaviours, which highlights 
watchkeeping periods where particular fatigue behaviours predominate. The 
0000 to 0400 watchkeeping period was also corrected to accommodate one 
report comprising a disproportionately large number of text units (the TNT 
Alltrans Report being a Marine Court of Inquiry rather than a standard 
incident report) by attributing the average number of text units for the 
watchkeeping period to that report. 
When the relative frequency of each category of fatigue behaviour was 
analysed within each watchkeeping period, the distribution revealed that 
activation problems and information processing deficiencies exhibit a strong 
diurnal variation, with the activation problems peaking during the 0000 to 
0400 and 0400 to 0800 periods and the information-processing problems 
peaking during 1600 to 2000 watch. Both activation problems and 
information processing fatigue behaviours were absent during the 0800 to 
1200 watch; however, this was the peak of the aversion to effort and 
differing nature of effort fatigue behaviour. 
Input limitations remained fairly evenly distributed throughout most of the 
day but were slightly higher in the 1600 to 2000 and 2000 to 0000 
watchkeeping periods. 
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Figure 9: Fatigue behaviours as a percentage of text units (ie. all behaviours) 
and time of day. Each graph expresses the relative incidence of a 
particular fatigue behaviour as a percentage of all behaviours 
for that watchkeeping period. 
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4.2. Sleep factors 
Quantitative analysis 
Accident investigators made reference to sleep in 38 of the 44 (86%) reports 
analysed. Of the 44 incidents analysed, 21 were groundings and 21 were 
collisions, the remaining two comprising an injury and a tank over-
pressurisation. 
Reference to sleep was made predominantly in the Analysis (122 references) 
and Narrative (103 references) sections of the report. Only 15 references to 
sleep were made in Conclusions and 8 in Summaries. Only 2.9% of all 
Conclusions contained reference to sleep, compared to 5.6% of Narrative and 
5.1% of Analysis text units (paragraphs). 
Most references (34%) were made to sleep loss as a way of life (waking at 
odd hours, daytime sleep, working instead of sleeping and sleep hygiene 
factors) followed by sleep as routine (28%). Only 23% of sleep references 
described sleep as having high levels of association with accidents (sleeping 
as contributory, 12% and sleep loss as contributory, 11%). These results are 
summarised in table 1. 
In the study sample, there were 11 collisions and 8 groundings on day 
watches (0800 to 0000) compared to 10 collisions and 13 groundings on night 
watches (0000 to 0800). More sleep references were made in reports of 
incidents occurring during the 0000 to 0400 watch than any other 
watchkeeping period. Most references were to sleep loss as a way of life (42 
references) and sleep as routine (31 references). Seventy-seven percent of all 
sleep references corresponded to incidents that occurred during the first two 
watchkeeping periods (i.e. 0000 to 0800). There were only 6 sleep references 
inferring a high level of contribution to accidents that corresponded to the 
four daytime watchkeeping periods (i.e. 0800 to 0000). 
Accident investigators' reference to sleep was evenly distributed between 
collisions and groundings (125 references in groundings, 119 references in 
collisions and 9 references in other incidents). Groundings contained more 
references to sleep loss and sleep deprivation (29) than collisions (22 
references). Groundings also contained more references to sleep loss as a 
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way of life than collisions (52, compared to 45 references). The sleep routine 
was referred to in more collisions than groundings (45 compared to 27 
references). Reference to being asleep was associated with twice as many 
collisions (8) as groundings (4), whereas being sleep deprived corresponded 
to twice as many groundings (4) as collisions (2). 
Table 5: Accident investigators' reference to sleep 
Descriptnie ategory 
and Level of Contribution-
eepmg as contributory 
(high level of contribution) 
eep, oss as cont~1 utory 
{high level of contrib,i:ition) 
eep . oss as a w~y ~ · 1 e 
. (medium level of ccmtribution) 
(low I eye I of. contri.b~tion) 
'' 
!·'Num er o ·· 
I• 
. ; Reference~ 
'~ Jy l "< 
eeper as eep orr':Natc 1 3 
at1on 
I . 
i. . 6 
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. '. 
12. 
i"· .. 27 
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The master was the major human contributor in 12 of the 44 incidents, the 
second mate in 9, and the pilot in 8 incidents. Association of the master with 
accidents occurred across all watches, but predominantly on both 4 to 8 
watches (with 3 incidents occurring during each watch). The second mate 
was predominantly associated with accidents during the 0000 to 0400 watch 
(in 6 incidents), whereas the pilot's association followed a similar distribution 
to the master (three incidents on the 0400 to 0800 and two on the 1600 to 
2000 watches). It is noteworthy that the second mate was associated with 
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twice as many incidents in the 0000 to 0400 watch-keeping period than any 
other officer in any other watchkeeping period. 
Behaviours of the pilot were associated with 7 groundings, but only 1 
collision, whereas behaviours of the second mate were associated with 6 
collisions and only two groundings. Ship's masters were associated with 6 
groundings and 5 collisions. The distribution of incidents according to major 
contributor is given in Figure 10. 
Third Mate 
9% 
Unknown 
11% 
Master 
26% 
First Mate 
4% 
Figure 10: Major contributor to collisions and groundings 
(from 44 incidents) 
Accident investigators' reference to sleep in Incidents at Sea reports 
Accident investigators report sleep at three levels of association with 
accidents. Being asleep on watch or being sleep deprived are conditions 
classed at the highest level of association with accidents - the condition was 
contributory to the accident. Reference to seafarers being woken at odd 
hours, sleeping during the day or working instead of sleeping describes a 
moderate level of association with accidents. Accident investigators also 
frequently refer to environmental aspects of sleep and sleep hygiene, 
sleeping and watchkeeping and resting rather than sleeping which have the 
lowest level of association with accidents. 
Reference to sleep by accident investigators does not always correspond 
with fatigue being determined a contributing factor to an incident at sea. For 
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exainple, the investigator determined in three out of four incidents where 
the watchkeeper was asleep on watch that fatigue was a factor. However, 
the investigator determined that fatigue was not a contributing factor in the 
three incidents where all the crew were asleep on board vessels at anchor or 
lying ahull (not under command), even though it is a requirement to 
maintain a watch at sea. Though being asleep was a contributing factor to the 
accident, fatigue was not. In each of the latter incidents, the two crew 
members of fishing boats were asleep following a period of fishing activity, 
the 24-hour work schedule making it extremely difficult to maintain the 
lookout required by regulations. 
Similarly, accident investigators have identified seven incidents where the 
master or pilot was asleep when the incident occurred. In five instances, in 
order to get some sleep, skippers of fishing vessels had handed over 
command of the vessel to an unqualified crewmember. Once again, though 
fatigue was not determined as a contributing factor by accident investigators, 
sleeping of critical crewmembers certainly was. In two instances on 
commercial ships, the master, or the pilot and the master were asleep when 
the watchkeeper became incapacitated through fatigue. In these two 
incidents, the sleep condition of the critical crewmembers was associated 
with the accident and the fatigue state of the watchkeeper was contributory. 
There are 22 references to waking at odd hours (16 reports), 15 of which 
correspond to reports where accident investigators determined that fatigue 
was a contributing factor. Seven references to waking at odd hours refer to 
waking to take over the watch. Other references include pilots being called to 
the bridge for pilotage duties, the master being called to the bridge due to 
fog, or to wait for a pilotage transfer, fishing boat crew waking to attend to 
nets, and in three instances, waking following a grounding or collision. 
Daytime sleeping was referred to 13 times in 9 reports. Most references to 
this are to crewmembers of fishing boats engaged in night-time fishing (such 
as prawn trawling). Remaining references to daytime sleep were to sleeping 
following or preceding a night watch or pilotage. Daytime sleeping in fishing 
boats at anchor or not-under-command is associated with the risk of collision 
with commercial vessels that fail to maintain a proper lookout. In some 
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instances, fishing vessels may not be exhibiting the correct lights and, in the 
early morning hours, risk being run down by commercial vessels. 
Accident investigators make five references to watchkeepers working 
instead of sleeping while off watch. In addition to watchkeeping, officers also 
supervise loading and unloading operations in port, write reports, conduct 
exercises and drills, supervise staff and manage aspects of ship operations. 
Reference to these additional duties competing with sleep time is made in 
five instances. In one instance, the master was on the bridge for 16 out of 
28.5 hours but didn't consider himself tired (investigators subsequently 
finding the master partially contributory to a collision). Another report 
describes a master writing a report to the shipping company at 0100 
followh1g his watch (during which the sleep-deprived pilot lost situational 
awareness and the vessel run aground). Fishing boat skippers are often 
described working alone, steaming to and from the fishing grounds, fishing 
and selling the catch and fishing during the day. 
Sixteen references (in six reports) to environmental and sleep hygiene factors 
illustrate some of the difficulties associated with sleepmg aboard ships and 
fishing boats. One fishing boat skipper bunked in the wheelhouse so as to be 
instantly available, and reference is made to deckhands on prawn trawlers 
sleeping between winching prawn nets, cleaning and packing prawns, the 
intermittent nature of the job hardly being conducive to sleeping. 
Investigators raise three critical sleep hygiene issues in two reports. Firstly is 
the need for socialisation and activity outside the operational routine on 
board. In the case of the Svenborg Guardian (report 82), the already fatigued 
ship's crew watched a Rugby Union match on television, an action that 
contributed to the second mate falling asleep in his cabin during the 0000 to 
0400 watch. Watching late night sport on television is hardly an issue in 
many land-based jobs; however, the failure of the second mate to remain 
vigilant during his watch due to watching evenmg television was described 
by the investigator as " ... displaying inexperience and irresponsibility". 
The second sleep hygiene factor relates to the influence of occupational stress 
on sleep. One incident (Peacock, report 95) refers to changed conditions of 
service of pilots resulting in anxiety and stress, and affecting an individual's 
sleep and concentration. 
100 
Thirdly, in the same report, investigators make reference to the possibility of 
sleep disorders such as sleep apnoea and snoring affecting the quality of 
sleep. Though it may be difficult for accident investigators to retrospectively 
evaluate the effect of sleep disorders, they are valid in identifying body 
weight, diet, domestic and occupational concerns, snoring and daytime 
sleepiness as factors possibly contributing to fatigue, and hence to accidents. 
Accident investigators occasionally refer to sleeping accommodation. Each of 
the seven references is to the general layout of sleeping accommodation in 
fishing boats. No reference is made to the sleeping arrangement on 
commercial vessels. Fishing vessel sleeping berths are commonly described 
as being below deck, usually accessed from the forecastle, the wheelhouse or 
a separate companionway from the deck. Because of the integrated nature of 
work on fishing boats, coupled with the small crews, accommodation is 
usually combined with the working areas of a fishing vessel. For example, 
the galley and sometimes a skipper's berth share space in the wheelhouse, 
and sleeping accommodation for the deckhands is usually under the working 
deck adjacent to the fish hold. 
Seafarers on commercial vessels enjoy a separate accommodation block that 
is remote from the operational areas of the deck, holds and bridge. Masters 
and pilot's cabins are usually close to the bridge. 
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CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION 
5.1. Coding, categorisation and analysis of Incidents at 
Sea reports 
The two analyses of Incidents at Sea reports attempted to present a profile of 
the human contribution to marine accidents (specifically time of day and 
sleep factors) from the perspective of marine investigation. Prior to 
discussion of these two analyses, it is appropriate to discuss the issue of 
coding and categorisation of data. 
In the first analysis, coding according to Reason's (1990) "human 
contribution to the breakdown of complex systems" was relatively 
straightforward and allowed the exclusion of latent errors (specifically fallible 
decisions and many line-management decisions) from subsequent fatigue 
analysis. Though fatigue may have contributed to a design error or 
inappropriate policy prior to an accident, it is not appropriate to be included 
as a watchkeeping error. It is unlikely that fatigue as a contributing factor to 
latent errors would ever be determined in maritime investigation. Fatigue 
behaviours therefore included psychological precursors (such as self-induced 
sleep deprivation, poor monitoring of vessel progress and inadequate crew 
communication), unsafe acts (such as accepting a close quarters situation or 
leaving the bridge unattended) and inadequate defences (such as failil'}g to 
alert the master, communicate with the other vessel or overreacting to an 
unsafe act). 
In contrast, coding according to the predetermined categories of error type 
(skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-based) proved difficult due to the 
limitations of the data. Skill-based errors are automated and unconscious, 
whereas rule-based errors are consciously executed. Differentiation between 
these categories, in the absence of the appropriate context, made coding 
difficult. For example, an inappropriate course alteration as described by an 
accident investigator may have been a skill-based error if it was failure to 
execute a pre-programmed manoeuvre, or a rule-based error if there was a 
conscious misinterpretation of the rules. The conclusion of the Incidents at 
Sea report often does not provide enough contextual data to allow 
102 
differentiation between these two error types. Conversely, knowledge-
based mistakes are usually information-processing deficiencies (i.e. 
conscious, judgement or problem solving errors) and were much easier to 
distinguish and code. 
The difficulty distinguishing between skill-based and rule-based errors led to 
the evolution of a fatigue behaviours categorisation based on an 
information-processing model. This model is easily applied to the tasks of 
watchkeeping and has its origins in basic communications theory. It also 
forms a basic level of description of human neurological function. In 
summary, the watchkeeper receives sensory (afferent or input) information, 
that is then processed (interpreted, coded and analysed) and an appropriate 
motor program is executed. The model assumes that the subject is conscious 
and alert, however this is not always the case in watchkeeping situations. The 
state of alertness (depending on time of day, prior sleep, the environment 
etc) and information processing as outlined above exhibit a complex 
interplay resulting in explainable changes in performance. 
Unfortunately, fatigue is frequently described only in terms of decreased 
alertness rather than combinations of decreased alertness and compromised 
information processing. Indeed, in the seven Incidents at Sea reports where 
fatigue was determined a contributing factor, investigators were able to 
identify only the decreased alertness component. If the conclusions of 
Incidents at Sea reports are categorised according to the information-
processing model as well as decreased alertness (comprising fatigue 
behaviours as described earlier) a more complete picture of the contribution 
of fatigue to accidents emerges. 
The fatigue behaviours model was developed both through a review of the 
literature (identifying behaviours consistent with being fatigued) and 
through coding and categorisation of conclusions of Incidents at Sea reports. 
This discussion will initially address the two contributing factors investigated 
in this study (time of day and sleep) and conclude with discussion on the 
possible relationship between fatigue, watchkeeping and accidents. 
Figure 11 illustrates the relationships between sleep deprivation, time of day, 
watchkeeper fatigue and accidents. This concept will be built on further in 
this discussion. 
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Figure 11: Sleep loss, time of day and accidents: the basic model 
5.2. Time-of-day factors 
Incidents where fatigue was determined to be a contributing factor 
Of the 62 collisions and groundings, fatigue was found to be a factor in only 
five (8%). Activation problems (or decreased alertness) and input limitations 
were the only fatigue behaviours identified in these incidents; no other 
fatigue behaviours were evident. Activation problems were manifest in the 
case of the Carola (report 79) where investigators found that the mate was 
overcome by drowsiness, and in the case of the Peacock (report 95 - see 
appendix 1) the pilot lost situational awareness and fell asleep. The second 
mate of the Svenborg Guardian (report 82) left the bridge and failed to return 
because he fell asleep, resulting in the ship being effectively out of control for 
almost five hours. In the case of the TNT Alltrans (report 8), the watchkeeper, 
due to alcohol and excessive tiredness, failed to alter course, resulting in the 
35,000 tonne vessel, steaming onto Lady Musgrove Island at over 13 knots 
with those in charge of the vessel being unaware of the predicament for over 
20 minutes. Input limitations commonly included lack of proper monitoring 
and lack of effective communication on the bridge (between master and 
watchkeeper and between pilot and watchkeeper). 
The theme in five of the seven fatigue incidents was a decrease in 
watchkeeper alertness and either failing to initiate a course change or take 
action to keep clear of another vessel or obstruction. Due to a combination of 
fatigue and personal problems, the deck officer of the Osco Star (report 63) 
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miscalculated the time to fill a tank, loaded the tank at an excessive rate and 
failed to act on an alarm, resulting in overpressurisation and structural failure 
of that tank. In the case of Boa Force (report 66), fatigue resulting from the 
operational program, although not explicitly stated as a contributing fact<;:ir, 
was not ruled out. 
In reports where investigators determined that fatigue was a contributing 
factor, contributory behaviours were expressed as deficiencies in alertness -
investigators did not identify fatigue behaviours in the form of deficiencies in 
information processing or problems with execution. It appears that fatigue 
was determined to be a factor only where the investigation process was able 
to demonstrate lack of activation (by decrease in vigilance or alertness) by 
the watchkeeper. As activation problems were generally most prevalent 
during the 0000 to 0800 watchkeeping periods, most incidents where fatigue 
has been determined to be a factor occured during these watches. This issue 
is pursued by Brown (1989) who questions the Tavistock team's finding of 
"'no direct evidence of the presence of fatigue in the Marine Surveyors' files' 
in the light of findings of carelessness, over-confidence and other risky 
behaviour, with errors of judgement and excessive speed in poor visibility 
being plausibly associated with the mental exhaustion associated with 
fatigue". It may appear that unless fatigue is explicitly presented as evidence 
in an inquiry (as evidenced by lack of alertness), other behaviours resultant 
from fatigue may be overlooked or attributed to some other cause. 
Fatigue behaviours in collisions and groundings 
The distribution of these incidents is diurnal - most occurring during the 
period 1600 to 0800, least during 0800 to 1600. Human factors weigh heavily 
in collisions and groundings, with most errors being errors of navigation. 
Activation problems and input limitations are the modal fatigue behaviours, 
which follow the circadian performance rhythm described by Folkard (1996). 
Activation problems 
The predominant unsafe act during the night watches was failing to keep a 
proper lookout, as with the watchkeepers on board the Metal Trader (report 
25), Jin Shan Hai (report 31), Khudozhnik Iaganson (report 35), Far East (report 
49), Libra (report 54), Iron Prince (report 81) and Midas (report 91). Although 
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the possibility of fatigue existed in these incidents, there were also other 
explanations for such errors, such as low personal standards of performance, 
an on-board culture of poor watchkeeping practices or the watchkeeper 
being distracted with another task. For example, the Second Mate of the 
f ovian Loop (report 36) busied himself with writing up the log book and failed 
to notice an incorrect course setting on the autopilot. Other specific 
behaviours during the night included failing to alter course and to monitor 
progress - behaviours also prevalent in incidents where fatigue was 
determined a contributing factor. Activation problems during the day 
watches were less frequent, with the predominant behaviour being failure to 
keep a proper lookout. 
Though activation problems can be explained in terms other than fatigue, 
there was a ten-fold increase in problems with activation and three times the 
proportion of activation behaviours per report during the midnight watch 
compared to the midday watch. Broughton (1988) notes that a major peak of 
alertness usually exists in the early evening and proposes that the peak of 
evening alertness is due to " ... synchrony of minimum pressures for both 
SWS and REM sleep associated with maximum body core temperature (all 
optimising vigilance functions), whereas the a.m. memory peak may be due 
to facilitation of REM sleep mechanisms which in extended sleep persists well 
across the morning." 
It is problematic whether errors resulting from decreases in activation at 
certain times of the day can be attributed to fatigue. Just because an error 
occurs at one o'clock in the morning and a decrease in human performance 
occurs at that time does not necessarily mean that the operator was fatigued. 
A review of the behaviours for the period 0000 to 0800 identifies the 
following possible alternative explanations for the increased incidence of 
activation errors during this period: 
• There is a lack of supemumery personnel during the night watches on 
large commercial vessels - this is a period where the pilot, the seaman 
watchkeeper or the master are more likely to be sleeping or absent 
from the bridge. 
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• Likewise on fishing vessels, there is greater likelihood of an untrained 
watchkeeper, or perhaps no watchkeeper at all during night watches. 
• The glare of working lights on fishing boats has been noted in report 
conclusions, both from the perspective of inducing loss of night vision 
as well as from obscuring navigation lights. 
• Where alcohol is be a contributing factor, the effect is more likely to be 
noticed following the evening meal and during the night watches, 
rather than the early morning and daytime. 
• Finally- the traditional need for evening socialising is more likely to 
affect performance during the evening and early morning watches 
rather than following during day. This was evident in the case of the 
Svenborg Guardian (report number 82) where the crew were tired as a 
result of watching a rugby match. 
Fatigue behaviours result from many other contributing factors, including 
time on task and the period of prior wakefulness. The United States Coast 
Guard (McCallum et al. 1996) have developed a fatigue index score as a 
potential indicator of the fatigue contribution to an incident, which 
incorporates fatigue symptoms, hours worked and hours slept. It is 
noteworthy that time of day is not considered a parameter in this study 
despite the unequivocal evidence linking time of day with human 
performance; for example, .Akerstadt and Folkard' s (1995) interactive 
computer program linking time of day and hours of prior waking with 
alertness. 
Limitations to perception 
Limitations to perception were characterised by failure to utilise all available 
information (particularly navigational information) and failure to ensure 
effective communication (verbal, radio and signals). Such behaviours were 
fairly evenly distributed over both day and night watches as a proportion of 
text units. The most common input-limiting behaviour during both day and 
night watches was failure of the watchkeeper to make use of all available 
navigational equipment. Such behaviours included failure to take visual 
bearings but, more commonly, failure to fully utilise the radar and 
Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARP A). As supporting evidence, Bryant 
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(1991) also notes misinterpretation of radar (despite improvements in 
training and equipment) and reliance on visual cues (where navigational aids 
are available) in an analysis of findings on collisions and groundings. 
As with incidents where fatigue was determined a contributing factor, 
misunderstandings and failing to advise others of intentions were frequent 
input-limiting behaviours, such as the master of the Jovian Loop (report 36) 
failing to advise the pilot that he was leaving the bridge. In several incidents, 
such as the Jhanski Ki Rani (report 13), the Mobil Endeavour (report 16), the 
TNT Carpentaria (report 37), the Kapitan Serykh (report 72), the River Torrens 
(report 80) and the Maresk Tapah (report 103), those on the bridge failed to 
effectively exchange information, thereby limiting the decision-making 
process of the watchkeeper. Ohashi and Morikiyo (1974) note that the 
uncertainty and extensiveness of information sources increased at nightti.me, 
largely due to the uncertainty of information in the dark environment. The 
authors note that the human difficulty in processing information from 
different sources (such as visual and radar) is more evident at night, with 
intership communication requiring more questions, confirmations and 
inferences concerning the situation. 
The issue of ship-to-shore communication problems was noted in the 
Tavistock Report where Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) fail to communicate the 
very information that would have prevented a collision (Bryant 1991). 
Analysis of accidents has previously shown that factors such as anxiety, 
boredom and fatigue influence the navigator's ability to perceive and process 
information and there is a reliance on sight or radar as the primary 
navigational equipment, discounting much of the information that is 
available to prevent the incident (Bryant 1991). 
Information-processing deficiencies 
The distribution of information processing deficiencies differed from the 
previous two fatigue behaviours in that the peak occurred in the late 
afternoon and evening - the incidence of information processing deficiencies 
during the 0000 to 1200 watches was quite low. Common specific behaviours 
during the day watches included planning deficiencies, making assumptions 
and making incorrect assessments. Information processing deficiencies in 
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association with a concomitant performance of a secondary task was also 
evident in many incidents. For example, the captain of the Charles H McKay 
(report 7) and the skipper of the Saltiford (report 10) both failed to make an 
appraisal of a developing collision due to preoccupation with the radios. The 
master of the New Noble (report 86) was preoccupied with recovering an 
anchor and the third officer of the Iron Cumberland (report 10) was assigned 
to a phone call which reduced his ability to act as a lookout and contributed 
to the collision with the Saltiford (whose skipper was preoccupied with the 
radios). This phenomenon is reflected in the results of a maritime simulation 
study by Sablowski (1989), where assessment of workload revealed a 
decrease in performance in a secondary task (mental arithmetic) during the 
execution of a simulated navigational task. Performance in the primary task 
was unchanged. Though this may be more an issue of methodology, one 
implication is that information processing deficiencies may not be evident in 
the task of navigation but may present in other, more subtle ways; unless 
such deficiencies are actively sought, they may remain undetected. 
Whereas activation problems predominated during the early morning, 
information processing problems occur mainly during the evening 
watchkeeping periods. While the distribution of activation problems is 
consistent with the circadian rhythm of subjective alertness (for example, as 
described by Folkard 1983) the distribution of information processing 
deficiencies is more consistent with the decrease in accuracy over the 
working day (as described by Monk & Leng 1982). This phenomenon may 
well be related to time on task effects in addition to circadian influences, due 
to the difficulty in separating on-duty time from off-duty time on a ship. 
Buxton (2003) reviews the effect of cognitive load on performance and notes 
that tasks with a high cognitive load may be performed satisfactorily in the 
early morning hours, usually the worst time for tasks involving low 
cognitive load (simple repetitive tasks). It appears from analysis of activation 
and information-processing behaviours that performance is about 180 
degrees out of phase. This is consistent with the interpretation of the 
literature by Buxton (2003). It appears that though complex tasks may be 
sensitive to the effects of sleep deprivation (Wallace 2002) they are 
performed better at night than routine or monotonous tasks. 
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Scott (1994) also reviews the effect of varying task complexity and notes that 
for simple tasks, the performance rhythm is in phase with the temperature 
rhythm, however as complexity increases, performance peaks earlier in the 
day. 
The information processing fatigue behaviours that occurred late in the day 
included making assumptions, incorrect assessments and inadequate 
planning (although aspects of the latter may be latent). Behaviours under 
contrived experimental conditions may not be easily transferable to analysis 
of real world situations. Indeed, one researcher claims that speed accuracy 
trade-off only occurs under strict laboratory conditions where subjects are 
asked to make a speeded response (Williams, D. 1996, pers. comm.). 
The greater frequency of information processing errors during the late 
afternoon may be attributed to factors other than a decrease in human 
performance during the working day. Alternative explanations for this 
increase include: 
• The greater likelihood of the presence of others during daytime 
operations, which may lead to confusion and distraction during 
information-processing tasks. 
• The possibility of complacency that is less likely at night, due to the 
presence of more evident visual cues during daytime navigation. This 
could be compounded by greater reliance on direct visual cues and less 
reliance on radar and automated radar plotting aids (ARP A) during 
daytime watches. 
• The possibility that port arrival and departure times may also play a 
part in the increased incidence of information processing errors during 
the late afternoon. An analysis of shipping arrival and departure times 
for the Port of Hobart for the financial year ending 2003 (n=350) 
showed that arrival and departure times were not evenly distributed 
throughout the day. Arrivals tended to predominate on the 0400 to 
1600 watchkeeping periods, whereas departures predominated during 
the 1200 to 2000 watchkeeping periods, probably as a result of the 
timing of loading and unloading operations in this port. The arrival 
and departure from port requires significant judgement on the part of 
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the watchkeeper, with the need for coastal pilotage, avoidance of other 
shipping and interpretation of navigational information. It is relevant 
to note, however, that the greatest number of accidents occur during 
the watchkeeping period (0000-0400) associated with the lowest 
number of port shipping movements (based on the Port of Hobart 
data). 
Information processing is also coupled to the issues of automation and crew 
size. As automation and advanced technology increase to accommodate a 
decrease in crew size, the need for higher levels of information processing, 
particularly during peak information load such as aircraft take off and 
landings and piloting a ship up a narrow channel, increase. Brown and 
Groeger (1990) suggest that" ... the human ability to correlate dynamic 
processes is rather low, especially if the variables in these processes change 
their states rapidly, and if the anticipation of change is impossible because of 
the stochastic signal characteristics of unforseen action to reaction cycles." 
There has been considerable work on the effects of information processing 
demands on ship handlers, air traffic controllers and in aviation. Ohashi and 
Hirota (1969) noted the heart rate increase of a master manoeuvring a ship, 
rising to 120 beats per minute during turning and 140 during docking. The 
authors noted that significant changes in the manoeuvrer' s heart rate 
showed when: 
• there was a need for more information to manoeuvre the ship, 
• the needed information to manoeuvre the ship was not easily obtained, 
• important decisions were made by the manoeuvrer (Ohashi & Hirota 
1969). 
Ohashi and Hirota (1969) attributed the mental strain to poor 
manoeuvrability and size of the ship, the increase in local shipping, poor 
navigation instruments and lack of information from land. In a later study of 
shiphandling in narrow channels, Luczac (1991) refers to a relationship 
between different information processing independent variables and the 
physiological dependent variables, finding that different navigational 
situations produce different influences on the stress-strain relationship. For 
example, in an oncoming traffic situation, radar and map information 
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predominated resulting in an increase in attention whereas an introduced 
radar defect situation resulted in increased emotional strain as measured by 
increased heart rate. 
In summary, the variables of crew size, automation and information 
processing are interrelated and complex man-machine systems such as those 
that existed at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl both generate fatigue and 
are vulnerable to human error caused by fatigue (Luczac 1991). In instances 
of maritime incident, investigators have found that operators have .failed to 
consider all the information available to them. Information overload, 
however, presents a challenge for better data display. 
Aversion to effort 
A version to effort includes such behaviours as failing to reduce speed, failing 
to avoid a close quarters situation and failure to take avoiding action (in the 
absence of deficiencies in alertness). This behaviour excluded instances where 
the action could be categorised as being caused by a loss of alertness, 
limitation to perception of information-processing deficiency. The incidence 
of aversion to effort was relatively small. 
This behaviour predominates during the day (late in the day in absolute 
frequency, but earlier in the day as a relative frequency). Examples include 
failure of the chief mate of the Ruca Challenge (report 18) to continue to plot 
the vessel's position, failure of the second officer of the Han Gil (report 4) to 
take avoiding action and failure of the watchkeeper of the Gumbet (report 
106) to take a sufficiently wide berth when passing fishing vessels. In a 
number of incidents such as the Jhanski Ki Rane (report 13), Yue Man (report 
7), Great Brisbane (report 17), River Embly (report 19), and Berlin Express 
(report 53), appropriate action in reducing speed was not taken. 
As with the previous behaviour, problems with execution follow the 
reported phenomenon of a decrease in accurate performance during the day 
(Monk 1989a). Other authors have described forms of aversion to effort as a 
consequence of time on task (Hockey 1986) but inevitably, in real world 
situations, a combination of partial sleep loss, time on task and circadian 
performance rhythm will all interplay in producing this pattern of behaviour. 
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Differing nature of effort 
Differing nature of effort was categorised on the basis of an inappropriate 
action being undertaken by the watchkeeper. As with the previous 
behaviour, this behaviour excluded instances where the action could be 
categorised as being caused by a loss of alertness, limitation to perception of 
information-processing deficiency. As the frequency of differing nature of 
effort fatigue behaviours was typically less than 2% {corresponding to only 
11 text units), no analysis of temporal distribution was made. 
One unsafe act, however, predominated in this category. In eight separate 
instances, port instead of starboard helm was inappropriately applied, 
resulting in the grounding of the River Boyne {report 9), the Alam Indah 
{report 14), the Berlin Express {report 53), the TNT Carpentaria (report 37), and 
collisions involving the Iron Cumberland {report 10), Yue Man (report 7), 
Longevity {report 41) and the Searoad Mersey {report 64). In most instances a 
course alteration to starboard is the correct action to avert a collision. 
Summary 
Accidents resulting from human error are caused by latent errors or active 
errors in the form of inappropriate line-management decisions, 
psychological precursors of unsafe acts, unsafe acts, or inadequate defences 
following unsafe acts. Such human contributions are evident in Incidents at 
Sea reports as behaviours of the various contributors. 
These behaviours were categorised using an information-processing model 
and their relationship with time of day is summarised in figure 12. 
Time of day affected the type and degree of behaviours; several behaviours 
exhibiting a diurnal variation. It is possible that time of day exerts a 
modulating influence on a fatigued watchkeeper - behaviours that may be 
suppressed or overcome by effort of will, motivation or circumstance at one 
time of the day, may become overt at another. Decreased alertness and 
information-processing behaviours are significant human error behaviours, 
both in terms of absolute frequency and diurnal variation and are perhaps 
the two manifestations of fatigue that are most likely modulated by time of 
day. 
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Figure 12: Sleep loss, time of day and accidents: the modulating influence 
of time of day on fatigue behaviours 
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5.3. Sleep factors 
Sleep and sleep deprivation 
Accident reports describe a complex interrelationship between sleep, work 
and leisure existing among those involved in watchkeeping activities. 
Falconer's Marine Dictionary of 1780 describes the adverse consequences of 
watchkeeping: "Those whose rest is regularly broken by watch-duty, 
generally put on an appearance of premature old age, that a person 
unacquainted with them would be liable to err several years in forming a 
calculation of their ages from their exterior physiogomy, owing principally 
to their abridged and broken sleep at night'' (Parkin 1997). At the time of 
Cook's voyage to Australia, regulations for watchkeeping were brief, article 
:XXVII of the Kings Regulations and Admiralty Instructions stating that "No 
person in or belonging to the fleet shall sleep upon his watch, or negligently 
perform the duty imposed on him, or forsake his station on pain of death ... " 
(Parkin 1997). While incidents at sea had life or death consequences for those 
18th century seafarers, the contemporary situation is arguably more 
threatening, as described by Dinges (1995):" ... it is now possible for a 
fatigue-related vigilance error of a single person working on the night shift 
and/ or without adequate sleep to trigger an industrial accident that can kill 
thousands of people, damage major proportions of the environment and/ or 
cost billions of dollars". 
Unfortunately, accident investigators are more able to assign watchkeepers 
frank-sleep episodes as contributory to an accident than the more subtle 
deficiencies in cognition and judgement resulting from fragmented and 
deficient sleep. 
Not all sleep is associated with the fatigue state. As will be detailed below, the 
routine on board coupled with the biological need for sleep infers that all 
crewmembers will sleep from time to time during the day, hopefully, but not 
always while off watch. At times, all crewmembers of fishing vessels with 
small crew number may be asleep without posting a watchkeeper. At other 
times, significant crewmembers, such as the master, the pilot or the skipper 
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of a fishing vessel may be asleep, when ideally their presence on watch may 
avert some incident. 
Accident reports describe contributory factors such as long work periods, 
poor quality sleep, "jet lag", broken sleep, self-inflicted sleep deprivation, 
disrupted sleep patterns and a poor sleeping environment. As the master, 
second mate and pilot were the primary contributors in two-thirds of all 
incidents, the routine and contribution of these particular watchkeepers 
could be considered in comparison to each other and to other watchkeepers. 
The Master 
The master's involvement is reported across all watches and evenly 
distributed between collisions and groundings. Only in one incident however 
is the master's contribution associated with being sleep deprived (the 
tugmaster of the Wambiri suffering slight sleep debt) and in no instance is the 
master reported as being asleep while on watch. The relative lack of 
association of sleeping and sleepiness with accidents involving masters is 
remarkable given the master's overall responsibility for the safe operation of 
the vessel and the requirement to take command during critical manoeuvres. 
Webb and Levy (1982) and Carskadon and Dement (1981) comment that 
neither prior experience with sleep loss nor perceived adaptation result in 
adjustment to sleep loss. It is unlikely therefore, that the master has adjusted 
to working in a sleep deprived state, but rather is in an advaritageous 
position to adapt his sleeping habits around the work routine. For example, 
the master of the Karin B (report 100) arranged a pilot boarding time to 
"allow him to get some sleep", and the master of the Columbus Victoria 
(report 102), "went to bed some time before 2200 ... anticipating an early call 
to weigh anchor". There are numerous references to masters getting some 
rest prior to berthing, anchoring or some demanding manoeuvre. Sanquist 
et al. (1997) report command personnel having the highest average sleep 
duration of all personnel in a field study of 141 marine personnel. They also 
report lower levels of subjective decreased alertness among command 
personnel than other watchkeepers (Sanquist et al. 1997). 
The master's responsibility for overall command as well as his ability to exert 
some control over his sleeping pattern may also lessen the impact of 
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disrupted and deficient sleep. Haslam (1982) and Krueger (1989) report a 
greater deterioration in event-paced tasks than self-paced tasks. In addition, 
Krueger (1989) notes that following sleep deprivation, vigilance and detailed 
cognitive tasks deteriorate more rapidly than simple and well-learned tasks. 
The master's experience as well as a greater capacity to self-pace tasks may 
help mitigate against the effects of sleep deprivation. 
The Second Mate 
The second mate's contribution is mainly to collisions (6 collisions compared 
to 2 groundings and one other incident) and incidents occurring during the 
second mate's watch (6 incidents on the 0000 to 0400 watch, 2 on the 1200 to 
1600 watch). Reference to the second mate either being asleep or sleep 
deprived is made in three incidents, the highest frequency of any individual 
contributor. The second mate being contributory is associated with the 
highest number of sleep references (44% of all sleep references) and the 
second highest number of incidents, yet the literature suggests that the 
second officer's watch allows longer sleep time than the average for 
watchkeepers (Ruterfranz et al. 1988; Sanquist et al. 1997). In contrast, 
however, Sanquist et al. (1997) report the second officer's watch as having 
significantly more work periods with critically low alertness levels than that 
of personnel on other watches. 
Rutenfranz et al. (1988) note that the second officer typically has two equal 
sleep periods commencing about 0500 and 1900. Sanquist et al. (1997) reports 
a similar pattern. Though the second mate's average sleep duration is 
reported to be longer, sleep commencing in the morning is shown to be less 
beneficial than sleep commencing in the afternoon (Naitoh 1981, in Haslam 
1982). Akerstedt (1995b) also reports a circadian influence resulting in short 
morning sleeps. In addition, the early evening time of sleep resistance 
reported by Lavie (1986) as the "forbidden zone" for sleep corresponds to 
the approximate starting time for the second mate's evening sleep. Finally, 
Carskadon et al. (1982, in Roth et al. 1989) note the relationship between 
sleep fragmentation and daytime sleepiness, a similar finding to Stepanski et 
al. (1984). It appears that though the second mate enjoys greater than 
average sleep duration, the split sleep periods occur at the least efficient 
times of the day for sufficient restorative value. 
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The majority of behaviours associated with incidents occurring on the second 
mate's 0000 to 0400 watch are associated with decreased alertness (Phillips 
1998). This is consistent with Monk and Embury's findings (1981, in De Vries-
Griever & Meijman 1987) that perceptual and sensorimotor errors 
predominate following sleep deprivation, but less errors are found at night 
in complex monitoring and control tasks. The sleep-deprived and fatigued 
second mate simply loses alertness and his vessel runs aground, or more 
likely collides with another vessel. 
Most collisions reported in this study involve commercial vessels and fishing 
boats. Fishing boat manning levels frequently lead to unsafe practices such as 
not posting an anchor watch or posting an unqualified watchkeeper (such as 
the cook). Five of the eight collisions where either the fishing boat skipper 
and/ or crew were asleep occurred on the second mate's 0000 to 0400 watch. 
Accident investigators usually find that a combination of the second mates 
decreased vigilance (possibly from sleep deprivation) and inappropriate or 
absent watchkeeping (possibly due to being asleep) on board fishing vessels 
is a common cause of collisions. 
The Pilot 
The pilot was associated with seven groundings and one collision, 
predominantly on the 0400 to 0800 watch. This distribution is not surprising, 
given the coastal nature of pilotage. In seven of the eight incidents, accident 
investigators describe various errors of judgement, disorientation or failure 
to appraise a situation. In only one incident was sleep a contributory factor, 
the pilot of the Peacock (report 95) losing situational awareness, in all 
probability by falling asleep. This incident occurred on the 0000 to 0400 
watch, consistent with most other instances of watchkeepers falling asleep on 
watch. 
The role of the marine pilot is substantially different from that of others 
involved in watchkeeping. Pilotage involves complex issue of port-state 
sovereignty, and the use of local knowledge and judgement by the pilot in 
navigating coastal waters. Carpenter and Huffner (1977) describe the 
retrieval of information stored in the pilot's long-term memory as he scans 
information sources in the environment in a repetitive manner, with 
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experienced pilots being able to anticipate situations well in advance before 
they become critical. It is therefore not surprising that incidents involving 
pilots are associated with failure of higher-level cognitive processes, rather 
than a decrease in alertness. 
There is considerable literature linking sleep deprivation with decreased 
vigilance and alertness (e.g. Akerstedt 1995b; Bonnet & Arand 1995, 
Wilkinson & Haines 1966); however, the pilot's role is more complex than 
just maintaining alertness. De Vries-Griever and Meijman (1987) note that 
performance in complex tasks that utilise high memory load (such as that of 
pilots) gets worse in the course of the day, whereas performance on tasks 
utilising low memory load seem to improve in the course of the day. 
Krueger (1989) notes that both vigilance and more detailed cognitive tasks 
deteriorated most in 90 hours of sleep deprivation and 4 hours sleep per day 
for 6 days (the latter resembling marine pilots average sleep), simple and 
well-learned tasks deteriorating little. Similarly, Haslam (1982) reports a 
deterioration of cognitive function and logical reasoning following one night 
without sleep. Parker and Hubinger (1998) describe decreased sleep time (an 
average of 0.59 hours per 24 hours in the Great North East Channel pilots) 
and fragmented sleep (an average over three sleep periods per 24 hour 
period on the Great Barrier Reef Inner Route), with pilots accumulating a 
daily sleep debt of 5.6 to 6 hours. Sleep latency and sleep efficiency data in 
Parker and Hubinger's study (1998) was consistent with pilots being in a 
fatigued state. 
Other Watchkeepers 
The first and third mate are only associated with six incidents, with only one 
incident each associated with sleeping. The first mate of the Carola (report 79) 
fell asleep due to fatigue during his 0400 to 0800 watch, while the master and 
the pilot were asleep off-watch. The first mate was described as a 
conscientious and keen officer, but following an intake of alcohol and a 
shorter than normal prior sleep, he probably fell asleep a little after 0430 
during the circadian low. This incident illustrates the extreme sleepiness as 
described by Akerstedt (1995a) due to the interrelationship between working 
during the circadian low, extended work hours and reduced sleep length. 
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The compounding effect of alcohol would have also exacerbated the first 
mate's sleepiness. 
The third mate of the Eternal Wind (report 131) failed to maintain an effective 
lookout (he was working out compass error while the seaman-lookout was 
working on deck). At 0815 the Eternal Wind collided with the fishing boat 
Melinda T. The watchkeeping deckhand noticed the Eternal Wind only 
seconds before the collision. The skipper of the Melinda T routinely slept in 
the wheelhouse in order to be immediately available, three-hour watches 
being maintained by the deckhands. During the voyage, the vessel 
experienced 20-25 knot winds and 2-2.5 metre seas, with the vessel yawing 
through 20 degrees. Though sleep deprivation was not identified by accident 
investigators, the need for daytime sleep by Melinda T's off-watch and the 
disagreeable sleeping environment for the skipper illustrates a number of 
sleep hygiene factors associated with fishing vessels. Torsvall and Akerstedt 
(1988) note that on-call conditions shorten sleep duration and sleep quality, 
with an increased sleepiness on the following day. The need to be readily 
available, in conjunction with the compounding effects of noise and motion 
on board a fishing vessel at sea may have adversely affected the skipper's 
sleep. There has been little sustained research on the effects of the physical 
environment other than noise and heat (Hockey 1986). Parker and 
Hubinger's 1998 study of the work and rest patterns of Great Barrier Reef 
Pilots found that it was unlikely that sleep at sea was affected to any degree 
by sea conditions, noting that such waters are generally protected from 
extreme weather found on the open sea. 
Intrinsic physiological and psychological differences 
The previous section of this thesis considered the individual watchkeeping 
periods and the corresponding watchkeeper role, their opportunities for 
sleep and the possibility of sleep deprivation. It is also appropriate to 
consider the possibility of individual differences in tolerance to sleep 
deprivation among those keeping watch. 
Home and Ostberg (1977) reviewed individual differences in circadian 
rhythm and note that individuals may be classified as either morning types 
or evening types according to the phase of their body temperature rhythm. 
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These "types" have also been related to personality theories. Colquhoun 
(1960), in a study of personality and performance involving 102 adult males, 
noted that at 10.00 a.m. introvert subjects tended to be more efficient at an 
inspection task, whereas at 3.00 p.m. extraverts were more efficient. In a 
study comparing morning-eveningness in 48 subjects, Horne and Ostberg 
(1977) supported the notion that extraverts tend to be evening types and 
introverts tend to be morning types. They noted studies that find this 
correlation becomes stronger after 40 years of age, with marked differences 
in sleep habits, with extraverts sleeping progressively longer and waking 
later and introverts shorter (Horne & Ostberg 1977). 
Given the years of experience required by Pilots or Masters, it is more likely 
that these officers are also older than Mates and possibly exhibit the 
morning-type chronotype with a corresponding difference in performance 
profile and coping strategies. Harma (1993) notes numerous studies relating 
morningness to decreased tolerance to shiftwork. 
In a recent survey of 2007 subjects by Taillard and Bioulac (1999), evening 
types were found to react differently to sleep deprivation than other 
chronotypes. The authors found that although evening types went to bed 
later and woke up earlier than morning types, they presented a daily sleep 
debt of 9-90 minutes, but slept more on weekend, thereby repaying their 
sleep debt. Evening types varied their bedtime more often than other 
chronotypes as well as consuming more coffee. It appears that evening types 
demonstrate more flexibility in sleep patterns and strategic measures, a 
characteristic identified by Costa et al. (1989) as associated with better 
tolerance and adjustment to shiftwork. It is possible that the sleep deprived, 
and possibly younger second mate (and therefore more likely to exhibit 
evening type characteristics) is being taxed in flexibility of sleeping habits and 
the second mate's less-than-average total sleep time exacerbates shift-
induced sleep deprivation (especially where that officer is unable to achieve 
recuperative off duty sleep). 
Akerstedt and Torsvall (1981) surveyed 390 workers on various shift systems 
and found that with increasing age and experience of shiftwork, sleep quality 
and sleep length were reduced. The authors note that in light of morningness 
increasing with age, the morning peak in alertness may inhibit the morning 
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sleep necessary for recuperation following night work. Hanna (1993) notes 
that elderly people have a two hour earlier peak of activity than younger 
people, which coupled with an increase in sleep disturbances and lower 
quality sleep (i.e. a greater proportion of stage one sleep) may result in 
poorer adjustment to shift work with advancing age. Harma (1993) noted 
that studies comparing male and female workers have not found differences 
between the genders in shiftwork tolerance. 
The quantity and quality of sleep of seafarers 
Akerstedt et al. (1997), from a study involving eight subjects undertaking 
short sleep episodes, describe the factors that contribute to a good night's 
sleep: 
A good night's sleep, then, seems to involve a long prior wake span, a 
location close to the circadian nadir, a long and continuous sleep 
sequence, and considerable amounts of SWS. For an easy awakening 
and a feeling of being refreshed from sleep some disturbance towards 
the end of sleep would be required, perhaps via a slightly delayed 
bedtime in order to terminate sleep higher up on the circadian 
upswing. 
These factors are frequently diminished or absent in the on board 
environment and conditions are less than ideal for Akerstedt's "good nights 
sleep". Sleep, sleeping and sleep deprivation are central issues in the life on 
board commercial ships and fishing boats. A number of studies have been 
undertaken to quantify the amount of sleep taken at sea. Rutenfranz et al. 
(1988) refer to a study of the sleep habits of submariners undertaken by 
Kleitman in 1949 where 75% of respondents described sleep quality as 
poorer at sea than ashore, though sleep time was 8.6 to 9.6 hours per 24 
hours. Rutenfranz et al. (1988) found average sleep duration of 7.55 hours 
per 24 on watchkeeping duties compared with 11.02 on days off in a diary 
study of 68 subjects over 540 days. Sanquist et al. (1997), in a study of 144 
mariners on tankers and freighters on US west coast runs, found average 
sleep duration of watchkeepers of 6.6 hours (5.2 hours for the 0400 to 0800 
watch on freighters.) This compares with home sleep of 7.98 hours, inferring 
a daily sleep debt of some 1.3 hours aboard ship. Thirty-eight percent of 
respondents indicated that they experienced fatigu~ or decreased alertness 
while watchkeeping and 11% of work periods were associated with low 
levels of alertness (Sanquist et al. 1997). 
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Marine pilots appear to suffer even greater sleep restriction. Parker and 
Hubinger's (1998) logbook study of 23 Queensland pilots based on 146 
assignments found that sleep time per 24 hours varied between 0.59 hours 
and 5.25 hours depending on the pilotage route. In this study, sleep latency 
varied from 4 to 7 minutes, consistent with the fatigued state. Sleep debt per 
24 hours was about 6 hours {compared with sleep ashore between 
assignments). In earlier studies of pilots, Cook and Shipley {1980) found that 
" ... pilots are extremely tired after a 'long-haul' pilotage, particularly at night 
... and frequently need an' effort of will' to maintain vigilance when on 
watch during uneventful passages". In a study of Port Phillip Sea Pilots, 
Berger {1984) suggests that a pilot might get 3 hours poor quality sleep in 27 
to 30 hours. 
Sleep loss and performance 
While ships officers clearly suffer considerable risk of sleep deprivation, what 
are the likely consequences of this in performance terms. 
Hockey {1986) states that " ... the general finding from studies that have used 
tasks involving the use of working memory is that sleep loss impairs 
performance." Hockey's (1986) assessment of the effect of sleep loss on 
memory is that " ... the sleeplessness state is quite suitable for maintaining the 
accessibility of recently acquired information, although less suitable for 
encoding or registering it." This may serve to explain the late afternoon 
increase in information processing problems described in the previous 
section. 
In a study utilising both a tracking task {keeping a cursor in the centre of a 
moving target on a computer screen) and time estimation (estimating time 
intervals), Bohnen and Gaillard (1994) found that following one night of sleep 
deprivation, " ... performance in the tracking task gradually degraded during 
the half hour working session ... but performance in the time estimation task 
was not impaired". Experimental design {allowing the subjects undertaking 
the time estimation task to make observation responses of status) allowed 
the researchers some measure of subject confidence and noted in this study 
" ... the tendency to make more observations indicates that sleep deprivation 
may lead to a higher uncertainty" {Bohnen & Gaillard 1994). The authors 
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propose that their subjects' observation responses required less cognitive 
resources than the continuous monitoring of an internal clock; it was easier 
to make more frequent checks than rely on internal resources. 
Performance deficit due to total sleep loss may be mitigated by modifying 
either the task or the environment. Gaillard and Steyvers (1988) found that 
the performance deficit effects of total sleep loss were greater with degraded 
stimuli than with intact stimuli which " ... suggests that the perceptual 
encoding process is affected by sleep loss." In addition, Gaillard and Steyvers 
(1988) claim that the effects of sleep loss are greater in the afternoon than in 
the morning and that the effects increase towards the end of a task. 
Angus and Heselgrave (1985), in a total sleep deprivation study involving 12 
female students, considered that previous studies had underestimated the 
effects of sleep deprivation, their subjects experiencing a decreased reaction 
time performance of 76% of baseline after one night of sleep deprivation and 
only 43% of baseline following the second night. Angus and Heselgrave' s 
study did, however, involve substantial cognitive activity (simulating a 
military setting), and this demanding workload could have depleted the 
reserve capacity normally available to subjects during daytime periods. In 
this study, the authors propose no sound rationale for selecting female 
subjects to participate in a study and extrapolating results to a particularly 
male domain (i.e. the military in the mid 1980's). In addition, the authors note 
that though the results of their studies are " ... directed towards a military 
command and control environment'', their results are also applicable to " ... a 
variety of crisis situations ... as well as to non crisis situations involving 
alternative work cycles." Given the small sample in the study, the narrow 
age bracket (19 to 24 years) and the gender homogeneity, this is an 
ambitious claim. 
A more recent study of total sleep deprivation (up to 102 hours) in a group 
of 20 naval gunners showed a deterioration in performance in a battery of 
neurobehavioural tests with increased hours of sleep loss with troughs at 
between 36 and 42 hours and between 66 to 78 hours (How et al. 1994). 
There was a similar pattern with short-term memory and muscle fatigue 
tests Subjective sleepiness assessment and mood scale showed an upward 
trend with peaks at 36 to 42 hours and again at 80 hours. This two-stage 
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deterioration with total sleep deprivation may indicate some adaptation 
occurring during the intervening plateau, however the exact nature of such 
adaptation remained undefined in this study (How et al. 1994). 
Consistent with the findings of Haslam (1982), How et al. (1994) found that 
performance in " ... routine military tests which involved well-learned 
mechanistic manoeuvres were not affected". This observation is consistent 
with the suggestion that " .. .lower and more peripheral processes are more 
sensitive to sleep loss than central, cognitive or memory processes" (Gaillard 
& Steyvers 1988). Wilkinson (1962) claims that the latter tasks are more 
intrinsically motivating to the subject and therefore better performed. 
Horne (1988) studied creative thinking in 24 subjects who went 32 hours 
without sleep, finding that sleep loss impaired performance on all creative 
thinking test scales. In a later study, Harrison and Horne (1999) utilised a 
marketing decision-making game to evaluate flexible thinking and cognitive 
responsiveness. The authors found that though critical reasoning 
(approximating information acquisition) was unaffected by sleep loss, 32-36 
hours of sleep deprivation led to more rigid thinking, increased 
perseverative errors and difficulty in appreciating an updated situation. The 
authors comment that well-rehearsed or familiar tasks are largely unaffected 
by one night of sleep deprivation, consistent with the observation by How et 
al. (1994) on the performance on routine military tests described above. 
Harrison and Horne (2000) reviewed the impact of sleep deprivation on 
decision making and surmised that though rule-based convergent and logical 
tasks are unaffected by short term sleep deprivation due to compensatory 
effort and heightened participant interest, divergent, unexpected and 
innovative skills are affected. The authors also confirm that monotonous and 
dull tasks are vulnerable to sleep loss. 
Partial sleep loss 
Though there have been many studies (e.g. Freidmann et al. 1977; Webb & 
Agnew 1974; Horne & Wilkinson 1985) in which reduced sleep resulted in 
minimal performance disruption, partial sleep loss has been shown to 
contribute to a progressive impairment of vigilance. Webb and Agnew 
(1974) studied 15 male subjects on a sleep regime of 5.5 hours a night for 60 
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days and determined that only vigilance performance declined with 
restricted sleep (a 28% decline in correct responses), behavioural 
consequences being minimal. Friedmann et al. (1977) concluded that 6-8 
months of gradual sleep reduction, down to 4.5 - 5.5 hours per night did not 
result in behavioural effects, subjective fatigue being the limiting factor 
determining tolerability. The authors did find however that 4.5 hours sleep 
per night was a possible genetic limit beyond which sleep cannot be reduced 
in most people. Home and Wilkinson (1985) paired twelve subjects 
comparing performance of 6-hour sleepers with 8-hour sleepers. The 
authors found no significant differences in daytime sleepiness measures 
(subjective sleepiness and vigilance), concluding that two hours sleep 
reduction can be achieved relatively easily in young adults. 
In contrast to the above studies, Wilkinson and Haines (1966) reported on 
vigilance and calculation tests in their study involving groups of 6 enlisted 
men on a regime of sleeping with either 0, 1, 2, 3, 5 or 7.5 hours sleep on the 
preceding night, the authors concluding that a reduction in sleep by about 
half on a single night can produce a significant fall in working efficiency. In 
addition, the authors noted that performance decrement is unlikely to show 
up on short duration tests (i.e. about 5 minutes), but is clearly evident on 
prolonged tests (i.e. 15-40 minutes). 
Bonnet and Arand (1995) refer to studies measuring multiple sleep latency 
(MSLT) and sleep propensity, noting that modest sleep reduction (1-2 hours 
per night) is associated with decreased sleep latency and increased sleep 
propensity. The authors review several studies where a reduction in sleep 
times in normal young adults is associated with a decrease in alertness by up 
to one third. 
In a field study of partial sleep deprivation over nine successive days, Haslam 
(1982) showed that sleep deprived subjects demonstrated a deterioration in a 
range of cognitive and motor skills over the nine day period and that even 
small amounts of sleep may be beneficial, compared with no sleep at all. 
Rutenfranz et al. (1988) in a study of watchkeepers sleep patterns while on 
active duty using both traditional watchkeeping systems (two four hour 
watches per day) and on daywork found that among watchkeepers using 
the traditional system, sleep was broken and that there were indications of a 
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lack of adaptation of the sleep-wakefulness cycle. Mean sleep duration for 
watchkeepers was 7.55, for daywork was 7.51 and for days off was 11.02 
(Rutenfranz et al. 1988). The authors claim that as sleep duration is 
dependent on the time of sleep onset; " ... sleep which begin~ in the daytime is 
in general shorter than sleep which begins in the evening", this fact in 
association with non watchkeeping duties and social activities contributes to 
fragmented sleep (Rutenfranz et al. 1988). This study also revealed that the 
shortest sleep duration of all (6.93 hours) was shared by the subjects on 
"stand by" duties (Rutenfranz et al. 1988). 
Selective sleep loss 
Very few performance studies have been carried out on the selective 
reduction in REM sleep (with a consequent reduction in total sleep time), 
however other studies have confirmed the view that REM sleep is important 
for the consolidation or elaboration of learned material (Hockey 1986). 
Fragmented sleep, as a result of noise, interruption or sleep disorders such as 
obstructive sleep apnoea may lead to selective sleep loss. Stepanski et al. 
(1984) studied the effect of arousals on daytime sleepiness on 45 subjects 
including those affected by sleep apnoea, myoclonus, insomnia as well as 
normal controls. The authors found that though arousal during sleep failed 
to significantly alter total sleep time, the proportion of various stages of sleep 
varied significantly. The percentage REM sleep in sleep apnoea subjects was 
10.3% compared to 17.4% with normal subjects, though the apnoea group 
enjoyed a greater total sleep time (7.3 hours compared to 7.0 hours). In 
addition, the authors found a positive correlation between nocturnal arousal 
(and hence fragmented sleep) and excessive daytime sleepiness as measured 
by the multiple sleep latency test. The authors conclude that consolidation of 
sleep is crucial and that arousals during sleep directly produce daytime 
sleepiness. 
In the study of on-call ship's engineers, Torsvall and Akerstedt (1988) found 
that being on call reduced REM and slow wave sleep and the first sleep cycle 
contained less stage four sleep and more stage two sleep. Given the 
predominance of slow wave sleep in the early part of the night and the 
relative increase in the incidence of REM sleep as the night progresses, any 
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delay in the onset of sleep time will subsequently reduce the proportion of 
slow wave sleep (Hockey 1986). Torsvall and Akerstedt (1988) identified in 
their study that " ... sleeping while on-call shortens sleep duration and reduces 
the amount of REM and slow wave sleep as well as the spectral power 
density ... these negative effects on sleep are followed by an increased 
sleepiness during the subsequent day". The duration of sleep, independent of 
actual waking to attend to alarms, was approximately 1.5 hours shorter 
during on-call nights. 
Factors mitigating sleep deprivation 
While nothing appears to be as effective as a good nights sleep in mitigating 
the effects of sleep loss, there are a number of strategies that have been 
studied that may reduce the consequences of sleep loss. 
Carskadon and Dement (1981) found that daytime sleepiness returned to 
basal levels following one full night of sleep in a study involving sleep 
restriction to 5 hours in 10 young adult subjects. Foo et al. (1994) in a study 
on total sleep deprivation (42-104 hours) of 20 male naval volunteers found 
that performance in routine tasks, mood and sleepiness improved following 
a sleep period of 4 hours (following 42 hours of sleep deprivation), however 
cognitive and perceptive skills did not. A similar finding was made by 
Haslam (1982) who noted that daytime recovery-sleep is less beneficial on 
performance than early morning recovery-sleep. 
Numerous authors have referred to the restitutive effects of naps, Graeber et 
al. (1990) evaluating the benefits of pre-planned naps by pilots in Boeing 747 
cockpits. Napping and pre-planned rest periods are now common practice as 
fatigue countermeasures in many long-haul commercial flights. 
Buxton (2003) reviews the nature of naps and classifies naps as either 
maintenance (usually short duration, to supplement main sleep in advance of 
an extended work period) or recovery (longer duration, to help make up for 
lost sleep during a work period). The author notes that naps need to be more 
than ten minutes in duration in order to be effective, but that naps of 120 
minutes do not produce any better performance than naps of 60 minutes. 
Buxton (2003) also notes the danger of waking from slow-wave sleep with 
subsequent sleep inertia and initial performance difficulties. She cites research 
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by Ferrara and De Gennaro (2000) recommending a nap length of about 20 
minutes or else about 80 to 100 minutes in order to minimise the chance of 
waking from slow-wave sleep. 
Reyner and Home (1997) compared a <15 minute nap and caffeine (150 mg) 
with a placebo, finding a substantial reduction in the number of incidents 
(drifting from the lane) in a driving simulation study in an experimental 
group of 12 graduate students. The effect was evident for about one hour 
and a benefit was also evident for a higher dose of caffeine (200 mg) for a 
second hour. In a later study, Reyner and Home (2002) found that 200 mg 
caffeine reduced early morning driver fatigue for about 30 minutes following 
a night without sleep, and for about 2 hours following a night with only 5 
hours sleep. (The authors note the relatively short duration of the caffeine 
effect in the light of its plasma elimination half-life of 5 - 7 hours.) Reyner and 
Home (2002) considered the effect of a "functional energy drink" (Red Bull®) 
containing 80 mg caffeine in a similar driving simulation study and found 
reduced subjective sleepiness, decreased driving incidents, particularly 
during the first 90 minutes of the drive. The authors noted that the 
magnitude of reduction in incidents with the energy drink is similar to the 
reductions following consumption of coffee containing 200 mg caffeine, the 
authors concluding that the energy drink is more effective than coffee with 
the same amount of caffeine. 
Stampi, (1988) in addressing sleep strategies for those engaged in continuous 
work (emergency services, health providers, astronauts etc) proposes that 
adopting polyphasic sleep and ultrashort sleep-wake patterns could mitigate 
against the effects of sleep deprivation. Stampi (1988) states that adult 
humans are the exception in the animal kingdom in adopting a monophasic 
sleep-wake pattern given the polyphasic nature of other animals' and human 
neonatal and early childhood sleep patterns. 
Linear regression analysis of mean sleep episode duration of single-handed 
sailors in three international competitions showed that " ... the shorter the 
sleep episode duration, the better his race standing" (Stampi 1985). Similarly, 
Bennet (1973) noted that " ... certain highly motivated people can wake 
themselves up at hourly intervals for 4 of 5 weeks on end and still apparently 
be functioning at a high level of efficiency." Bennet's (1973) study of the 
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medical and psychological effects of the 1972 singlehanded transatlantic race 
did document errors of navigation, probably due to fatigue, however it is 
remarkable that no evidence of fatigue was documented as a contributing 
factor in the several major mishaps that occurred during the race. It is 
noteworthy that in this environment, there is an absence of social, cultural 
and occupational cues, which may have a significant impact on regulating the 
nature of conventional monophasic sleep. 
Hartley (1974) has shown that " ... a polyphasic schedule of three 80-minute 
naps lead to a significantly higher performance level compared to a 
monophasic pattern of the same amount of sleep per day." 
Summary 
The literature strongly suggests that seafarers, like contemporaries in other 
professions, are obtaining less sleep than desirable, or in fact essential for 
efficient functioning. Ship's watchkeepers enjoy less total sleep time and 
suffer partial sleep deprivation by virtue of life on board and the essential 
requirement to be part of watch. Watchkeepers are shift workers, but with 
the added burden that they are unable to go home or return to a stable 
day I night pattern of activity and rest - their work is their home for weeks at 
a time. This is particularly true of those engaged in the fishing industry. The 
integral nature of work and sleep on board, in addition to the sleep loss 
suffered by watchkeepers is summarised in figure 13. 
It is evident from the figure that the data supports two patterns where sleep 
factors may contribute to accidents. First, the nature of seafaring is not 
particularly conducive to sleep in sufficient quality or quantity, such 
environmental factors contributing to sleep loss, which, at certain times of 
the day may manifest as a fatigue behaviour, which, in tum, may contribute 
to an accident. The second pattern results from a routine on board where the 
work environment necessitates daytime sleep which may result in critical 
crewmembers being asleep or a vessel being "not under command." These 
circumstances usually result in a watch not being kept or inappropriate 
responses from untrained crewmembers in critical situations (such as close 
quarters requiring navigational decision making). 
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not sleeping 
Waking at 
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Sleeping conditions, 
sleep hygiene 
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social factors 
Routine on board 
Sleep loss 
,, 
Time of day 
Watch keeper 
fatigue 
Daytime sleep 
Crewmember asleep at anchor 
or vessel not under command 
Critical crewmember asleep/ 
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Accident 
Figure 13: Sleep loss, time of day and accidents: the effect of the integrated 
nature of work and sleep and factors contributory to sleep loss 
5.4. The task of navigation 
In an analysis of findings on collisions and groundings, Bryant (1991) and the 
Tavistock team noted that collisions often occur where a vessel traffic service 
(VTS) is set up to convey information about traffic in the vicinity. In addition, 
the team noted misinterpretation of radar (despite improvements in training 
and equipment), reliance on visual cues (where navigational aids are 
available) and invoking close encounters with other vessels, possibly as a 
means of reducing uncertainty (Bryant 1991). It appears that the behaviour 
adopted in shipping collisions and groundings is compounded by factors 
other than the simple logic of decision-making. In the luxury of hindsight, 
there appears, in many cases at least, a number of simple explanations to 
account for such incidents, for example, failure to consider all available 
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information in decision making, insufficient utilisation of electronic aids and 
failure to maintain a safe distance off. Unlike the hard digital logic of 
electronic information and the predicability of mechanical automation, the 
involvement of the human element in the control loop adds another complex 
dimension. 
In comparison to the observations of poor navigation instruments and lack 
of information, by Ohashi and Hirota (1969), Bryant (1991) in the later 
Tavistock Institute Report observes that in over half the cases of collisions 
studied in depth, all the information to prevent the collision was on hand. 
Bryant (1991) notes that "it is doubtful whether additional technical aids and 
data sources would be used any more than the information currently 
available to the navigator and, rather than providing him with more 
information, greater benefits are more likely to be obtained from better data 
display." Johansson (1975) notes that there are" ... more things out there in 
the environment than are worth paying attention to" and "much of 
everyday perception is overdetermined." Bryant (1988) notes that ship 
navigators are aware of much more information than they ever use. Factors 
such as anxiety, motivation, fatigue and boredom could influence their ability 
both to perceive and to process information, and hence to use it effectively. 
Brown (1989) quotes Merchant Shipping Regulations, which require that 
"The watchkeeping system shall be such that the efficiency of watchkeeping 
officers and watchkeeping ratings is not impaired by fatigue. Duties shall be 
so organised that the first watch at the commencement of a voyage and the 
subsequent relieving watches are sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for 
duty." (This requirement, which forms part of the 1978 Standards for the 
Certification and Training of Watchkeepers was replaced in 1996 by more 
specific amendments which have become the international standard.) This 
objective should be read in conjunction with the United Kingdom Merchant 
Shipping Notice No.M1178 which places the onus on any person sending a 
ship to sea to ensure that it is seaworthy in respect of manning, having 
regard to the nature of the service for which the ship is intended. Brown 
(1989) notes the approach of ensuring fitness for duty by requiring that 
vessels be adequately manned. In the days of sail and later steam, where 
voyages took many months and most maintenance was carried out while 
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underway, considerable manpower was required for sail handling, 
maintenance, attending boilers, greasing and oiling and preparation of 
meals. The scene has changed considerably and in the modem complex 
sociotechnical ship consisting of technologies, people, organisational 
structures and the external environment (Committee on the Effects of 
Smaller Crew Size on Maritime Safety 1990) a vessel that carried a crew of 40 
a few years ago now carries a crew of less than 20. 
In summary, navigation involves a complex interface of the ship and its 
environment, technology and systems, and the human element. In the 
context of increasing automation and decreasing crew size the changing 
nature of these factors may contribute not only to a change in the work of 
seafarers but also to a change in the nature of accidents, specifically less 
frequent but more catastrophic. 
5.5. W atchkeeping and shiftwork 
Adaptation to shift work 
In a temporally ideal world, the nocturnal decrease in performance, alertness 
and mood would coincide with sleeping. Indeed this was the case until 
Thomas Edison invented the light bulb with the possible exceptions of 
traditional night-shift workers in the medical and seafaring professions. With 
the industrialisation of society during the 20th century, and the modem world 
of "24/7", services are provided around the clock, necessitating an increasing 
number of workers involved in shift work with performance demands 
occurring at biologically inappropriate times. 
A n.umber of studies have demonstrated that the human circadian rhythm 
does not adjust well to shiftwork. Akerstedt (1995b) in his review of work 
hours and sleepiness noted that adjustment to a new circadian phase position 
occurs at a speed of about one hour per day. Monk (1989b) states" ... the 
prime impact of the circadian system stems from its inability to adjust 
instantaneously to the changes in routine that shiftwork requires." 
Nicholson and Spencer (1988) in a study of the effects of irregularity of work 
and rest claim that desynchronisation of temperature and sleep wake 
rhythms occur during a schedule which involves irregularity of periods of 
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work and rest and that the phase change suggests that the sleep wake cycle 
is acting as a zeitgeber for the temperature rhythm. Nicholson and Spencer 
(1988), using a mathematical model, have been able to predict the effects that 
both time since sleep and time of day have on a performance test (digit 
symbol substitution test). The authors describe a low but constant 
performance with work that starts in the early hours of the morning 
(opposing effects of time on task and time of day) and an ever-decreasing 
performance for work commenced in the evening due to the combined 
effects of time on task and time of day (Nicholson & Spencer 1988). 
Nicholson and Spencer (1988) therefore warn of the risks of a shift schedule 
where a long period of duty terminates near the low point of the circadian 
rhythm of body temperature. 
The ability of the body to successfully be entrained into a pattern of different 
schedules and the effect that this has on performance has significance for 
those designing shift schedules. Studies reviewed by Hockey (1986) reveal 
that adjustment to a new shift schedule takes between 7 and 14 days and is 
rarely, if ever complete. Folkard et al. (1976) has demonstrated however, 
that this slow adaptation of performance is in jobs that are low in cognitive 
complexity; cognitive tasks with a high requirement for internal processing 
that use the working memory system have been shown to adapt more 
quickly to phase shifts that are produced by alterations of the work rest 
schedule. Folkard and Monk (1979) suggest that performance efficiency 
exhibits a circadian rhythm and is at low ebb at night, and that this rhythm 
adjusts fairly slowly to night-work. Knauth et al. (1978) found in both 
experimental and field studies that re-entrainment of the body temperature 
rhythm took two or more days after two or more successive nightshifts, but 
only one day after a single nightshift. 
Early shift starts are associated with sleep loss as found by Folkard and 
Barton (1993). In their study involving 297 shift workers, the authors found 
that (in comparison to a nominal starting time) for each hour earlier that shift 
workers needed to leave home before morning shift, they went to sleep only 
5.3 minutes earlier, slept for 46 minutes less and were awake for 8.7 minutes 
less before leaving home. This study appears to illustrate that workers on 
early shifts are largely unable to compensate for their early start by going to 
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bed earlier. The authors propose that the individually stable "forbidden 
zone" for sleep propensity proposed by Lavie, may discourage individuals 
from going to bed earlier than normal. 
In a study of 23 female SAS cabin crew by Kecklund et al. (1994) early 
morning work was associated with more difficulties waking up, more 
discomfort due to insufficient sleep and more afternoon sleepiness. Waking 
at 0416, compared with the control group at 0733 was associated with over 
two hours less sleep. The authors also noted that participants undertaking 
early morning shifts went to bed approximately one hour earlier, though 
their wake up time was approximately three hours earlier than the control 
group. In addition to the deficiencies in performance associated with shift 
work in this study, recovery was also associated with adverse after effects. 
Meijman et al. (1993) studied the effects of physical exercise (a momentary 
state change to tax participants of their available resources) on memory, in 
participants 32 hours after night, day and afternoon shifts. The authors found 
that while no differences in a memory search task were found between day 
shift and night shift groups on baseline days, physical exercise adversely 
affected performance in the night recovery group significantly more than the 
day recovery group; the authors contributing this to the burden of night 
work. 
Smith et al. (1994) found a 23% increased risk of sustaining an injury while on 
night shift compared to day shift in a review of 4350 accident records from a 
large engineering company. Moore-Ede and Richardson (1985), in a review 
of medical implications of shiftwork note an association with sleeping 
disorders, daytime sleepiness, falling asleep on the job, peptic ulcer disease, 
eating disorders, increased alcohol and tobacco consumption, and acute 
myocardial infarction. Moore-Ede and Richardson (1985) note the 
methodological difficulties associated with studies involving shiftworkers, 
specifically the phenomena that poorly adapted shiftworkers self-select to 
leave shift work, and older shiftworkers tend to be promoted to day work 
supervisory positions. Adaptability to shift work seems to be affected by 
personality, age and medical disorders such as sleep apnoea, which are 
known to affect sleep. 
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Knauth (1997) gives 20 ergonomic recommendations for shift systems that 
incorporate shift sequencing, duration and distribution of working time, 
position of the working time during the day and provision for short term 
deviations. 
Sustained operations 
In military operations and increasingly in civil applications the need for 
continuous (around-the-dock) and sustained operations (unusually long 
work stints) places specific additional demands on workers, either due to the 
nature of the operation, economic necessity or personal choice of the 
employees. Such tasks may be physically demanding, require prolonged 
attention or may require long periods of reduced activity, with well 
documented effects on performance over time (e.g. Mackworth 1950; Angus 
& Heselgrave 1985). Vigilance in a monitoring task deteriorates rapidly over 
time with substantial deterioration occurring within 20-35 minutes and 
monitoring stints less than 4 hours are recommended (Krueger 1989). 
The distinction between worker-controlled tasks (such as making telephone 
calls or data entry) and machine or event-controlled tasks (such as assembly 
line work or navigating a ship in a confined waterway) is important in 
determining the effect of sustained and continuous operations on 
performance. Williams et al. (1959) notes that performance on machine-
paced tasks is often affected by small amounts of sleep loss leading to errors 
of omission. Similarly, it has been claimed that task based (i.e. machine-
paced) pacing is most influenced by fatigue Q"oly, R. 1996, pers. comm.). 
Navigation of a ship may include aspects of worker-controlled tasks (for 
example underway while at sea in the absence of other shipping) and 
machine-controlled tasks (for example pilotage in a confined waterway in 
traffic, under the influence of tide and wind. 
In military applications, sustained operations are often conducted without 
incident as evidenced by Operation Southern Watch in 1992, where the Navy 
Air Wing flew more hours than during an equivalent time during Desert 
Storm In this operation pilots flew approximately 100 sorties per day for the 
18 days of the operation without mishap. A survey of 125 aircrew members 
(55% response) conducted by Belland and Bissell (1994) indicated that only 
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18% said fatigue was not a factor and sleep decreased by only 0.4 hours per 
night. Aircrew utilised caffeine and nicotine tablets to maintain performance 
levels and to decrease drowsiness. Survey respondents indicated that fatigue 
was most evident at times of decreased sensory inputs such as flying in 
marshal {waiting to be recovered on the deck of the carrier), long 
monotonous flights and flying during circadian troughs {Belland & Bissell 
1994). One individual response is noteworthy- "continuous operations were 
not a problem as long as we could take naps". 
The highly restitutive nature of naps in sustained and continuous operations 
is well established (e.g. Graeber et al. 1990, Reyner & Home, 1997). Graeber 
(1989), aware of the soporific nature of the long-haul cockpit observed the 
napping propensity of international flight crews during the course of trip 
patterns lasting up to nine days finding that on one seven day eastward trip, 
unplanned naps of over 20 minutes duration occurred on 20% of 
opportunities. Generally these naps are not approved by management and 
given the presence of an observer, probably underestimated the extent of 
this practice. Graeber (1989b) again notes that napping may have an overall 
beneficial effect on the vigilance level of the crew. 
The differences between flying medium duration military sorties (4 to 6 
hours as described by Belland and Bissell, 1994) and the long-haul civil 
aviation operations of up to 16 hours may be explained in terms of 
motivation and exhorting subjects to perform. In addition, the highly specific 
selection process, training and technical and logistical support of naval 
aviators, coupled to the highly intense and infrequent nature of actual live 
missions may account for the difference in incident rate between military and 
civil sustained operations. 
In summary, sustained operations have the potential to expose the 
consequences of vigilance decrement, however the human ability to adapt is 
evident in prolonged military operations. In comparison, long-haul aircraft 
operations have a higher rate of accident than short and medium haul 
operations, possibly due to flight duration and time zone changes. The 
combination of sustained operations, particularly machine-paced operations 
{such as a prolonged ship pilotage), has the potential to adversely affect 
performance and result in accidents. 
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5.6. Fatigue and Accidents 
Sleep loss, fatigue and accidents 
Akerstedt (1995b) states that a series of reliable events occur when people 
attempt to remain awake and alert during times of endogenous pressure for 
sleep. These are reviewed by Dinges (1995) and include: 
• an increase in sleep propensity 
• an increase in the compensatory effort required to remain awake and 
perform effectively 
• an increase in involuntary intrusions of drowsiness or EEG microsleeps 
despite compensatory effort 
• an increase in periods of poor, inefficient and variable performance 
• performance deficits in elementary cognitive processes (that form the 
building blocks for higher order functions) 
• increased periods of non-responding or delayed responding (lapses) on 
attention-based tasks 
• reduced accuracy of short-term memory 
• accelerated decrements in performance with time on task. 
The interaction between the drive for sleep and time of day are dynamically 
complex (Dinges 1995). Akerstedt (1995a) notes that alertness impairment in 
night work results from working at the circadian low point, an extended 
time of prior wakefulness and poor prior daytime sleep. Though most errors 
occurring during night shifts involve errors of vigilance (Reason 1990), errors 
in cognitive processing probably contribute substantially to incidents at sea. 
Dinges (1995) notes that although frank sleep-onset episodes underlie the 
most serious performance failures, some of the performance effects resulting 
from sleepiness can occur without microsleeps. Folkard (1997) also notes that 
" ... any parallelism found between sleep propensity and accident risk need 
not imply that those involved fell asleep, but may simply reflect a reduced 
speed and an increased error rate in prolonged performance". 
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Reduction in sleep by as little as 1.3 to 1.5 hours per night has been shown to 
decrease daytime alertness by as much as 32% (Bonnet & Arand 1995). 
Carskadon and Dement (1981) state that modest sleep reduction of one hour 
per night will accumulate over time to progressively increase daytime 
sleepiness. Working during the night has well-documented consequences, 
partly due to difficulty in obtaining sufficient daytime sleep (Monk 1989b; 
Tepas & Monk 1987; Akerstedt 1995b; Folkard 1996). 
Compounding the effect of sleep reduction is the displacement of work to 
the circadian phase that is least conducive to alert behaviour (Akerstedt 
1995a). Early morning work (such as the first mate's 0400 to 0800 watch) is 
also fatigue inducing. Compounding the sleep-depriving effects of early 
morning watches is the fragmented nature of sleep brought about by two 
daily work periods. Higher rates of sleep fragmentation lower the 
recuperative value of sleep and minimise restorations in cognitive function 
(Krueger 1989). 
Fatigue effects appear to be prolonged with ongoing sleep debt; however, it 
is unclear in the literature as to the extent. Meijman et al. (1993) note that 
shiftworkers are still in a sub-optimal state during the second day after a 
prolonged shift period; however, Carskadon and Dement (1981) note that a 
single full night of sleep can completely reverse daytime sleepiness. 
A concise summary of the significance of sleep as contributory to accidents is 
the consensus of the international group of sleep scientists compiled by 
Torbjom Akerstedt and his colleagues and presented in the Journal of Sleep 
Research in 1994. These scientists make seven recommendations: 
• "greater attention be paid to developing guidelines that regulate the 
hours of work and stipulate hours of rest; 
• the responsibility for these guidelines be shared amongst government, 
industry, the work force, the public and the scientific community; 
• regulations, practices and policies be based upon sound scientific 
research; 
• there should be more systematic consideration on the role of 
sleepiness in accident investigation; 
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• a uniform set of standard reporting criteria be established to document 
accurately the occurrence of sleep-related accidents; 
• public education campaigns be undertaken on the importance of sleep 
and circadian rhythms, the adverse effects of sleep loss, and the 
symptoms of sleep disorders; 
• preventative countermeasures to sleep-related accidents receive 
increased attention." (Akerstedt et al. 1994) 
It is evident from this summary document that an eyidence-based approach 
to regulation and public education is desirable - though beyond the scope of 
this thesis, an important subsequent outcome would be to make available to 
members of the maritime industry, including managers, shipowners and 
seagoing personnel, information on sleep, and circadian rhythms such as that 
referred to by Akerstedt et al. 
Accidents and time of day 
Folkard (1997) notes that transportation accident risk peaks at particular 
times and analyses the possible causes. The author undertook a "macro-
analysis" (an analysis based on a z-score transformation of the means 
obtained from the published studies, not taking into account the size of the 
data sets) of road transport accidents and found that accident risk was clearly 
highest in the early hours of the morning (about two standard deviations 
higher than the overall), with a secondary peak in the early afternoon, 
corresponding to the "post-lunch dip". Similarly, the author noted a time of 
day effect in maritime collisions taken from 123 collision claims (except for a 
slightly later peak, at around 0600-0700) and Filor (1996) reported a similar 
pattern from an analysis of Australian collisions and groundings. However 
Craig and Condon (1984) claim " ... that in the absence of evidence on the 
actual diurnal distribution of critical...human errors at sea, conclusions on 
vulnerability at times when performance on the bridge of a ship is likely to 
be below the expected norm must remain tentative." 
A consensus study by the Association of Professional Sleep Societies (Mitler 
et al. 1988) reported that in addition to a diurnal distribution of fatigue-
related vehicle accidents, meter-reading errors and anecdotal evidence of 
circadian influences in industrial catastrophes, there existed a diurnal 
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distribution in heart attacks and even human mortality! Folkard (1997) 
concurs with Mitler et al. (1988) that the human species habitually sleeps at 
night and is awake during daylight hours, and that the increased tendency to 
sleep during the early morning, and to a lesser extent in the early afternoon 
results in an increased risk of human error and accident. 
Stokes and Kite (1994) cite a study within the Israeli Air Force which revealed 
that the daytime accident rate was highest during the first hour after 
awakening in the morning, decreased until late afternoon and rose again 
during the evening. A review ·of fatigue-related incidents across the 24 hours 
identified the largest number of fatigue-related errors occurred between 
midnight and 6.00 a.m. (Stokes & Kite 1994). The authors caution against the 
possible compounding of errors in such studies where the effects of visibility, 
air traffic density, sleep deprivation and accumulated fatigue may be more 
likely to occur at night. Simulation studies of pilot performance have 
revealed results consistent with less complex experimental studies (Stokes & 
Kite 1994). Pilots undergoing brief but demanding missions at three hour 
intervals during the day have demonstrated a relatively high error rate in 
the morning, which progressively decreased until about 3.00 p.m., with 
errors increasing again and reaching their highest frequency between 3.00 
a.m. and 6.00 a.m. (Stokes & Kite 1994). The authors note that this pattern 
has been observed in studies where sleep was permitted apart from actual 
testing periods and that performance does not degrade in a linear fashion 
with sleep deprivation; thereby supporting the case for an independent daily 
rhythm in performance. 
To associate accident risk with a loss of alertness is to oversimplify the 
complex interrelationship between circadian and sleep factors and their 
contribution to human error. Folkard (1997), in noting the parallelism 
between sleep propensity and road traffic accident risk, also notes the time 
on shift effect, whereby it appears that the safest duty duration might lie in 
the region of 8-10 hours, and that the four hour watch might be associated 
with a 20% increased accident risk relative to 8 hour duties. The author 
suggests that in land transport statistics at least, commencement of duty and 
circadian factors interact to provide a transient 2-4 hour peak in risk 
superimposed on the otherwise exponential increase in risk over time on 
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task, with circadian factors exhibiting their characteristic bimodal 
distribution. 
Summary 
Based on the Incidents at Sea reports analysed it would be inappropriate to 
claim unequivocally that fatigue was causal to these incidents. In conjunction 
with the body of literature that establishes clear associations between sleep 
loss, time of day and fatigue, and the body of literature that establishes 
association between fatigue, human performance (human behaviour) and 
accidents, relationships can be established between the behaviours described 
in the Incidents at Sea reports. These behaviours (by virtue of being reported 
in this literature must constitute error behaviours) and the descriptions of life 
on board (particularly relating to conditions conducive to sleeping and sleep 
loss) present a characteristic distribution of behaviour over the working day. 
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Figure 14 provides a model outlining the relationships between sleep factors, 
time of day factors, fatigue and accidents obtained from analysis of the data 
in this study. 
Sleeping 
conditions, 
sleep hygiene 
Medical 
conditions, 
social factors 
Aversion 
to effort 
Differing 
effort 
Figure 14: Sleep loss, time of day and accidents: the interaction of sleep 
loss and time of day and the contribution to fatigue and accidents 
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CHAPTER 6 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1. Summary 
Maritime incident reports form a rich source of human performance data 
with high face validity. However, fatigue, as contributory to human error, is 
elusive and direct evidence of accident causation is difficult to come by. The 
present study aimed to determine the nature and distribution of behaviours 
associated with fatigue in Australian Incidents at Sea reports. Using a 
qualitative content analysis of reported behaviour patterns of ship's 
watchkeepers, 100 consecutive reports were analysed on the basis of incident 
type, error types, and factors contributing to fatigue, using non-numerical 
unstructured data indexing, searching and theorising software (NUDIST®). 
Although fires, foundering and injuries were evenly distributed throughout 
the day, collisions and groundings were more prevalent during the early 
morning watches. Investigators found fatigue was a contributing factor in 
only seven incidents, six of which occurred during the 0000 to 0800 watches. 
Behaviours consistent with fatigue, identified from the scientific literature, 
were categorised and compared with investigators' descriptions of 
behaviours in incident reports. Such "fatigue behaviours" were richly 
distributed throughout the 62 collisions and groundings analysed, with 
alertness and information processing fatigue behaviours exhibiting different 
diurnal variations. Behaviour patterns, consistent with fatigue, are described 
for different times of the day. 
The unique profession of seafaring involves rest and sleep in a 24-hour-a-day 
work environment that is usually mobile, with time-zone crossings, noise, 
heat, cold and motion. Sleep under such conditions is often difficult to obtain, 
and sleeping and sleep loss is often related to fatigue and contributory to 
accidents. This study aims to determine how accident investigators report 
sleep in Incidents at Sea reports and subsequently analyse the relationships 
between sleep, fatigue and accidents in these reports. 
The full text of 44 Incidents at Sea reports was coded and analysed using 
NUDIST® software. This sample included collisions and groundings reported 
since 1991, where significant human factors contributed to the incident. The 
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Incidents at Sea reports were electronically searched for reference to sleep 
and content was indexed against parameters such as fatigue behaviours, time 
of day and contributing personnel. 
Incidents at Sea reports incorporate three levels of reference to sleep, 
analysis of which may associate sleeping and sleepiness with accident 
causation. The highest level of reference unequivocally associates either 
being asleep, or being sleep deprived with accidents, but not always with 
fatigue. At an intermediate level, reference to the conflicting pressures of 
work and sleep on board fishing boats and ships suggests a work 
environment that is not conducive to obtaining sufficient sleep, and accident 
investigators are usually unable to link the watchkeeping environment with 
fatigue as a contributing factor. At the lowest level of association, reference is 
made to the integrated nature of sleeping and work on board. 
6.2. Conclusions 
The ship's watchkeeper is a fallible human operator in a complex 
technological system and unsafe acts by such operators may result in 
subsequent incidents being investigated. Collisions and groundings are two 
categories of incident where the fatigued watchkeeper may perform unsafe 
acts. Fatigue is one factor that contributes to such unsafe acts but many 
authors feel that its contribution is under-reported; indeed fatigue was 
identified as a contributing factor in only seven of 100 Incidents at Sea 
reports. In this study, a model of fatigue behaviours was developed from a 
review of the scientific literature and subsequently applied to a content 
analysis of Incidents at Sea reports of collisions and groundings. 
The literature revealed fatigue presenting as activation problems, sensory 
limitations, information processing problems, aversion to effort and differing 
nature of effort, and that these behaviours had characteristic distribution 
throughout the working day. Activation problems were most evident during 
the early morning watches, whereas information-processing problems 
predominated during the afternoon and evening watches. A version to effort 
was behaviour most evident during the morning and afternoon watches. 
Specific unsafe acts were associated with each category of fatigue behaviour; 
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for example, activation problems commonly presented as failing to keep a 
proper lookout and monitor progress whereas information processing 
problems presented as planning and assessment deficiencies, frequently in 
association with secondary tasks. 
Fatigue behaviours, as reported in the scientific literature, are evident in real 
world situations - in this study the fallible behaviours of ship's watchkeepers. 
Fatigue is an elusive variable; however, the increasingly automated and 
technological working environment of the ship's watchkeeper provides an 
ideal environment for further study. 
While no rigorous causal link can be established between the watchkeeping 
environment, sleepiness and accidents, this analysis shows that Incidents at 
Sea reports are a rich source of descriptive data showing a high level of 
association of sleeping and sleepiness with accidents. Thirty nine percent of 
Incidents at Sea reports where human error was a contributing factor 
describe sleeping or sleepiness as contributory to an accident. The Incidents 
at Sea reports also paint a picture of the truncated and fragmented sleep of 
watchkeepers, critical fatigue behaviours, and occasionally the unfavourable 
sleeping environment found on board fishing vessels. 
The nature and distribution of the accident investigator's references to sleep 
compared to the incident type and watchkeeping period allowed some 
analysis of the contributing factors of sleepiness between key crewmembers. 
Ship masters rarely exhibit sleepiness, but appear to have well-developed 
strategies for coping in a sleep-depriving environment. Second mates, 
however, suffer a greater frequency of decreased alertness than other 
officers, possibly due to their watch times and sleep times. Marine pilots may 
be the most sleep-deprived of all watchkeepers, but rarely suffer loss of 
alertness. The pilot's contribution to accidents is in the form of errors of 
judgement and disorientation. First and third mates are rarely associated 
with incidents at sea. There is considerable scope for further work to 
establish the relationship between the tasks, sleep opportunities and 
circadian factors affecting the performance of the various officers involved in 
watchkeeping. 
Though accident investigators may experience difficulty retrospectively 
analysing the contribution of sleep loss to behavioural manifestations of 
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fatigue other than decreased alertness, the investigation process should 
continue to consider the effect of sleep deprivation and time of day on errors 
involving judgement, reasoning and higher level cognitive functions. 
Finally, the unique nature of watchkeeping and seafaring demands that 
further industry-specific research should be undertaken to identify and 
quantify the manifestations of fatigue other than that of decreased alertness. 
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Navigation Act 1912 
Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations 
into the grounding of the Panamanian flag 
refrigerated cargo vessel 
PEACOCK 
on Piper Reef, in the Great Barrier Reef, 
on 18 July 1996 
No95 
Published: January 1997 
ISBN 0 642 19980 9 
Investigation into marine casualties occuring within the Commonwealth's jurisdiction are 
conducted under the provisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, made 
pursuant to sub section 425 (1) (ea) and 425 1 AAA of the Navigation Act 1912. The 
Regulations provide discretionary powers to the Inspector to investigate incidents as defined 
by the regulations. Where an investigation is undertaken the Inspector must submit a report 
to the Secretary of the Department. It 1s Departmental policy to publish such reports in full 
as an educational tool. 
To increase the value of the safety material presented in this report, readers are encouraged 
to copy or reprint the material in part or in whole for further distribution, but should 
acknowledge the source. Additional copies of the report can be obtained from: 
Inspector of Marine Accidents 
Marine Incident Investigation Unit 
Department of Transport and Regional Development 
GP 0 Box594 
CANBERRA ACT 2601 
Phone: 06 274 7324 
Fax: 06 27 4 6699 
Email: MllU@dot.gov.au 
MllU on the INTERNET 
Information relating to this report and other marine investigation reports can be located from 
the Marine Incident Investigation Unit's Internet homepage at our URL· 
http://www.dot.gov.au/programs/miiu/miiuhome.htm 
3 
Summary 
The Panamanian flag refrigerated cargo vessel Peacock, on a ballast 
pa~sage from Singapore to New Plymouth, New Zealand, embarked a 
licensed pilot off Goods Island at 1630 AEST on 17 July 1996 for the 
passage through the Torres Strait and the Inner Two Way Route of the 
Great Barrier Reef. 
At about 0155 on 18 July 1996, the vessel grounded on Piper Reef at 
full speed, in a position 100 metres eastward of the light beacon. 
Initial attempts to refloat the vessel by going astern on the engine were 
unsuccessful. 
Peacock remained stranded on Piper Reef until the late afternoon of 
26 July 1996, when salvors successfully refloated the vessel after 
having transferred some of the fuel oil bunkers to a barge. 
The vessel's hull was not breached and no pollution occurred. 
However, machinery tests showed that only one steering motor was 
fully functional, therefore Peacock was towed to Cairns for necessary 
repairs. 
4 
Sources of Information 
Master, Second Mate and Helmsman 
Pilot 
Queensland Coastal Pilot Service Pty Ltd 
Australian Reef Pilots Pty Ltd 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
Acknowledgement 
Professional opinion on fatigue was provided by: 
Director of Aviation Medicine, Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
Circadian Technologies Inc 
Portion of chart Aus 835 reproduced by permission of the 
Hydrographic Office, RAN. 
5 
Narrative 
The Panamanian registered, four hold, refrigerated cargo vessel 
Peacock has an overall length of 124.7 m, a beam of 17 .8 m and a 
moulded depth of 9.85 m. The vessel has a gross tonnage of 4964 and 
a summer deadweight of 6541 tonnes at a mean draught of 7 .317 m. 
Built in 1986 at the Koehl Jyuko K K shipyard in Japan, the vessel is 
powered by a six cylinder, 5149 kW Mitsubishi diesel engine, driving a 
single fixed propeller and providing a service speed of 16~ knots. 
Owned by Libero Panama SA and operated by Shunko Shipping 
Corporation of Tokyo, Peacock is engaged in world-wide trading. 
The vessel has a Korean Master, a mixture of Korean and Indonesian 
officers, and Indonesian ratings. The three Deck Officers maintain the 
traditional "4 on, 8 off" bridge watchkeeping routine, each bridge 
watch being comprised of one deck officer and one helmsman/ 
lookout. 
In common with a number of small Japanese owned/operated vessels 
engaged in world-wide trading, Peacock carries extra fuel oil and 
diesel oil bunkers. This additional fuel oil is carried in the double 
bottom tanks and the only ballast tanks in the vessel are the fore peak 
and aft peak tanks. 
Peacock sailed from Singapore in a light condition, at 0220 local time 
(UTC + 8) on Wednesday 10 July 1996, having discharged the second 
consignment of a full cargo of apples loaded in Chile. The vessel was 
bound for New Plymouth, New Zealand, its route being via the 
southern China Sea, the Flores Sea and the Torres Strait and Inner 
Two Way Route of the Great Barrier Reef to the South Pacific Ocean. 
As part of the passage plan for the voyage, the Second Mate had laid 
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Portion of chart Aus835 showing course of Peacock 
off the courses in the delineated two-way route of the Torres Strait 
and the inner route of the Great Barrier Reef. 
A licensed pilot of the Queensland Coastal Pilot Service Pty Ltd 
boarded the vessel to the west of Goods Island, at the western end of 
the Prince of Wales Channel, Torres Strait, at 1630 AEST on 
Wednesday 17 July. Another eastbound vessel was approaching about 
three or four miles astern of Peacock, so the Pilot immediately called 
for full harbour speed. After being advised of the vessel 's draught (3.3 
m forward and 5.1 m aft) and full sea speed (16 knots) the Pilot 
ordered full sea speed. 
Harrison Rock buoy was passed abeam to port at 1650 and the Pilot 
then concentrated on conning the vessel clear of Mecca Reef, 
7 
Hammond Rock and Nardana Patches. Once Peacock was lined up 
on the East Strait leads, and before the vessel reached Ince Point, the 
Pilot laid off his intended courses on the chart to take the vessel clear 
of Alpha Rock. While on the East Strait leads, the Pilot ascertained 
that there was an error on the gyrocompass of between 12° and 1° 
high. 
After clearing the Alert Patches the Pilot, watched by the Master, laid 
off his courses down to Caimcross, rubbing off the Second Mate's 
courses as he did so. While engaged in this, he noticed that apart 
from a position off Hammond Rock, no positions had been marked on 
the chart by the Watch Officer. He brought this to the Master's 
attention and placed on the chart table a copy of his "Standing 
Procedures for Pilotage in the Reef', detailing position fixing 
requirements. These "Standing Procedures" stipulated that the 
vessel's position was to be plotted every 15 minutes when the Pilot 
was absent from the bridge. The Master discussed this with the Mate, 
the Watch Officer, and thereafter the vessel's position was plotted on 
the chart at regular intervals. 
With just the one helmsman to the Watch, the practice was for the ship 
to proceed in automatic steering, with the helmsman taking the wheel 
for course alterations. Once the vessel was steadied on the next 
course, the steering would be changed back to automatic mode, the 
change-over being achieved by the helmsman using a single, positive, 
two-way switch located on the steering console. 
Wybum Reef was rounded at 1945 and, when the vessel was steadied 
on the new course of 167°, the Pilot, satisfied that it was safe for him 
to do so and with the Master's agreement, left the bridge to take a rest 
in the pilot's cabin, two decks below. Before leaving the bridge, he 
gave instructions that he should be called at any time considered 
necessary and when the vessel arrived at the position he had marked 
on the chart, just northward of Caimcross Islets, 25 miles to the south. 
8 
The Pilot was called at about 2110 and returned to the bridge, having 
spent the time in the cabin resting, mainly awake. On his return to the 
bridge, the Master was still there and the Third Mate had taken over 
from the Mate as Watch Officer. The Pilot checked the chart and 
noted that the vessel's position had been plotted on the chart at 15 
minute intervals, as required by his "Standing Procedures". 
After the vessel had altered course off Hannibal Island, at 2220, the 
Pilot left the bridge for another rest period, leaving instructions that he 
be called at a position off Sunday Island, about 23 miles distant, which 
he calculated would be at about 0020. On this occasion he slept, and 
was asleep when called at 0010. When he arrived on the bridge, he 
found that he had been called slightly early, with still seven miles to 
run to the course alteration point off Clerke Island (off Cape 
Grenville). The reason for his being called early was that the Master 
had had a plate of noodles prepared for him. He noted that the Third 
Mate had been relieved by the Second Mate as Watch Officer and that 
the steering was still in automatic. 
Rounding Clerke Island, the Pilot followed his normal procedure, 
waiting until Moody Reef light was in transit with Clerke Island light 
and altering to 180°, bringing the eastern edge of Haggerstone Island 
right ahead. Just before Clerke Island light was abeam to starboard, 
course was altered to 212° (on this occasion 213°). The pilot noted 
the time of Clerke Island light being abeam as 0050. Once steadied on 
this new course, the Master, who had been on the bridge since before 
the Pilot had boarded off Goods Island, asked the Pilot if it would be 
all right if he went down to his cabin to get some sleep. The Pilot 
assured the Master that that would be all right and the Master left the 
bridge at about 0100, having first instructed the Second Mate to follow 
the Pilot's instructions and to ensure the safety of the navigation. 
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After rounding Clerke Island, the Pilot felt that the wheelhouse was 
becoming rather stuffy. He checked the air conditioning vents and, as 
the issuing air was warm, thought the air conditioning unit had either 
been turned down or off. 
Haggerstone Island was passed at a distance (by radar) of two miles, 
about two cables greater than his normal passing distance, so the pilot 
adjusted the course to 208°, in order to pass between 1.2 and 1.3 
miles off Moody Reef light when it was abeam to port. The radar 
distance off Moody Reef light, when abeam, was 1.3 miles, so the 
pilot let the vessel run on for about two cables before altering course 
to 175°. With Peacock steady on the 175°course and Moody Reef 
light abeam at 1.3 miles, Piper Island light lay between t2° and 1° on 
the starboard bow, rather than the normal right ahead, this to make 
allowance for any drift effect of the 15 to 20 knots south-easterly wind 
on the ship in light condition. 
With a little over seven miles to run to the next alteration point, 1 % 
miles north of Piper Reef light, the Pilot went to the chartroom and did 
some paperwork. After a few minutes, he went into the wheelhouse 
to check that all was well, then, returning to the chartroom, he saw 
that the Second Mate had plotted the vessel's position on the chart for 
0125. Satisfied that the position was correct, the pilot returned to the 
wheelhouse, where he walked up and down for a while, watching 
Piper Reef light, very fine to starboard, and Inset Reef light, broader 
on the port bow. 
After plotting the position on the chart at 0125, the Second Mate 
checked the radar and visually checked through the wheelhouse 
windows to see that everything was all right. He then returned to the 
chart table and got out the next chart to check the courses laid off by 
the Pilot. 
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At about 0135, the Pilot glanced at the radar and saw that there was 
about 3 to 3Y2 miles to run to the point where he normally starts to 
alter course off Piper Reef. He calculated that after another seven or 
eight minutes there would be% mile or so to run to the position and 
therefore sat in the pilot chair, chin cupped in the palm of his left 
hand, to await that moment. He watched the lights, Piper Reef light 
still very fine to starboard and occasionally becoming concealed from 
his view by the forward starboard Samson post and Inset Reef light 
broadening out to port. He also kept an eye on the clock, located on 
the forward bulkhead, as the time moved towards 0140. 
Suddenly, the ship vibrated, described by the Pilot as being similar to 
that caused by a ship moving from a calm to a choppy sea, or feeling a 
few waves. The Pilot moved out of the pilot chair, ordered "hard a 
port" and as the vibration increased, called "stop engines", realising 
the vessel had run aground. As he moved to the starboard wheelhouse 
door, which he had some difficulty in opening, he was aware of 
someone behind him moving to the engine telegraph and putting the 
telegraph to stop. The time of the grounding, although not recorded, 
was considered to have been about 0155. Peacock had come to rest 
on a heading of 166°. 
After leaving the bridge at about 0100, the Master, instead of going to 
bed, had started to write a report to the Company. When Peacock 
started to shake, he looked out of the window and saw a light beacon 
very close on the starboard side. He went up to the bridge, where he 
found the engine had been stopped, the Second Mate was looking out 
through the wheelhouse starboard window and the Pilot was out on 
the starboard bridgewing. He ordered all the deck lights to be 
switched on, so as to be better able to assess the situation. Peacock 
was listed four degrees to port and appeared to be hard aground. The 
engine was put to full astern, but there was no movement and the 
engine was stopped again after about four minutes, at 0203. 
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The Mate had arrived on the bridge shortly after the Master, and after 
the engine had been stopped again he joined the Master and the Pilot 
in discussing the best course of action. The Pilot suggested going 
ahead on the engine with the rudder hard over to starboard, in an 
attempt to pivot the vessel to starboard before going astern on the 
engine again. The Mate agreed with the Pilot, but the Master 
preferred to go astern and the telegraph was put to full astern at 0208. 
Again there was no movement and the engine was stopped at 0219. 
The Master discussed the situation with the Chief Engineer, who was 
concerned about the fact that heavy fuel oil was still in the system, 
which would cause problems if the engine was to remain stopped for 
any appreciable length of time. It was therefore decided to run the 
engine astern and change over to diesel oil and the engine was put to 
full astern at 0225. 
The Master issued instructions for the crew to sound around the 
vessel, also for the Chief Engineer to sound all of the tanks. These 
soundings showed that although Peacock was well aground, there had 
been no penetration of the hull. 
Assisted by the Pilot, the Master prepared messages to be telexed to 
the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Canberra and to 
the Queensland Coastal Pilot Service Pty Ltd in Brisbane. The 
message to MRCC Canberra was transmitted at 0319. 
The change over to diesel oil took until 0332, after which an attempt 
was made to pivot the vessel to starboard, the engine being worked up 
to half ahead. However, this was aborted at 0340, the Pilot advising 
the Master that it would be better to wait for the next high tide, at 
about 1030, before making further attempts to refloat the vessel. 
The engine was again put on full astern at 1016 and run until 1038. 
As this had no effect, the Master and Pilot concluded that Peacock 
could not be refloated without assistance. On instructions from the 
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owner, the Master signed a salvage agreement, using Lloyd's Standard 
Form, with salvors who flew to the vessel by helicopter that same 
mormng. 
In compliance with 6.5.121 of Marine Orders Part 54, the Pilot was 
relieved from the vessel on 19 July. 
After the failed attempt on the morning high tide, the Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority issued an Intervention Order, under the 
MARPOL Convention, stipulating that no further attempts were to be 
made to refloat Peacock until such time as oil pollution prevention 
equipment was in place. Floating boom equipment was shipped from 
Cairns aboard the tug Hamilton, which arrived at Piper Reef early on 
20 July, and further equipment was flown to Lockhart River by DC4 
aircraft. 
The tides were such that there was insufficient water for refloating the 
vessel for another week. On Friday 26 July, 450 tonnes of bunker fuel 
were transferred to Pacific Explorer, a landing barge operated by 
Endeavour Shipping and normally used for transporting aviation fuel 
and general cargo to Thursday Island. Late that afternoon Peacock 
was pulled off the reef by the tug Pacific Salvor (brought down from 
Papua New Guinea for the salvage operation) and was moved to an 
anchorage position approximately one mile northward of Piper Reef. 
No pollution had occurred, either as a result of the grounding, or the 
slavage operation. 
An underwater inspection of the vessel's hull was carried out by divers 
on Saturday 27 July, and as the various double bottom tanks were 
1 If a ship under pilotage grounds ... the Manager must as soon as practical after being 
advised of the grounding ... suspend the licence of the pilot having conduct of the vessel for 
a period not exceeding seven days. 
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cleared as being sound, the bunker fuel was transferred back from 
Pacific Explorer. The underwater inspection revealed that Peacock 
had suffered very little damage, the maximum indentation of plating 
being about 50 mm. 
Inspection by a classification society surveyor of the main engine and 
other machinery revealed a problem with one of the vessel's steering 
motors, which though operable, was not fully functional. As it is a 
requirement that vessels transiting the Inner Two Way Route have two 
steering motors operating during the transit, AMSA issued another 
Intervention Order, requiring Peacock to be towed to Cairns. The 
salvage company and the owner extended the salvage agreement to 
cover the tow, Pacific Salvor commencing the towage operation on 
Sunday 28 July. 
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Comment and Analysis 
Peacock grounded on Piper Reef while the navigation was under the 
conduct of a pilot with 26 years experience in the Great Barrier Reef 
and when an alteration of course was not made about six minutes 
before the grounding. No machinery or equipment failure contributed 
to the grounding. 
It is therefore necessary to examine why the Pilot did not make the 
necessary course alteration, why this was not detected by the vessel's 
Bridge Watch and what the circumstances were which led to the 
situation. 
The Pilot had sat in the pilot chair at about 0135 and his last 
recollection of time, before being startled by the ship vibrating on 
grounding, was at about 0137 or 0138. From that point, or shortly 
thereafter, he lost situational awareness and it seems probable that he 
fell asleep about 15 minutes before the grounding. 
The Second Mate absented himself from the wheelhouse for a 
considerable length of time, taking no part in the navigation of the 
vessel, with the result that the alertness of not only the Pilot but also 
that of the Second Mate was impaired to such a degree that the vessel 
was placed at hazard. 
Alertness 
Research has shown that nine internal or external factors and stimuli 
are relevant to the level of alertness in an individual2. They are: 
1. Environmental Fght. 
2 Moore-Ede, M., The Twenty-Four Hour Society, Random House Australia, 1993 
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2. Environmental temperature. 
3. Environmental sound. 
4. Environmental aroma. 
5. Time of day on circadian clock. 
6. Muscular activity. 
7. Ingested nutrients and chemicals. 
8. Interest, opportunity or sense of danger 
9. Sleep bank balance. 
These factors can be seen as switches that may be in the "on" 
position, "off' position or in "neutral". Whereas just one individual 
switch in the closed position may not be sufficient to cause a 
dangerous loss of alertness or induce sleep, the greater the number of 
closed switches, the greater the hazard. 
Environmental factors 
Bright light, cool temperature, irregular sound and certain aromas all 
act as stimulants, which help keep a person alert. Dim lighting and 
darkness, warm sultry heat and regular rhythmic noise can all have the 
opposite effect. 
The conditions on any ship's bridge at night, particularly in the tropics, 
with the darkness, warmth, rhythmic sound of the engines and steady 
background noise of electrical machinery, are such that the 
environmental switches are all in the "off' position. However, there is 
normally sufficient activity to maintain the alertness of those on duty. 
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There is some dispute with respect to the claimed stuffiness of the 
atmosphere in the wheelhouse and whether or not the wheelhouse 
doors were open. Any stuffiness would have decreased the alertness 
of those in the wheelhouse and made them more susceptible to 
drowsiness. 
Time of day 
The natural period of sleep is during the hours of darkness, between 
2200 to 0600, the brain automatically regulating the body into the 
sleep mode. People working regular shift work, where the periods of 
work are not changed, can adapt to the different sleeping period 
without too much ill effect, their biological clock adjusting to the 
changed conditions. Thus mariners are able to adjust to their watch 
regime, the time of day switch being in the "on" position at the 
required times. 
The pilots serving the Great Barrier Reef, however, work a routine 
where the natural sleep period is seriously disrupted, although 
generally for periods not exceeding 48 hours at one time. During the 
natural sleep period, 2200 to 0600, the time of day switch will be in 
the "off' position. 
Depending on the speed of the ship, pilots have conduct of the ship in 
the Inner Two Way Route for between 34 and 50 hours. However, 
there are five recognised areas within the Inner Two Way Route 
where pilots can leave the bridge to take a rest, provided 
circumstances permit. Also, their schedule is so programmed that after 
each pilotage they are usually able to get at least one full night's sleep 
before their next assignment. The pilots are apparently able to adjust 
to this routine, without ill effect. 
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Muscular activity 
All types of muscular activity, even 
chewing, act as a stimulant to 
alertness, the muscular activity 
switch moving to the "off' position 
when the body is at rest. 
The inner route pilotage requires 
the pilot to be on the bridge for very 
long periods at a stretch and it is not 
unusual for a pilot to sit in the chair 
specifically provided for his use. 
However, in sitting in the pilot chair 
at 0135 and particularly in cupping 
his chin in his hand, the pilot caused 
the muscular activity switch to move 
to the "off' position, making himself 
more susceptible to sleep. Also, by 
supporting his head in his hand, his 
Photograph of interior of Peacock 
wheelhouse showing position of 
pilot chair 
head could not fall forward as he relaxed and a basic warning 
mechanism was lost. 
Ingested nutrients and chemicals 
Caffeine and amphetamines are stimulants, whereas alcohol and some 
medications are sleep inducing. Although the Pilot had drunk an 
occasional cup of coffee whilst on the bridge, he had not consumed 
large quantities. 
The Pilot stated that he had consumed two glasses of wine during 
dinner the previous evening, or some 21 hours before he boarded 
Peacock. He stated that he had consumed no other alcohol whilst 
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awaiting the vessel at Thursday Island, and the Master confirmed that 
he had had no alcohol whilst on board. 
The Pilot also stated that he was not under any long term medication, 
and had not taken any short term medication for relief of a cold, 
influenza or pain. 
In the early hours of 18 July 1996, the Pilot's nutrients and chemicals 
alertness switch would have been in the "neutral" position. 
Interest, opportunity, sense of danger 
These are all stimulants to alertness - the Pilot was jolted into full 
alertness by the vibration as the ship ran aground. 
As the Pilot was sitting in the pilot chair everything was going 
smoothly - the vessel was on course, the weather was fine and the 
passage through the reef presented no special challenge to the Pilot, 
for whom it was purely routine. The Pilot's sense of risk was 
therefore reduced. With still some minutes to run to the next course 
alteration he was relaxed and, whereas it would not have been in the 
"off' position, this alertness switch would have been in "neutral". 
Sleep bank balance 
Sleep periods are considered as making deposits in the individual's 
"sleep bank" and periods of wakefulness make withdrawals. As a 
general and approximate rule, sleep deprivation occurs, and the 
alertness switch goes to the "off' position, when an individual expends 
the total "sleep credits". Sleep credits are considered to accumulate at 
a rate of two for every hour of sleep and to expend at the rate of one 
for every hour awake. Hence, after eight hours sleep an individual 
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can be considered to have 16 credits, which are expended over the 
next sixteen hours. 
Summary of alertness switches 
From the time the pilot sat in the pilot chair, at 0135, six alertness 
switches were in the "off' position and two were in the "neutral" 
position. However, the situation was not remarkably different from 
any other inner route pilotage situation and could be considered as 
being normal. 
The fact that an experienced pilot succumbed to sleep while having 
the conduct of the vessel suggests a prima facie case of sleep 
deprivation, or fatigue, on the part of the pilot. 
Fatigue 
The Pilot stated that he had had a good night's sleep, between eight 
and nine hours, in the hotel on Thursday Island, the night before 
joining Peacock. He also sated that he had also spent the early part of 
the afternoon sitting down, resting, while waiting to go out to the 
vessel. Although he had not slept, other than a possible short nap, 
during his first spell away from the bridge, between 1945 and 2110 on 17 
July, he did sleep during his second spell away, between 2225 on 17 
July and 0010 on 18 July. The period between returning to the bridge 
at 0010 and sitting in the chair at 0135 was 85 minutes. Theoretically, 
with his period of sleep immediately before 0010, the Pilot would not 
have expended all his sleep credits, although they would have been 
low, therefore, it is considered unlikely that the Pilot would have been 
suffering from acute fatigue during the early hours of 18 July. 
Chronic fatigue is reached when a 'normal' period of sleep proves 
insufficient to restore the individuals's working performance to its 
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usual level.3 It is brought about by sleep disturbance, due to various 
factors, and or sleep deprivation over a prolonged period. 
In 1993, new regulations came into force, administered by AMSA 
which also licences the pilots, governing pilotage within the 
compulsory pilotage areas within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. 
The introduction of the new regulations and the opening up of the 
pilotage to competition, resulted in the formation of two pilotage 
services, with separate managing companies. 
The managing company with the smaller number of pilots was able to 
secure the larger share of the available business, resulting in those 
pilots having to take on a greater workload. In the twelve months prior 
to the split, the Pilot conducted 59 pilotag~s, whereas in the same 12-
month period prior to the incident he had conducted 69 pilotages, an 
increase of 17%, with a decrease in recreational time of about 7%. 
Prior to the introduction of compulsory pilotage under the Great 
Barrier Marine Park Act, in October 1991, the workload was 
distributed fairly equally by the secretariat amongst all the Queensland 
Coast and Torres Strait pilots, although senior pilots had the option of 
reducing their workload. During the 12 months period July 1990 to 
June 1991, the Pilot conducted 47 pilotages. Therefore, over the 
intervening five-year period, as a result of pilotage being made 
compulsory and the restructuring, the number of pilotages conducted 
by the pilot has increased by 47%. Much of this increase has been in 
pilotage of ships through Hydrographers Passage, a pilotage of about 
9Y2 hours duration. However, of importance is the number of nights 
worked in any period and whether rest periods between pilotages are 
disrupted by relocation travel. 
3 Executive Summary of the Procedings of a Research Workshop on fatigue in the Maritime 
Industry, Seafarers International Reseach Centre, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1996 
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From time/date To time/date 
Blossom Banlc 0800, 22 June Hay Pt 1620, 22 June 
Hay Point 0900, 24 June Booby Island 2310, 26 June 
Booby Island 1600, 28 June Stephen Island 0400, 29 June 
Stephen Island 1800, 30 June Goods Island 0300, 1 July 
Booby Is 0940, 2 July Cape Aattery 1930,3 July 
Cape Aattery 1000, 6July Booby Island 2000, 7 July 
Goods Island 0130, 9 July Townsville 0700, 11 July 
Goods Island 1900, 14 July Cairns 2359, 15 July 
Goods Island 1630, 17 July 
JaD1e1 - t"llOts scnec Ule 
A pilot's tour of duty is generally of between 14 and 21 days duration. 
However, of the six tours of duty the Pilot had undertaken since 1 
January 1996, one had been of 26 days duration and that particular 
tour was into its 27th day. 
The Pilot had started that particular tour of duty on 22 June 1996, 
after a period of 12 days at home and after travelling to Hamilton 
Island on 21 June. The Pilot was involved in pilotage, with either little 
sleep or disrupted sleep patterns, during the nights of 25, 26, 28 and 
30 June, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 17 July. That is 12 nights out of a 
total of 26 for the tour and 6 nights out of the last 10. 
Tables land 2 show the Pilot's schedule over the period. 
The major contributing factor to possible chronic fatigue would seem 
to be irregular hours of work over a prolonged period. However, in 
addition to the actual hours of work, a number of other factors, such 
as sleep apnoea, diet and, domestic and occupational concerns, can 
affect the quality of sleep and an individual's susceptibility to fatigue. 
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HOURS OF WORK 
Table 2 - Pilot's Hours of Work 
At 64 years of age and heavily built, the Pilot is a prime subject to 
suffer sleep apnoea. Prior to his weight loss in 1993, the Pilot 
reportedly was a heavy snorer, an indication of sleep apnoea. 
Although he reportedly now snores less, it is possible the Pilot suffers 
some degree of sleep apnoea, with the resultant effect on the quality 
of his sleep. 
Although not under medication, the Pilot had been diagnosed as being 
a type 2 diabetic in January 1993 and was under a dietary regime. 
After an initial weight loss of approximately 26 kg over a two month 
period, the Pilot's weight had since remained stable at 106 kg. 
In the 24 hours prior to the incident, the Pilot had eaten breakfast, 
consisting of Swiss Muesli with milk and coffee; lunch, consisting of a 
bread roll with ham and tuna, but with no butter or spread, an apple 
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and a coffee; dinner, consisting of a small amount of a rather fatty and 
unappetising meat dish and; supper, consisting of a bowl of noodles. 
Although the Pilot was obviously well adjusted to his diet, dieting and 
food intake of insufficient calorific value can reduce both energy and 
stamina and so make an individual more prone to fatigue, particularly 
under increased workload. 
The formation of competing pilotage services has resulted in changed 
conditions of service, including a reduction in income for individual 
pilots and a number of pilots have reported experiencing concern and 
anxiety as a result of these changes. Such anxieties are acknowledged 
to cause stress, which can affect an individual's sleep and 
concentration. 
Despite the pilot stating that he had not felt tired, only a little leg 
weary, taking all the above into account, it is considered that the Pilot, 
at the time of having the conduct of Peacock, was suffering to some 
degree from chronic fatigue. 
Details of the Pilot's schedule were submitted to Circadian 
Technologies Inc, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, an institution that is 
widely consulted on investigating the effects of disruption to the 
body's natural sleep pattern. Based on an initial appraisal of the 
information provided, the Institution considered pilot fatigue to be a 
major factor in the incident. 
At the behest of AMSA, the Pilot was examined by specialists at the 
Airport Health Centre, an accredited rehabilitation provider, and was 
also referred to a neurologist. The report by the Centre included the 
comment "All the investigations and reports indicate that there was no 
underlying medical reason, other than fatigue, to explain the short 
absence of conscious awareness during which the incident of 18 July 
1996, occurred. Certainly there is no underlying medical illness or 
condition of any significance". 
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Pilot's roster 
Although the regulations allow for pilots performing up to 28-day tours 
of duty, in that they stipulate that after 28 days a pilot should have a 
minimum of 10 days rest, generally tours are of between 10 and 21 
days duration. However, it is not uncommon for their tours to be 
longer than 21 days, particularly for those living in the Brisbane and 
Sydney areas. 
The pilots are organised by their managing companies, based in 
Brisbane, and their work is governed by the shipping demand. 
However, the length of a particular tour, or tours, can be tailored to an 
individual's needs. Also, any pilot is at liberty at any time (and it is his 
responsibility) to request relief if he considers himself for any reason 
unable to perform his duties to acceptable standards. 
In this instance, the Pilot was in a suitable location to terminate the 
tour in Townsville on 11 July and in Cairns on 16 July, by which time 
he had completed 20 days and 25 days on duty respectively. 
However, on both of these occasions he was relocated to Thursday 
Island to pick up another vessel at the request of the managing 
company. 
Before commencing that tour of duty, the Pilot had advised his 
managing company that he had a dental appointment in Sydney on 23 
July, enabling the managing company to program his movements to 
suit both the company and himself. 
On completing a pilotage at Townsville on 11 July, the Pilot initially 
received instructions to proceed home, but this was quickly followed 
by a series of instructions, to remain in Townsville to pick up a north 
bound vessel, to proceed to Cairns and, to proceed to Thursday 
Island. Finally, his instructions were to proceed to Thursday Island 
after overnighting in Cairns, as the managing company was short of 
pilots at Thursday Island. 
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After completing the next pilotage at Cairns on 16 July, the Pilot was 
again requested by the managing company to take one more vessel 
from Thursday Island. He reminded the company about his dental 
appointment, but was assured he would be home in time to keep it. 
Although the regulatory rest periods between vessels were being 
maintained, the three consecutive inner route pilotages resulted in a 
high proportion of nights worked in the latter part of a long tour. 
An examination was made of the work schedules of 22 pilots of the 
Queensland Coastal Pilot Service for the period 1 January 1996 to 21 
July 1996. Sixteen pilots had performed at least one tour of duty in 
excess of 21 days; six pilots had performed two tours of duty in 
excess of 21 days; one pilot had performed three tours of duty in 
excess of 21 days and; five pilots had performed a tour of duty in 
excess of 30 days. 
In all cases, the pilots appeared to have had good rest periods between 
pilotages, usually well in excess of the minimum 24 hours. However, 
only dates were provided, not times, which could be misleading, as 
nights with interrupted sleep could be hidden. Early embarkation 
times and late disembarkation times both impinge on natural sleep 
patterns. Also, a 24-hour rest period from disembarkation at midnight 
one day to embarkation at midnight the following day does not provide 
the same recuperative sleep as midday to midday. 
Although the companies monitor the rest periods pilots have between 
ships and the number of days they work, the number of nights worked 
do not appear to be taken into account, nor allowance made for the 
reduced quality of rest. To avoid a pilot becoming over tired, it is 
imperative that a person does not work an excessive number of nights 
in any given period. 
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Bridge procedures and organisation 
Pilots are aware that the length of the passage (the longest single 
pilotage in the world), their irregular hours and disrupted sleep 
patterns expose them to fatigue. Without counter-measures, strategies 
and management of their bridge routine the risk of an accident through 
reduced performance as a result of fatigue is significantly increased. 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, requires officers to check the 
courses steered, the ship's position and speed at frequent intervals to 
ensure that the ship follows the intended course. Also, on taking over 
the watch an officer must satisfy himself of the ship's position, course 
and speed, take note of any dangers that may be encountered and also 
maintain a proper record of the ship's movements. The STCW 
Convention also makes specific provision that the presence of a pilot 
does not relieve the officer of the watch from their duties and 
obligations for the safety of the ship. (See Annex 1) 
These provisions are also recommended in the International Chamber 
of Shipping's Bridge Procedures Guide, which recommends that 
officers of the watch should cooperate closely with pilots and maintain 
an accurate check on the ship's position and movements. It also 
recommends that, where an officer becomes unsure of the pilot's 
actions he should if necessary call the master and take action before 
the master arrives on the bridge. (See Annex 1) 
Such cooperation is a two-way street, although it is not easy to 
implement a standard procedure when piloting vessels of different 
nationalities and with crews who may have little or no English. 
However, it should be possible to ensure that every officer of the 
watch is involved, is told or shown each alteration of course position 
and encouraged to take an active role in supporting the pilot. 
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In the case of the Peacock, the Pilot did call the Master's attention to 
the fact that positions were not being entered on the chart, but it was 
confined to this basic task. However, as the Second Mate's command 
of the English language was limited the Pilot had no dialogue with him 
at all, nor did he indicate the alter course position to him. It is 
probable the Second Mate felt ignored and irrelevant, rather than an 
important element in the bridge organisation, which removed the 
defences against pilot error. 
Bridge watchkeeping 
When the Pilot started to lay off his courses on the charts, once 
Peacock was steadied on the East Strait leads, he noted that only one 
position had been marked on the chart, off Hammond Rock, in the 
western straits of the Prince of Wales Channel. From this it seems 
that it was not normal for the vessel's progress to be monitored by the 
officer of the watch when under pilotage. 
After the Pilot had brought this lack of monitoring to the attention of 
the Master, who in turn brought it to the attention of the Mate, the 
vessel's position was plotted on the chart at 15 minute intervals until 
midnight. 
At midnight the Second Mate relieved the Third Mate as officer of the 
watch. The Second Mate had maintained a regular sleep pattern for 
some days, did not drink alcohol and was not on any medication, 
therefore, his level of alertness could be expected to have been 
normal. However, it is apparent the Second Mate took the view that 
the Pilot was responsible for navigation, that he had little or no role to 
play and as a result his alertness was seriously affected. 
The Second Mate, a Korean, and the Third Mate, an Indonesian, had 
difficulty in communicating and the hand over consisted mostly of 
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gestures. After midnight, the vessel's position was plotted on the chart 
at 0010, the time the Pilot was called as the vessel approached the 
Home Islands, and at 25 minute intervals at 0035, 0100 and 0125. 
Based on the above, the Second Mate should have plotted the position 
at 0150, at which time Peacock should have been on the next course. 
Had he maintained his 25-minute regime and plotted the position at 
0150, he should have realised that the vessel had passed the alter 
course position. With more than one mile to run before Piper Reef 
light, there would have been time to avert the grounding. It is evident 
that, having plotted the position at 0125, the Second Mate did not 
check the vessel's speed and estimate the time the vessel would be at 
the next alteration of course position. 
As it was, after the Second Mate had plotted the position at 0125, he 
busied himself behind the curtains closing off the chart table. He 
stated that he had been checking the courses laid off by the pilot on 
the next chart. In doing this he was following the Master's 
instructions, however, such a task should not take very many minutes. 
The length of time he spent at the chart table, more than twenty five 
minutes, was excessive and not satisfactorily explained and resulted in 
him not monitoring the navigation of the vessel and the actions of the 
pilot, which were his prime responsibilities. 
The helmsman said that he had been able to see the light and had 
realised it would be passed very close, but because the pilot was 
present, he felt that it must be all right. However, the helmsman was 
aware that the Second Mate had been absent from the wheelhouse for 
some considerable time and it would have been prudent, therefore, for 
him to summon the Second Mate to the wheelhouse as the light 
beacon was approached. 
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There is differing evidence as to whether the steering was in manual 
or in automatic at the time of the grounding. The Pilot thought the 
helmsman had moved away from the wheel, to the port side of the 
wheelhouse, after the alteration of course off Moody Reef, and had 
moved back to the wheel when he ordered "hard a port". According 
to the helmsman, however, he was at the wheel, steering the vessel 
manually. Although this had no bearing on the grounding, it is 
considered probable that the helmsman had changed over to automatic 
steering and had moved away from the wheel, as this would have been 
in line with the normal procedure on board. 
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Conclusions 
These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the 
incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to 
any particular organisation or individual. 
Peacock grounded on Piper Reef as a result of the vessel's course not 
being altered, from 175° to 149°, as it approached from the north with 
the reef right ahead. 
The following factors are considered to have contributed to the 
grounding: 
1. The Pilot's loss of situational awareness, the balance of 
probability being that he fell asleep. 
2. The Pilot's sitting with his chin cupped in his left hand, making 
him more susceptible to falling sleep. 
3. The warm, stuffiness of the wheelhouse atmosphere, in 
association with the sleep inducing factors of time of day 
and background environmental noises. 
4. Chronic fatigue as a result of the Pilot's recent work schedule, 
particularly the high proportion of nights of disrupted sleep. 
5. The lack of a strategy on the part of the Pilot to counter the 
effects of foreseeable fatigue during periods of reduced activity. 
6. The lack of proper bridge management and lack of 
interaction between the Pilot and the Watch Officer. 
7. The lack of proper monitoring of the vessel's progress by the 
Watch Officer. 
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8. The attitude of the Watch Officer in assuming the Pilot was 
solely responsible for the navigation and his prolonged absence 
from the wheelhouse. 
9. The absence of a formal control framework, to monitor a coastal 
pilot's nights of disrupted sleep, to prevent the development of 
chronic fatigue. 
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Submissions 
Under sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) 
Regulations, if a report, or part of a report, relates to a person's affairs 
to a material extent, the Inspector must, if it is reasonable to do so, 
give that person a copy of the report or the relevant part of the report. 
Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a person may provide written 
comments or information relating to the report. 
The final draft of the report, or relevant parts thereof, was sent to the 
following: 
The Pilot 
The Master, Second Mate and Helmsman, m.v. Peacock. 
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
A written submission was received from the Pilot, a joint 
acknowledgement from the Master and Second Mate, and written 
comment from AMSA. The text of the report has been amended 
where it was considered appropriate. 
The Pilot's submission also contained the following comments: 
"/am not aware of having suffered from the symptoms of sleep 
apnoea apart from snoring. I have had no sudden waking in the 
middle of the night for no apparent reason and have never discussed 
such a condition with any medical practitioner whom I have 
consulted. 
"/question the suggestion that my diet should be considered to be 
inadequate, given that I have had a regular pattern of eating reduced 
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sugars and fats for three years. There has been no reduction in my 
energy or stamina levels during this period. 
"I was not aware of any actual fatigue or its symptoms nor did I 
foresee that I would suffer fatigue (Conclusion no.5) despite the fact 
that I had experienced a high proportion of working nights during 
which I had a disrupted sleep. 
"Prior to June 1993 pilots had no distractions from their pilotage 
duties apart from those associated with normal living. However, it is 
now a different matter as there are continuous concerns felt by pilots 
with respect to competition currently existing between the pilotage 
services and the general uncertainty that ensues from this 
circumstance. Both income and sufficient recreational time are 
matters of concern noting that the pressure of work is stressfal 
enough without adding these other factors. Pilots today have these 
distractions to cope with in addition to their pilotage duties. In my 
view it all adds up to the placement of extra stress on pilots. It is my 
view that some responsibility for this situation rests with the 
authorities, in particular noting their obligations in respect of the 
maintenance of an efficient and safe pilotage system and the integral 
factor in achieving this, namely the conditions and environment 
under which pilots are required to earn their livelihood. " 
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Details of Peacock 
Former name Southern Cross 
IMO No. 8518819 
Flag Panama 
Classification Society Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 
Ship type Refrigerated cargo/vehicles 
Owner Libero Panama S.A. 
Operator Shunko Shipping Corp, 
Tokyo 
Year of build 1986 
Builder Kochi Jyuko K K, Japan 
Gross tonnage 4964 
Net tonnage 3036 
Summer deadweight 6541 tonnes 
Length overall 124.70 m 
Breadth, extreme 17.80 m 
Draught (summer) 7.317 m 
Engine Mitsubishi 6 cylinder diesel 
Engine power 5149 kW 
Crew 19 Korean and Indonesian 
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Annex 1 
Bridge Watchkeeping 
Regulation II/l .6(b) of the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978: 
"During the watch the course steered, position and speed shall be 
checked at sufficiently frequent intervals, ... to ensure that the ship 
follows the planned course." 
Regulation II/1.8(b): 
"On taking over the watch the relieving officer shall satisfy himself as 
to the ship's estimated or true position and confirm its intended track, 
course and speed and shall note any dangers to navigation expected to 
be encountered during his watch." 
Regulation II/l.8(c): 
"A proper record shall be kept of the movements and activities during 
the watch relating to the navigation of the ship." 
Regulation 11/1.10: 
"Despite the duties and obligations of a pilot, his presence on board 
does not relieve the master or officer in charge of the watch from their 
duties and obligations for the safety of the ship. ... The master and 
officer of the watch shall co-operate closely with the pilot and 
maintain an accurate check of the ship's position and movement." 
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Paragraph 3.10.3 of the International Chamber of Shipping's Bridge 
Procedures Guide: 
"The officer of the watch should co-operate closely with the pilot to 
assist him where possible and to maintain an accurate check on the 
ship's position and movements. If the officer of the watch becomes 
unsure of the pilot's actions or intentions, he should seek clarification 
and, if still in doubt, should inform the master immediately and take 
the necessary action before the master arrives on the bridge." 
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APPENDIX 2 
NUDIST® REPORT 
An example of the format of a NUDIS~ report, in this 
instance a report on the conclusions of all reports indexed 
against node (1 2 3) /Fatigue/Fatigue Behaviours/ 
l.P.deficiencies giving all conclusions coded as information-
processing deficiencies. 
Q.S.R. NUD*IST Power version, revision 4.0. 
Licensee: Richard Phillips. 
PROJECT: Proj 98, User Richard, 1:19 am, Dec 16, 2002. 
********************************************************************** 
********** 
(1 2 3) /Fatigue/Fatigue Behaviours/I.P.deficiencies 
*** Definition: 
encoding, interpretation, correlation, processing. 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 102ColumbVic/SampHp 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 19, 11% 
*Conclusions 
13 
++ Text units 15-15: 
1. The Master and Officers on Columbus Victoria took insufficient 
account 
of the increase in wind strength and the likelihood that pronounced 
yawing could trip the anchor out of its holding ground. 
15 -
++ Text units 17-17: 
3. The 2000 anchor position did not appear to cause concern to the 
watchkeepers on Columbus Victoria and any ambiguity between the 2000 
position and other positions plotted on the chart was not resolved. 
17 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 103Nimb/MareskT 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 13, 
*Conclusions 
6 
++ Text units 11-11: 
7.7% 
3. With Maersk Tapah's automatic radar plotting aid giving 
inconsistent 
data for the vessels being overtaken, the Second Mate did not use 
compass 
bearings to establish whether the bearings of the vessels being 
overtaken 
were altering appreciably. 
11 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 1130sco Star 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 29, 
*Conclusions. 
12 
++ Text units 15-15: 
6.9% 
2. A proper appraisal of the possible movement of the cyclone was not 
made, and no account taken of the steady fall in barometric pressure 
and 
lack of wind directional shift, which resulted in Osco Star passing 
close 
to the centre of the cyclone. 
15 
++ Text units 17-17: 
4. Reliance was placed upon the wind conditions being experienced 
beyond 
the immediate area of effect of the cyclone, rather than on the Bureau 
Of 
Meteorology's predicted wind strengths. 
17 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 116ExterminUnisina 
+++Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 17, = 5.9% 
*Conclusions. 
9 
++Text units 13-13: 
2. A proper appraisal of the situation was not carried out by the 
watch 
Officer, by using either visual bearings or radar, before he altered 
course to starboard. 
13 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 117Tiao Frontier 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 15, 13% 
*Conclusions. 
7 
++ Text units 9-10: 
1 The pilot ladder was rigged on the weather side, preventing the 
Pilots 
from boarding until a lee had been provided. 
9 
2 The lack of any planning of the approach, with no delineation of 
danger 
areas or safety limits on the chart, or consideration of possible 
contingencies. 
10 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 120Dakshine ••. 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 16, = 6.2% 
*Conclusions. 
7 
++ Text units 16-16: 
9. The assumption made by the 3rd Mate that the problem was not the 
engine but the steering, and any confusion that caused, occurred at 
such 
a time that his actions did not alter the outcome. 
16 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 123RivYar/Trotter 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 22, 4.5% 
*Conclusions. 11 
++ Text units 18-18: 
6. The lack of appreciation by the Pilot and Master of the difficulty 
in 
controlling the directional stability of W J Trotter when towing stern 
first at speed. 
18 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 126PineTrust 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 18, 11% 
*Conclusions. 
8 
++ Text units 14-14: 
2. Inadequate monitoring by the Pilot of the position of the vessel, 
prior to passage of beacon No. 10, till the vessel grounded. 
14 
++ Text units 16-16: 
4. Inadequate monitoring of the vessel's position by the Master. 
16 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 127NOL Amber 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 18, 11% 
*Conclusions. 
8 
++ Text units 14-15: 
5.The Pilot did not fully evaluate the situation regarding River 
Embley 
before deciding which way to turn the vessel. 
14 
6.At the start of the turn, the Master did not satisfy himself that 
the 
vessel had sufficient room in which to carry out the manoeuvre. 
15 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 27Sanko Harvest 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 16, = 6.2% 
*Inserted sub-header •.. 
6 
++ Text units 9-9: 
1. The lack of appreciation by the Master and Second Officer (and 
other 
officers who were aware of the planned approach to Esperance) of the 
warnings contained on the charts and Australian Sailing Directions, 
Volume 1. 
9 
+++++t++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 36Jovian Loop 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 21, 
*Inserted sub-header ..• 
5 
++ Text units 15-15: 
4.8% 
5. When taking over the watch at 0355 the Mate failed to pick up the 
discrepancy between the course line drawn on the chart (15200) and the 
course being steered as handed over by the 2nd mate (13500). 
15 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 37TNT Carpentaria 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 3 units out of 23, 13% 
*Inserted sub-header •.• 
9 
++ Text units 14-15: 
3. The Master and Mate failed to fix the ship's position before the 
turn to port was made and failed to monitor the ship's position 
through 
the course of the turn. 
14 
4. The Master and Mate failed to properly assess the option of 
turning 
to starboard. 
15 
++ Text units 18-18: 
7. The Master, having completed a passage plan, did not properly 
appraise and appreciate the significance of the transmissions from 
tidal 
stations. 
18 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 39Daishowa Maru 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 18, 11% 
*Inserted sub-header •.. 
6 
++ Text units 11-11: 
3. The strong wind and high swell warnings issued by the Bureau of 
Meteorology should have indicated to the Master that, under the 
forecast 
conditions, the Twofold Bay Quarantine Anchorage was not safe, 
placing 
the ship on a lee shore. 
11 
++ Text units 14-14: 
6. In his concern to head the ship to the east and pick up the 
anchor, 
the Master failed to fully evaluate the situation and consider 
alternative actions. 
14 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 41Longevity/Blue G 
+++Retrieval for this document:3 units out of 18, = 17% 
*Inserted sub-header ••• 
6 
++Text units 11-12: 
3. The Master failed to properly ascertain the situation with 
respect 
to the Blue Goose of Arne and whether it was safe to alter course to 
180 
degrees. 
11 
4. The Master also failed, having altered course to 180 degrees, to 
ascertain whether a safe situation existed, before handing over the 
watch to the Second Mate. 
12 
++ Text units 14-14: 
6. The Second Mate's actions were directed by the recommendations of 
the Master, not as a result of a correct assessment of the situation. 
14 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 48Wyuna 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 20, 
*Inserted sub-header ••• 
7 
++ Text units 14-14: 
5.0% 
5. The Master's conclusion that the radar information was wrong and 
that the Wyuna had grounded on the northern shore of Mid Pasco Island 
was erroneous. 
14 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 52Malinska 
+++Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 24, = 4.2% 
*Inserted sub-header .•• 
7 
++ Text units 12-12: 
3. The Master failed to fully assess the situation before altering 
course to starboard, placing undue reliance on the ARPA, mis-reading 
or 
misinterpreting the distance to the collision point, and failing to 
check the ship's position. 
12 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 54LibraSankoHeron 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 16, 
*Inserted sub-header •.• 
7 
++ Text units 14-14: 
6.2% 
3. The skipper of the yacht was unaware that he was crossing a major 
shipping lane. 
14 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 65Searoad Mersey 
+++Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 17, 5.9% 
*Inserted sub-header •.• 
6 
++ Text units 11-11: 
3. The Master's conservative use of propeller pitch, giving a 
reduced 
rate of turn, together with the delay in the commencement of the turn 
and wind drift due to the easterly wind, resulted in the turn being 
too 
wide. 
11 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 66Boa Force 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 31, = 6.5% 
*Inserted sub-header ••• 
13 
++ Text units 21-22: 
5. The lack of appreciation on board Support Station III of the 
problems in manoeuvring an off-shore anchor handling vessel in a 
relatively confined area for a prolonged period without an effective 
point of reference. 
21 
6. The failure of the job safety analysis to properly take into 
account 
the operational safety issues of an unmarked subsea well. 
22 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 70Cape Grafton 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 31, 
*Inserted sub-header .•. 
11 
++ Text units 16-16: 
3.2% 
2. There is little doubt that, had those on the bridge and in the 
engine room worked together properly, had the Master thoroughly 
understood the operation of the propulsion system and the steering, 
had 
the secondary systems and local controls available in an emergency 
been 
appreciated and had these been utilised, the grounding could have 
been 
prevented. 
16 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 75Conus 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 16, = 12% 
*Inserted sub-header •.• 
7 
++ Text units 10-11: 
1. The Pilot did not plan the undocking and take full account of the 
wind strength and direction. 
10 
2. The Pilot and Master did not jointly consider any sailing plan 
for 
Conus, taking into account the prevailing conditions, rather they 
relied 
on a 'standard' departure which did not take into account the 
possible 
effect of the wind or tide. 
11 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 78Bulkazores 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 16, 12% 
*Inserted sub-header ••• 
9 
++ Text units 12-13: 
The grounding of Bulkazores in shoal water off Kendrew Island, 
Western 
Australia, on 24 February 1995, was caused by poor seamanship, in that 
Bulkazores did not clear the area when the tropical cyclone changed 
direction and moved towards the Dampier Archipelago, as a result of 
which 
the vessel came within the dangerous semicircle of the cyclone and was 
trapped on a lee shore. 
12 
Other decisions and actions, both before Bulkazorres arrived at 
Dampier 
and after it was instructed to leave Dampier Roads anchorage, are 
considered to have contributed to the incident: The initial 
recommendation of the weather routing consultant was disregarded, 
probably in order that Bulkazores would arrive before a competing 
vessel 
and, apparently, without taking into account the known behaviour of 
tropical cyclones off the north-west coast of Australia and their 
propensity to curve towards the coast. 
13 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 83Iron Baron 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 24, 
*Inserted sub-header .•• 
10 
++ Text units 16-16: 
4.2% 
2. Due consideration was not paid to the effects of the strong 
northerly wind and south flowing flood tide when manoeuvring to pick 
up 
the Pilot. 
16 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 86NewNob/Goonz 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 5 units out of 28, 18% 
*Inserted sub-header ••• 
14 
++ Text units 20-21: 
3. The need to monitor the shipis position from a consistent set of 
reference marks was not fully appreciated by the Master and officers 
on 
board New Noble. 
20 
4. The limitations of the anchors was not fully appreciated by New 
Nobleis Master. 
21 
++ Text units 23-24: 
6. New Nobleis Master was preoccupied with the recovery of the anchor 
and did not drive the ship ahead, either dragging the anchor or 
releasing 
the bitter end and allowing it to pay out, while the opportunity 
existed. 23 
7. New Nobleis Master undertook no contingency planning regarding 
recovery of the anchor, nor did he think through his intended action 
or 
make any realistic assessment of how long it would take to recover the 
anchor. 
24 
++ Text units 27-27: 
10. Goonzaranis Master had the option of slipping his shipis anchor 
cable and this may have avoided the collision. 
27 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 90Carabao 1 
+++Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 17, = 12% 
*Conclusions 
7 
++ Text units 10-10: 
1. Faced with a deviation from the usual operational procedures, the 
Harbour Master did not fully evaluate the changed circumstances and 
assess what appropriate action was required. 
10 
++ Text units 12-12: 
3. The phenomenon of tunnel, or narrowing field vision while the 
Harbour 
Master was executing the turn around Old Man Rock. 
12 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 91BogDua/Midas 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 2 units out of 22, 
*Inserted sub-header .•. 
7 
++ Text units 18-18: 
9.1% 
5. Knowing there was to be a lengthy time at anchor before berthing 
and 
knowing the exposed nature of the anchorage, the Master of Bogasari 
Dua 
did not consider using more anchor cable to improve the holding 
capability of the anchor, or consider ballasting the vessel down to 
reduce its windage area. 
18 
++ Text units 21-21: 
8. The Master of Midas did not consider the slipping of his anchor 
cable 
as an option open to him. 
21 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 96Niaga 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 18, 
*Conclusions 
9 
++ Text units 16-16: 
5.6% 
4. A lack of any realistic assessment by the Master or deck officers 
of 
the risks involved while drifting off Christmas Island, together with 
the 
lack of planning and deter~ination of sensible safety margins. 
16 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: 98FV Galaxy/Alam Tenggiri 
+++ Retrieval for this document: 1 unit out of 18, 
*Conclusions 
10 
++ Text units 13-13: 
5.6% 
o The Second Mate on Alam Tenggiri, having seen the light of the 
vessel 
bein9 overtaken, did not keep a proper lookout in that he did not make 
a 
full and effective appraisal of the situation and of the risk of 
collision. 
13 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
++++++++++ 
+++ Total number of text units retrieved = 47 
+++ Retrievals in 28 out of 100 documents, = 28%. 
+++ The documents with retrievals have a total of 561 text units, 
so text units retrieved in these documents = 8.4%. 
+++ All documents have a total of 1966 text units, 
so text units found in these documents = 2.4%. 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
++++++++++ 
